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Mobile crowdsensing (MCS) is an emerging form of crowdsourcing, which fa-
cilitates the sensing data collection with the help of mobile participants (workers).
A central problem in MCS is the assignment of sensing tasks to workers. Existing
work in the field mostly seek a system-level optimization of task assignments (e.g.,
maximize the number of completed tasks, minimize the total distance traveled by
workers) without considering individual preferences of task requesters and workers.
However, users may be reluctant to participate in MCS campaigns that disregard
their preferences. In this dissertation, we argue that user preferences should be a
primary concern in the task assignment process for an MCS campaign to be effective,
and we develop preference-aware task assignment (PTA) mechanisms for five different
MCS settings. We first look at the PTA problem in a setting, where the objective
of task requesters is to maximize their additive utility functions based on worker
qualities by recruiting multiple high-quality workers within their budgets, and that
of workers is to maximize their profits. Following that, we consider a more general
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model that allows for non-additive, coverage-based utility functions to describe task
requester preferences. We then study the PTA problem in a setting with uncertain
and uncontrollable worker trajectories, where the assignments have to be made in
an online manner based on the visits of workers to task regions unfolding in real
time. Next, we consider a semi-controlled mobility setting, where workers are asked
to provide multiple paths they find acceptable between their starting locations and
destinations. Finally, we investigate the problem of finding a maximum size task as-
signment that satisfies user preferences as much as possible. Since the PTA problem
is computationally hard in most of these settings, we present efficient approximation
and heuristic algorithms. Extensive simulations performed on synthetic and real data
sets validate our theoretical results, and demonstrate that the proposed algorithms
produce near-optimal solutions in terms of preference-awareness, outperforming the




Mobile crowdsensing (MCS) is an emerging form of crowdsourcing that aims to ac-
complish spatiotemporal sensing tasks with the help of mobile participants (workers).
It connects the entities that need to collect a certain type of sensing data from a
set of regions of interest with the individuals who are willing to perform the desired
sensing tasks for them in return for monetary rewards or voluntarily to support the
cause of the sensing campaign (e.g., environmental protection [1]). Notable recent
applications of MCS can be found in various fields such as urban planning [2], public
safety [3], and indoor localization [4]. A recent study [5] also discusses the timely
applications of MCS in Spain to address the COVID-19 outbreak. Typical sensing
tasks in MCS include recording noise pollution for a urban planning system [2] and
taking pictures of buildings for a place naming system [6].
According to the involvement level of workers, MCS applications can be classi-
fied into two types [7]: participatory and opportunistic. In the former, workers are
expected to travel to the regions of the assigned sensing tasks by interrupting their
own schedules for a period of time, while in the latter they are asked to perform a
sensing task if they are already in or close to the task region. Thus, participatory
MCS campaigns usually have shorter task completion times as workers are immedi-
ately dispatched to the task regions. However, they require workers to devote their
resources and time to carry out the assigned tasks, which introduces significant extra
costs for workers who then need to be compensated for these costs by task requesters.
Opportunistic MCS campaigns, on the other hand, only deal with the costs of
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sensing and delivery of the sensed data, which tend to be much smaller compared
to the time and travel costs incurred in participatory MCS campaigns. However,
for opportunistic MCS campaigns to function effectively, the assignment of sensing
tasks to workers should be made very efficiently especially under capacity or budget
constraints [8], because the assignment opportunities hinge upon the presence of
workers in the task regions, and they emerge and vanish as workers move.
Accordingly, a pivotal problem in both participatory and opportunistic MCS
campaigns is the assignment of sensing tasks to workers. In fact, the utility of an
MCS system is generally quantified by the quality of the assignments made by the
adopted task assignment algorithm. However, the quality of assignments has been
measured differently in the literature. For example, some studies [36, 11] favor the
assignments that minimize the travel distance of workers, while others [39, 12] prefer
those that maximize the total quality of service (QoS) received by task requesters.
Despite the variety of existing task assignment algorithms [40], the ultimate goal of
the assignment is mostly defined as the maximization of a system utility without
considering the individual user needs and preferences. However, such solutions may
result in dissatisfied users and impair their future participation, as users in practice
may not want to sacrifice their individual convenience for the system utility.
Preference-awareness has been extensively studied in general bipartite matching
problems especially in the economics literature [41] under the name of stable match-
ing problem. However, these studies do not tackle the issues peculiar to MCS such
as budget constraints of task requesters, uncertain matching opportunities due to
unknown worker trajectories, and time constraints of tasks. In this dissertation, we
study the preference-aware (or stable) task assignment problem in MCS in a variety of
settings. Below, we first discuss the benefits of considering the concept of preference-
awareness (or stability) in the task assignment process of an MCS campaign, and
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then summarize our contributions.
Stability is an important concept in matching problems with selfish and rational
individuals. In broad terms, it defines the satisfaction of users with their assignments.
A stable matching promotes long-term user participation by making certain that users
are not upset by being forced into less favorable assignments whilst there are better
options available. Thus, considering stability in the matching process is not only
beneficial for task requesters and workers, but also for the platform.
The goal with the stability is to ensure that no user u (i.e., a worker or a re-
quester) can lay claim to have deserved a better assignment. That is, all the possible
assignments that user u prefers1 more than his/her current assignment in the stable
matching are matched with someone they prefer to user u; thus, they would not like
to break up with their current assignments to get matched with user u. This ensures
that workers will be satisfied with their assignments and will be motivated to carry
out their tasks, which will in turn improve their performance [43] and the quality of
results. Moreover, this also ensures that task requesters will obtain the most benefit
while respecting the workers’ preferences.
A stable matching solution based on individual user preferences also allows incor-
porating various metrics that are appraised uniquely by each user. For example, the
priority of a worker might be the proximity to the task location, so he would form his
preference list in a way that the closer tasks precede the others. On the other hand,
another worker who does not mind traveling long distances can form his preference
list solely based on the rewards he will be paid. Moreover, they can even reflect their
own personal interests in their preference lists such as location of tasks being close to
1When we use the active voice for a task (e.g., prefers, pays a reward), we mean
the person/entity that corresponds to it, i.e., the task requester/owner. Also, we use
male and female subject pronouns for workers and tasks respectively as a reference
to the original stable marriage problem [42].
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their home or work, and pleasure of performing the tasks (e.g., preference for taking
pictures of a scene of interest over recording noise pollution).
Despite these benefits attached to stability, user preferences have been mostly
ignored in the existing literature on the task assignment problem in MCS. In this
dissertation, we study the preference-aware task assignment problem in various types
of MCS systems, define the stability conditions peculiar to MCS systems, develop
efficient task assignment algorithms, and conduct extensive experiments using real
and synthetic data sets to show their performances in comparison with the benchmark
task assignment algorithms. Our major contributions are as follows:
• In Chapter 3, we study the many-to-one stable task assignment problem in a
system model where task requesters aim to maximize the quality of sensing (or
service) they get by hiring multiple high-quality workers within their budget.
We prove that a stable matching may not exist in some MCS instances in this
model, and that it is NP-hard to find a stable matching (if exists). We propose
two different pseudo-polynomial time approximation algorithms, which produce
2-approximate and pairwise (i.e., a relaxed stability requirement) stable task as-
signments under certain assumptions about worker qualities and task rewards.
We also develop a pseudo-polynomial time heuristic algorithm that guarantees
the perfect happiness of at least one task requester. Through extensive sim-
ulations, we show that the proposed algorithms significantly outperform the
benchmark stable matching algorithms.
Related publication [44]: Fatih Yucel, Murat Yuksel, and Eyuphan Bulut.“QoS-
based budget constrained stable task assignment in mobile crowdsensing.” IEEE
Transactions on Mobile Computing (2020).
• In Chapter 4, we investigate the problem of finding a stable matching between
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workers that perform assigned tasks only in an opportunistic manner and com-
plex sensing tasks with coverage requirements. In presence of coverage require-
ments, the utility of workers for sensing tasks become non-additive (different
from the problem studied in Chapter 3, which deals with additive utility func-
tions based on worker qualities) due to overlaps in the regions covered by work-
ers. We begin by showing that the nonexistence and hardness results mentioned
above hold for this problem as well. We then present a polynomial-time task
assignment algorithm, and derive its (non-constant) approximation ratio. How-
ever, we prove that a variant of this algorithm has a constant approximation
ratio under the assumption that task rewards are proportional to coverage-based
utilities of workers. In simulations, we compare the performance of our algo-
rithms with the state-of-the-art task assignment algorithms that also consider
coverage requirements of task requesters, and show that our algorithms not
only make users happier with their assignments, but also achieve better system
utility scores in most of the scenarios examined.
Related publication [45]: Fatih Yucel, Murat Yuksel, and Eyuphan Bulut. “Cov-
erage-aware stable task assignment in opportunistic mobile crowdsensing.” IEEE
Transactions on Vehicular Technology (2021).
• In Chapter 5, we study the problem in an online setting, where workers per-
form sensing tasks only opportunistically, but their trajectories are uncertain
or unknown to the matching platform in advance. This introduces novel issues
such as uncertain matching opportunities between worker-task pairs, and makes
the existing stability conditions invalid. Thus, we first describe how to measure
stability in this online setting, and then present a method to compute the av-
erage utility of users in all possible (exponentially many) stable matchings in
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a given matching instance in polynomial-time, which enables us to make opti-
mal decisions in the online setting. We propose efficient online task assignment
algorithms for MCS systems with and without capacity constraints, and prove
their optimality. Extensive simulations performed on both synthetic and real
data sets validate our theoretical results, and demonstrate that the proposed
algorithms significantly outperform the existing solutions.
Related publication [46]: Fatih Yucel and Eyuphan Bulut. “Online stable task
assignment in opportunistic mobile crowdsensing with uncertain trajectories.”
IEEE Internet of Things Journal (2021).
• In Chapter 6, we consider a semi-opportunistic sensing mode, where workers are
asked to provide the matching platform with multiple paths they find accept-
able between their starting locations and destinations in order to alleviate the
problem of poor coverage in opportunistic MCS without forcing them to take
potentially much costlier and hence undesirable paths as in participatory MCS.
We formally define the stability conditions for this three-dimensional task as-
signment problem (i.e., workers/paths/tasks), and propose two polynomial-time
task assignment algorithms: an exact algorithm for systems with uniform worker
qualities, and a c-approximate algorithm for general systems (i.e., with/without
uniform worker qualities), where c is the number of the acceptable paths of the
worker with the largest set of acceptable paths. We also provide an empirical
analysis of the proposed algorithms.
Related publication: Fatih Yucel and Eyuphan Bulut. “Three-dimensional sta-
ble task assignment in semi-opportunistic mobile crowdsensing.” (Submitted for
publication).
• In Chapter 7, we consider the happiness of the matching platform as well as the
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happiness of the workers and task requesters. We assume that the happiness
of the matching platform is proportional to the number of matched users, and
study the problem of finding maximum size task assignments with as few un-
happy worker-task pairs as possible, which turns out to be NP-hard. We first
present an Integer Linear Programming model to solve the problem optimally.
Then, we propose two novel methods to adjust the number of matched users and
happiness of users in a given task assignment by re-matching a carefully-selected
user set. Based on these methods, we develop two polynomial-time heuristic
algorithms, and show via extensive simulations that they produce near-optimal
task assignments.
Related publication [47]: Fatih Yucel and Eyuphan Bulut. “User satisfaction
aware maximum utility task assignment in mobile crowdsensing.” Computer
Networks 172 (2020): 107156.
Next, we present a summary of the related work in Chapter 2. In the following
five chapters, we study the stable task assignment problem in different settings as




In this chapter, we review the recent studies on mobile crowdsensing and matching
under preferences. A comprehensive survey on mobile crowdsensing and a summary
of various matching problems with user preferences can be found in [48] and [49],
respectively.
2.1 Mobile Crowdsensing
Mobile crowdsensing has attracted a lot of attention recently, and a number of
studies have explored the issues that need to be addressed to realize its true potential.
One of the key problems investigated in these studies is the task assignment (or
worker recruitment) problem since the overall performance of an MCS system and
the satisfaction of its users are highly dependent on the efficiency of the assignments.
These studies have considered various objectives in the task assignment process such
as maximizing the number of completed tasks [25], minimizing the completion times
of tasks [13], minimizing the incentives provided to the users [14, 15, 29], assuring
the task or sensing quality [12] under some constraints on traveling distance [11],
energy consumption [39], and expenses of task requesters [26]. Beyond these works,
the issues of security [16], privacy [17, 18], and truthfulness [22, 19] have also been
considered in the worker recruitment process.
In participatory MCS, since workers need to travel between the task regions to
perform the assigned tasks, a key factor that shapes the task assignment process is the
travel costs of the workers. In [27], the authors investigate the problem of minimizing
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the total travel costs of the workers while maximizing the number of completed tasks
and keeping the rewards to be paid to the workers as low as possible. In [11], the
authors study the task assignment problem in an online setting, and aim to maximize
the total task quality while ensuring that the travel costs of the workers do not
exceed their individual travel budgets. In [20], the authors adopt a system model in
which each worker has a maximum travelling distance that needs to be considered in
the assignment process, and the objective is to maximize the profit of the platform.
The authors propose a deep reinforcement learning-based scheme that significantly
outperforms the other heuristic algorithms. In [21], the goal is also to minimize the
travel distance of workers, however, differently from the aforementioned studies, the
authors consider the issue of user privacy, and present a mechanism that finds the
task assignments without exposing any private information about workers or task
requesters. Lastly, in [28], the authors study the destination-aware task assignment
problem in participatory crowdsourcing systems. The unique aspect of this problem
is the constraint that each worker should be able to arrive at his destination by the
deadline he specifies, thus he cannot be assigned to too many tasks or tasks that are
far away from his destination.
On the other hand, in opportunistic MCS, the main objectives are to maximize
the coverage and to minimize the completion times of the tasks due to the uncontrolled
mobility (i.e., a task can only be performed if its region resides on the trajectory of a
worker). In [8], the authors study the maximum coverage task assignment problem in
opportunistic MCS with worker trajectories that are known beforehand. It is assumed
that each task needs to be performed at a certain point of interest and has a weight
that indicates how important its completion is to the platform, which has a fixed
budget and can hence recruit only so many workers. The objective of the platform
is to select a set of workers within the budget constraints, which maximizes the
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weighted coverage over the set of tasks according to the given trajectories of workers.
The authors develop a (1 − 1/e)-approximate algorithm with a time complexity of
O(n5), where n is the number of workers in the system. [9] studies the same problem,
and proposes a greedy algorithm that, despite not having a theoretical guarantee,
outperforms the algorithm proposed in [8] in terms of achieved coverage in certain
settings, and runs in O(n2) time.
The problem studied in [10] differs from those in [8] and [9] as it also considers
the delivery of the sensed data in an opportunistic manner. That is, after carrying
out a task, a worker should either deliver the sensed data to the server through one of
the collection points (i.e., WiFi APs) on his trajectory, or transmit it to another user
who will deliver it for him. Thus, here, not only does the platform need to estimate
whether and when workers would visit task regions and collection points, but it is
also crucial to obtain and utilize the encounter frequencies of workers to improve the
delivery probability of the sensed data. The authors present different approximation
algorithms for the systems with deterministic and uncertain worker trajectories, and
evaluate their performance on real data sets. The data delivery aspect of the problem
in [10] has also been studied in [23] and [24]. They both utilize Nash Bargaining
Theory to decide on whether or not selfish data collectors and mobile (relay) users
who only take part in delivery of sensed data would like to cooperate with each other
according to their utility in either scenario. However, in [24], the authors consider a
more complete mobile social network model and present an enhanced data collection
mechanism.
In [31], the problem of maximizing spatio-temporal coverage in vehicular mo-
bile crowdsensing with uncertain but predictable vehicle (i.e., worker) trajectories is
investigated. The authors first prove that the problem is NP-hard when there is a
budget constraint, and then propose a greedy approximation algorithm and a genetic
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algorithm. In [30], the authors also assume predictable worker trajectories. However,
they focus on the task assignment problem in a mobile social network where task
assignments and delivery of sensed data are realized in an online manner when task
requesters and workers encounter with each other. They aim to minimize the task
completion times, and propose different approximation algorithms to optimize both
worst-case and average-case performance. For predictions of worker trajectories, [31]
uses spatio-temporal trajectory matrices, while [30] assumes that user inter-meeting
times follow an exponential distribution, which is used widely in mobile social net-
works [50, 51, 52] literature.
There are a few recent studies [37, 38] that look at the task assignment problem in
a hybrid system model to integrate the advantages of participatory and opportunis-
tic MCS. In [37], the authors propose a two-phased task allocation process, where
opportunistic task assignment is followed by participatory task assignment. The ob-
jective behind this design is to maximize the number of tasks that are performed in
an opportunistic manner, which is much less costly compared to participatory MCS,
and then to ensure that the tasks that cannot be completed by opportunistic workers
are assigned to workers that are willing to perform tasks in a participatory manner
to alleviate the coverage problem in opportunistic MCS. On the other hand, in [38],
the workers carry out the sensing tasks only in opportunistic mode, but they provide
the matching platform with multiple paths that they would take if requested, instead
of a single path as in classic opportunistic MCS. This enables the platform to find a
matching with a high task coverage.
2.2 Matching under Preferences
Stable Matching (SM) problem is introduced in the seminal paper of Gale and
Shapley [42] and can simply be defined as the problem of finding a matching between
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two groups of objects such that no pair of objects favor each other over their partners
in the matching. Gale and Shapley have also introduced what is called the deferred ac-
ceptance procedure that finds stable matchings in both one-to-one matching scenarios
(i.e., stable marriages) and many-to-one matching scenarios with capacity constraints
(i.e., stable college admissions) in O(mn) time, where m and n are the size of the
sets being matched (e.g., men/women, colleges/students, workers/tasks). Since its
introduction in [42], the concept of stability has been utilized in different problems
including hospital resident assignment [53], resource allocation in device-to-device
communications [54], SDN controller assignment in data center networks [55], and
supplier and demander matching in electric vehicle charging [56].
Since there can be multiple stable matchings in a matching instance, finding
the best SM in terms of another performance metric has received a lot of attention.
First, [57] proves that the set of matched nodes is identical in all stable matchings,
therefore all stable matchings are of the same size. [58] studies the problem of finding
sex-equal stable matchings where the difference between the quality of the matching
for two sides (e.g., men/women) of the matching is minimum. The authors prove that
the problem is NP-hard and propose a polynomial time approximation algorithm.
[59] focuses on the maximum weighted stable matching problem, which turns out to
be solvable in O(N4 logN) time (N = max{m,n}) and remains as one of the few
significant optimal stable matching problems that are solvable in polynomial time.
Note that an explicit method to solve these problems and all optimal stable matching
problems is simply to enumerate all stable matchings and find the best according
to the utility metric considered. In fact, [60] proposes an algorithm that iterates all
stable matchings in a matching instance of size N in O(N2 +N |S|) time, where S is
the set of all stable matchings in the instance. However, since the number of stable
matchings (|S|) can be massive even for small problem sizes (e.g., the maximum
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number of stable matching for a matching instance of size N = 32 is larger than
1011) and grows exponentially with increasing problem size [61], this method (i.e.,
enumerating stable matchings to find the optimal one) would be a feasible solution
only in a very limited set of scenarios.
In a given matching instance with preferences, the number of the matched users
in a stable matching may be significantly less than that in a maximum size matching
if the preferences of some users are incomplete (i.e., they prefer being unmatched
to being matched with some users on the other side). When this is the case, it
may be desirable to find a maximum size matching that satisfies users based on
their preferences as much as possible. This issue is firstly addressed in [62] from
a theoretical perspective, and it has been shown that given a matching instance
with incomplete preference lists, the problem of finding a matching of maximum size
with as few blocking/unhappy pairs as possible is NP-hard and is not approximable
within a constant factor. In other words, there cannot exist a polynomial time c-
approximation algorithm that would produce matchings with at most c× β unhappy
pairs unless P=NP, where c is a constant (≥ 1) and β is the number of blocking pairs
in the optimal matching. In the SM literature, the idea of relaxing the stability in
order to achieve a better matching in terms of another utility has also been studied
under the concept of almost stable matchings, but these studies [63, 64] have mostly
focused on reducing the running time by sacrificing from the stability, for which they
propose truncated versions of the deferred acceptance procedure.
Some matching problems allow or require nodes in one or both sides to be
matched with multiple nodes (i.e., many-to-one and many-to-many matching prob-
lems). A few studies investigate the issue of stability in such matching problems. For
instance, [65] and [66] study the many-to-one stable matching of students-colleges
and doctors-hospitals, respectively. In [65], all colleges define a utility and a wage
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value for students, and aim to hire the best set of students (i.e., with the highest
total utility) within their budget constraints. Each student also forms a preference
list over colleges. The authors prove that there may not exist a stable matching in
this setting and even checking the existence is NP-hard. However, they provide a
polynomial time algorithm that finds pairwise stable matchings in the so called typed
weighted model where students are categorized into groups (e.g., Master’s and PhD
students) and colleges are restricted to define a set of possible wages for each group
(i.e., they cannot define a particular wage for each student). [66] studies the same
problem and proposes two different fully polynomial-time approximation algorithms
with some performance guarantee in terms of coalitional stability for general and
proportional (i.e., the wage of doctors are proportional to their utility for hospitals)
settings. However, the study does not provide an experimental analysis of the algo-
rithms or discuss their actual/expected performance in these settings. Moreover, the
proposed solutions can only be applied to a limited set of scenarios.
There are some studies that look at the stable matching problem in settings
with incomplete information on user preferences or dynamic user arrivals/departures.
[67] and [68] both study the dynamic stable taxi dispatching problem considering
passenger and taxi preferences. However, the objective adopted in [68] is to find
locally optimal stable assignments for a given time-point, whereas that in [67] is to
minimize the number of unhappy taxi-passenger pairs globally. [69] investigates the
stable matching problem in the presence of uncertainty in user preferences. [70] looks
at the problem of minimizing the number of partner changes that need to be made in
a stable matching to maintain stability when preference profiles of some users change
in time. Lastly, [71] studies an interesting combination of famous stable marriage and
secretary (hiring) problems.
The concept of stability is studied in multi-dimensional matching problems as
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well. In [72], the authors introduce the three-dimensional stable matching problem.
In this problem, there are three sets of different types, each individual from a set
has a preference list over all pairs from the other two sets, and the goal is to form
stable/satisfactory families of three, where each individual in a family is a member
of a different set. Wu [73] investigates a different version of this problem, where
each individual has a one-dimensional preference list over the individuals from the
other two sets instead of over all pairs of individuals as in [72]. In [74], the authors
extend the stable roommates problem [75] to a three-dimensional setting, where a
set of individuals are assigned into groups of three instead of two based on their
preferences. Lastly, in [76], the authors study the problem of matching data sources,
servers, and users in a stable manner in video streaming services under restricted
preference settings.
In a typical MCS system, the objectives of workers and task requesters can be
defined as to maximize their profits and to have their tasks completed with the highest
quality possible, respectively. Thus, they are likely to have preferences over possible
assignments they can get, and the task assignment in MCS can be consequently
characterised as a matching problem under preferences. However, apart from the
work in this dissertation, there are only a few studies that consider user preferences
in mobile crowdsensing (or in mobile crowdsourcing). In [32], the authors study the
budget-constrained many-to-many stable task assignment problem, which they prove
to be NP-hard, and propose efficient approximation algorithms. In [33], the authors
study the same problem, but in a system model with capacity constraints. On the
other hand, [34] considers a many-to-one matching setting and introduce additional
constraints (e.g., minimum task quality requirements) that are taken into account in
the matching process, along with user preferences. Lastly, in [35], the authors consider




















Fig. 1. A summary of related work. If a study considers a quality-based additive util-
ity function, or adopts a system-level objective disregarding user preferences,
then it is, respectively, placed outside of the ‘Coverage-based utility function’
and ‘Preference-awareness’ boxes. If it assumes a participatory sensing mode
with controllable worker trajectories, then it is placed outside of both ‘Uncer-
tain worker trajectories’ and ‘Fixed worker trajectories’ boxes, which contain
the related work that assume an opportunistic sensing mode. [36], [37], [38],
and Chap. 6 are on the borders of these two boxes, as [36] studies the task
assignment problem in participatory and opportunistic (with uncertain worker
trajectories) MCS separately, [37] considers a hybrid model, where an oppor-
tunistic sensing process is followed by a participatory one to reduce costs, and
[38] and Chap. 6 assume a semi-opportunistic sensing mode with partly con-
trollable worker trajectories. Lastly, our work in Chapter 7, which considers
both overall system utility and user preferences in the task assignment process,
is accordingly on the border of the ‘Preference-awareness’ box.
tasks, and presents an exponential-time algorithm to find weakly-stable many-to-one




QOS-ORIENTED PREFERENCE-AWARE TASK ASSIGNMENT
WITH BUDGET CONSTRAINTS
3.1 Introduction
Most of the existing work in the MCS literature aim to maximize a predefined
system utility (e.g., quality of service or sensing) in the task assignment process,
however users (i.e., task requesters and workers) may value different parameters and
hence find an assignment unsatisfying if it is produced by disregarding these parame-
ters that define their preferences. While several studies utilize incentive mechanisms
to motivate user participation in different ways, they do not take individual user pref-
erences into account either. Besides, the existing approaches to find preference-aware
matchings between two groups of objects (e.g., men/women, students/colleges) do
not work in MCS systems that contain task requesters with budget constraints, and
that require many-to-one or many-to-many assignments between tasks and workers.
In this chapter, we focus on these issues, and study the problem of finding many-
to-one, preference-aware task assignments in MCS systems with task requesters that
aim to maximize the quality of sensing (QoS) they get by recruiting high-quality
workers within a given budget. We begin by defining the criteria for stability as
the existing ones are not applicable to our setting due to its unique requirements
(i.e., multiple assignments and budget constraints). We then provide a classification
of MCS systems based on their reward scheme and QoS setting, and present three
different algorithms that find optimal or near-optimal task assignments in terms of
stability in different types of MCS systems.
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Our key contributions in this chapter can be summarized as follows:
• We present QoS-based stability conditions under budget constraints in many-to-
one MCS systems, and discuss existence and hardness results for stable match-
ings in different types of MCS systems.
• We propose a polynomial time algorithm to find pairwise stable matchings in
MCS systems in which the preference profiles of tasks are identical (i.e., uniform
MCS system), which is a significant improvement from the exponential time
algorithm proposed in [35]. Also, our algorithm does not require the rewards
that workers will be paid to be proportional with the corresponding QoS they
provide (i.e., proportional MCS system), while [35] does.
• Despite the nonexistence results for pairwise stable matchings in general set-
tings, we prove that there always exists a pairwise stable matching in a pro-
portional MCS system by providing a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm that
always finds pairwise stable matchings in these systems. Furthermore, this al-
gorithm outperforms all the benchmark algorithms in terms of pairwise stability
regardless of the type of the MCS system.
• We propose a heuristic algorithm that also runs in pseudo-polynomial time and
produces considerably higher quality assignments in terms of overall stability
and user happiness compared to the benchmark algorithms especially in pro-
portional MCS systems.
• In addition to the theoretical analysis of the proposed algorithms, we provide ex-
tensive simulation results where we compare the performance of our algorithms




We assume a system model with a set of workersW = {w1, w2, . . . , wn} and a set
of sensing tasks T = {t1, t2, . . . , tm}. Let ct(w) denote the cost of performing task t
for worker w, which may be calculated by taking into account various factors such as
the time and cost required to travel to the task location and perform the task, energy
consumption on the worker’s device due to sensing, and privacy risks to the worker.
Also, let rt(w) denote the reward that worker w is offered to carry out task t. We
assume ct(w) and rt(w) to have a financial value so that rt(w) − ct(w) is simply the
profit worker w would make by performing task t. Additional cost functions can be
used to determine the eligibility of the workers for the tasks based on worker resources
and task requirements (e.g., to check whether a worker has sufficient residual battery
power in his sensing device to carry out a given task).
Since a rational worker will aim to maximize his profit and will not accept to
perform the tasks that cost higher than the corresponding rewards he will be paid,
we can define the preference list of worker w as
Pw = ti1 , ti2 , . . . , tik (3.1)
where Pw ⊆ T , ∀t ∈ Pw, rt(w) > ct(w), and ∀t′ = tij , t′′ = tij+1 , rt′(w) − ct′(w) >
rt′′(w) − ct′′(w). We denote the jth task (tij) in Pw by Pw(j) and utilize t′ ≻w t′′
notation to express that t′ precedes t′′ in Pw. For each worker w, ≻w is a strict
relation, so even if two tasks provide the same gain to worker w, we assume that he
prefers one over another (i.e., no ties are allowed). Note that in our system model, we
only need the preference profiles of workers, so a worker can form his preference list
himself by estimating his profit from each task using the announced rewards for the
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tasks on the platform2 and then submit only the list to the platform. Alternatively,
he can submit an estimated cost value for each task to the platform, which can then
form his preference list based on this information.
On the other hand, a rational task requester will try to maximize the total
quality of service/sensing (QoS) she gets from the workers she hires within her budget
constraint. Let qt(w) denote the QoS that worker w can provide for task t, which may
be based on various factors such as the quality of the sensing device and the average
satisfaction of the task requesters that have hired worker w in the past. Also, let bt
denote the budget of task t. Then, we can define the preference list of task t as
Pt = S1, S2, . . . , Sk (3.2)
where ∀S ∈ Pt, S ⊆ W and
∑
w∈S rt(w) ≤ bt, and ∀Si, Si+1 ∈ Pt,
∑
w∈Si qt(w) ≥∑
w∈Si+1 qt(w). Note that we allow ties in preference lists of tasks as it is very likely
for tasks to have multiple sets with an equal total quality value in their preference
list. Thus, a task is said to prefer a set S ′ of workers to another set S ′′ of workers
only if S ′ has a greater total quality value than S ′′. For ease of reading, we let
rt(S) =
∑
w∈S rt(w), qt(S) =
∑
w∈S qt(w) and use S




Given a worker-task pair (w, t), we assume that ∄S ∈ Pt : w ∈ S if worker w finds
task t unacceptable (i.e., rt(w) <= ct(w)). Also, in MCS systems where the rewards
are determined by the server instead of the task requesters, we might have rt(w) > bt
for a worker-task pair (w, t). In this case, if t ∈ Pw, we remove task t from Pw as the
2Throughout this dissertation, we assume that workers and task requesters have
a perfect communication medium through a central server (matching platform), and
that the delivery of sensed data from a worker to a task requester is either realized
using the central server as an intermediary, or via a direct communication channel
between the worker and the task requester, which is established by the central server.
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Notation Description
W , T Set of workers and tasks, respectively
n, m Number of workers and tasks, respectively
M Many-to-one task assignment
ct(w) Cost of performing task t for worker w
qt(w) QoS that worker w can provide for task t
qt(S) Total QoS that S ⊆ W can provide for task t
Qt(S) List of QoS that workers in S can provide for task t
rt(w) Reward offered to worker w by task t
rt(S) Total reward offered to S ⊆ W by task t
Rt(S) List of rewards offered to workers in S by task t
bt Budget of task t
β maxt∈T bt
bMt Remaining budget of task t inM
Pu Preference list of user (worker/task) u
Pw(x) xth task in Pw
Table 1. Notations used in Chapter 3.
budget of task t is insufficient to recruit worker w. Lastly, we assume that for each
task t, bt and rt(w) values for all w ∈ W are either defined as integers or scaled into
integers with the smallest scaling factor (different tasks might have different scaling
factors).
To make a formal development and evaluation of our matching algorithms, we















Fig. 2. A uniform and proportional MCS instance with 3 workers (1, 2, 3) and 2 tasks
(x, y). [crqt(w) = ct(w), rt(w), qt(w)]
Definition 1 (Feasible matching). A mapping
M : (W 7→ T ∪ {∅}) ∪ (T 7→ 2W) (3.3)
is a feasible many-to-one matching if it satisfies the following:
• ∀(w, t) ∈ W × T ,M(w) = t iff w ∈M(t),
• ∀w ∈ W, t ∈ Pw ifM(w) = t,
• rt(M(t)) ≤ bt.
Here, given a matching M and w ∈ W , t ∈ T , the partner3 of worker w is
denoted byM(w) and the partner set of task t is denoted byM(t). IfM(u) = ∅ for
user u ∈ W ∪ T , it means user u is unmatched inM. Note that the last set in the
preference list of each task t is ∅, so we have S ≻t ∅, ∀S ∈ (Pt \ ∅). Also, even though
the preference lists of workers do not include ∅, since we assume that the workers in
3The partner of a worker refers to the task that the worker is assigned to perform,
while the partner set of a task refers to the set of all workers assigned with the task.
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User Preference list
x {2, 3}, {1}, {2}, {3}, ∅




Table 2. Preference lists of the users in Fig. 2.
our system are rational, we have t ≻w ∅, for all w ∈ W and t ∈ Pw. We denote the
remaining budget of task t inM by bMt = bt − rt(M(t)).
Definition 2 (Unhappy pair). Given a matchingM, a worker w and a task t form
an unhappy (blocking) pair ⟨w, t⟩ if t ≻w M(w) and there is a subset S ⊆M(t) such
that {w} ≻t S and rt(w) ≤ bMt + rt(S).
Definition 3 (Pairwise stable matching). A matchingM is said to be pairwise stable
if it does not admit any unhappy pairs.
Definition 4 (Unhappy coalition). Given a matchingM, a subset of workers S ⊆ W
and a task t form an unhappy (blocking) coalition ⟨S, t⟩ if ∀w ∈ S, t ≻w M(w) and
there is a subset S ′ ⊆M(t) such that S ≻t S ′ and rt(S) ≤ bMt + rt(S ′).
The reason such a coalition ⟨S, t⟩ is said to block the stability of the matching is
that the users in the coalition can communicate with each other and decide to jointly
update their partners to have a better assignment.
Definition 5 (Coalitionally stable matching). A matchingM is said to be coalition-
ally stable if it does not admit any unhappy coalitions.
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Note that the coalitional stability is a stronger requirement compared with the
pairwise stability. In fact, since every unhappy pair ⟨w, t⟩ corresponds to an unhappy
coalition ⟨{w}, t⟩, coalitionally stable matchings are also pairwise stable, but not
the other way around. For example, on the MCS instance shown in Fig 2 (with
preference lists given in Table 2), the matching in which task x is matched with the
worker 1 and task y is matched with the worker 2 is a pairwise stable matching, yet
it has an unhappy coalition (⟨{2, 3}, x⟩), and hence is not coalitionally stable. This is
because worker set {2, 3} provides a higher QoS (i.e., 7) to x than what her current
assignment, worker 1, provides (i.e., 5) and both worker 2 and worker 3 prefer task x
to their currently assigned tasks as their net income (i.e., reward - cost) with task x
are larger.
Definition 6 (Coalitionally unhappy pair). Given a matching M, a worker w and
a task t form a coalitionally unhappy pair if there is an unhappy coalition ⟨S, t⟩ such
that w ∈ S.
When the objective is to achieve pairwise stability, the number of unhappy pairs
can be used as the degree of instability of the resulting matching. On the other hand,
it is not feasible to use the number of unhappy coalitions to measure the coalitional
stability for two reasons. First, since the number of unhappy coalitions in a matching
can be as large as m(2n − 1), even just enumerating them would take exponential
time. Second, given a worker-task pair (w, t), knowing all the unhappy coalitions
⟨S, t⟩ : w ∈ S does not provide any useful information to either party, whereas
knowing that there is at least one makes them aware that there is a matching in which
they are matched to each other and are both better off. For these reasons, we propose
to use the number of coalitionally unhappy pairs to measure the coalitional instability
of a matching. Note that we can check whether a certain worker-task pair (w, t) is a
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coalitionally unhappy pair as described in Algorithm 1. This algorithm uses a sub-
procedure named solve01Knapsack(c,W, V ) in line 9, which denotes the dynamic-
programming based algorithm [77] to find the optimal solution for an instance of
0-1 knapsack problem with a knapsack capacity of c, and k items (k = |W | = |V |)
whose weights and values are given in order in W and V , respectively. It returns
the item set that has the largest total value among the sets that have a total weight
less than c. Since solving the 0-1 knapsack problem is the most costly operation in
Algorithm 1 and has a time complexity of O(nbt), we can find and count the unhappy
and coalitionally unhappy pairs in a matching in pseudo-polynomial time O(mn2β),
where β = maxt∈T bt. Lastly, it should be noted that every unhappy pair is also a
coalitionally unhappy pair.
We classify MCS systems according to the variability in the QoS provided by
the workers for different tasks (uniform/non-uniform), and the relationship between
the QoS provided by the workers and the rewards they are offered (proportional/non-
proportional). Note that these classifications are exclusive; thus, it is possible to
have four different MCS systems, namely, (i) proportional and non-uniform, (ii)
non-proportional and non-uniform, (iii) proportional and uniform, and (iv) non-
proportional and uniform.
Definition 7 (Uniform MCS system). An MCS system is called uniform if the QoS
provided by each worker is the same for all tasks.
That is, for all (w, t, t′) ∈ W × T 2, qt(w) = qt′(w). This indicates that all tasks
have the same preference ordering for all S, S ′ ⊆ W since we have qt(S) = qt′(S)
and qt(S
′) = qt′(S
′), ∀t, t′ ∈ T . However, they may not have the same preference list
because of the difference in their budgets (i.e., a task will not include a certain worker
set in her preference list if the total reward to be paid to that worker set exceeds her
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Algorithm 1: Check Pair (w, t,M, CheckIf )
Input: (w, t): Worker, task pair to check
M: The current many-to-one matching
CheckIf = CoalitionallyUnhappyPair or UnhappyPair
1 if M(w) = t orM(w) ≻w t then
2 return false
3 S ←M(t)
4 if CheckIf = CoalitionallyUnhappyPair then
5 foreach w′ ∈ W do
6 if t ∈ Pw and t ≻w′ M(w′) then
7 S ← S ∪ {w′}
8 S ← S \ {w}
9 Smax ← solve01Knapsack(bt − rt(w), Rt(S), Qt(S))




budget) and being unacceptable to different workers. Despite their simplicity, uniform
MCS systems are actually quite common. For example, all MCS systems in which the
QoS of workers are determined solely based on trustworthiness or seniority scores of
workers (e.g., Waze [78] in which users are ranked according to what is called Waze
points that they collect by performing different tasks such as editing the map), or
that only contain very basic tasks (e.g., taking a picture of a scene, measuring noise
pollution) that do not demand any expertise and can be performed as effectively by
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all workers can be viewed as uniform MCS systems. An MCS system that is not
uniform is called a non-uniform MCS system.
Definition 8 (Proportional MCS system). An MCS system is called proportional if,




= θt for all (w, t) ∈ W × T , where θt is a constant defined by task
t. Thus, different tasks might have a different reward per QoS ratio. Note that in
proportional MCS systems, the objective of tasks can be expressed as maximizing the
total reward paid to workers within the budget constraints as it also maximizes the
total QoS they get. Hence, we will use rt(w) in place of qt(w) in the relevant sections.
Also, if an MCS system is not proportional, we simply call it a non-proportional MCS
system.
3.2.1.1 Existence of Stable Matchings
In the following theorems, we give the existence results for pairwise and coali-
tionally stable matchings in different types of MCS systems.
Theorem 1. There exists a non-proportional MCS instance, in which none of the
feasible matchings is pairwise stable.
Proof. We prove by giving a counterexample. Let qx(3) = 6 in the instance given




, hence makes the instance non-
proportional. It also changes the preference list of task x, which becomes Px =
{2, 3}, {3}, {1}, {2}, ∅. The preference list of the other users remain the same as given
in Table 2. Let us analyze all possible task assignments in this modified instance.
• AssumeM(y) ̸= {3}. Then, for (3, y) to not be an unhappy pair, we must have
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M(y) = {2}. In this case, if M(x) ̸= {3}, then (3, x) is an unhappy pair. If
M(x) = {3}, then (2, x) is an unhappy pair.
• Assume M(y) = {3}. If M(x) ̸= {1}, then (1, x) is an unhappy pair, and if
M(x) = {1}, then (2, y) is an unhappy pair.
Therefore, we conclude that no pairwise stable matching exists in the given non-
proportional MCS instance.
Since every unhappy pair is also an unhappy coalition, the following corollary is
an immediate result of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1.1. There exists a non-proportional MCS instance, in which none of the
feasible matchings is coalitionally stable.
Theorem 2. There exists a uniform and/or proportional MCS instance, in which
none of the feasible matchings is coalitionally stable.
Proof. We prove by giving a counterexample. Note that the MCS instance given in
Fig. 2 is both uniform and proportional. Then, it suffices to show that all feasible
matchings that can be defined on this instance have at least one unhappy coalition.
• Assume M(x) ̸= {1}. Then, the worker set {1} and task x do not form an
unhappy coalition only ifM(x) = {2, 3}. However, ifM(x) = {2, 3}, then the
worker set {3} and task y form an unhappy coalition.
• AssumeM(x) = {1}. IfM(y) ̸= {2}, then ({2}, y) is an unhappy coalition. If
M(y) = {2}, then ({2, 3}, x) is an unhappy coalition.
We will show in the next section that there always exists a pairwise stable match-
ing in uniform and proportional MCS systems.
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3.2.1.2 Hardness of Finding Stable Matchings
Consider an MCS instance with n workers (w1, w2, . . . , wn) and a single task
(t). Note that, by definition, finding a coalitionally stable matching in this instance
is exactly the same problem with finding an optimal solution for a 0-1 knapsack
instance with a knapsack that has a weight capacity of bt and n items such that
the weight and value of ith item are, respectively, the reward (rt(wi)) and the QoS
(qt(wi)) of ith worker (wi) for task t. Since the 0-1 knapsack problem is NP-hard, we
can conclude that the problem of finding a coalitionally stable matching (even for an
MCS system that has only one task) is NP-hard as well.
In fact, as proved in [65], given a many-to-one matching instance with budget
constraints, both checking the existence of a coalitionally stable matching and finding
one if exists are NP-hard. Also, since even checking whether a particular worker-task
pair form an unhappy pair in a given matching is NP-hard (as it requires to solve the
corresponding 0-1 knapsack problem shown in Algorithm 1), it is highly likely that
the same hardness results apply to the pairwise stable matchings as well.
3.2.2 Problem Formulation
Given the definitions as well as the nonexistence and hardness results provided










xij ≤ 1 ∀i (3.5)
∑
i
xij × rtj(wi) ≤ btj ∀j (3.6)
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1, if tj ∈ Pwi (eligibility)
0, otherwise.
(3.10)
That is, we would like to produce feasible matchings with as few (coalitionally) un-
happy pairs as possible. When the goal is to minimize the number of coalitionally
unhappy pairs (i.e., uij = 1 for coalitionally unhappy pairs), the optimization objec-
tive in (3.4) attains the strongest stability conditions, but becomes intractable in all
types of MCS systems. On the other hand, minimizing the number of unhappy pairs
is a more practical objective and generally adequate to virtually satisfy the users for
two reasons. First, it is much harder for a pair of users to find out that they are
a coalitionally unhappy pair than that they are simply an unhappy pair, since the
former requires them to know the preferences and the current partners of all workers
in the platform. Second, unlike unhappy pairs, modifying the matching to make a
coalitionally unhappy pair happy necessitates that all the workers in the correspond-
ing unhappy coalition (see Definition 6) cooperate and break up with their current
partners simultaneously, which might be hard to attain.
It is also desirable to minimize the degree of user unhappiness in general rather
than the number of unhappy users. In this case, an alternative objective would be
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to minimize the highest dissatisfaction ratio in the matching from the perspective of
tasks, since they, unlike workers who are simply either happy or not with their assign-
ments, have a degree of unhappiness based on the total QoS service they receive (i.e.,
non-binary utility) in the many-to-one matching scenario described earlier. Formally,
let
St = {S : ⟨S, t⟩ is an unhappy coalition}, (3.11)
and ∀S ∈ St, let SR ⊆ M(t) be the set with the lowest total quality such that its
removal from the partner set of task t suffices to accept S (i.e., rt(S) ≤ bMt + rt(SR)).
Then, the dissatisfaction ratio of task t can be computed by:
δt =

1, if St = ∅






Thus, for a task t the optimal (minimum) value of δt is 1. Finally, the objective




We will address this version of the problem using the following definition.
Definition 9 (Coalitionally α-stable matching). A matching M is said to be coali-
tionally α-stable if ∀t ∈ T
δt ≤ α. (3.14)
3.3 Proposed Solution
In this section, we provide the details of the proposed task assignment algorithms.
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Algorithm 2: Uniform Task Assignment (W , T , PT )
Input: W : The set of workers
T : The set of tasks
PT : The common preference profile of tasks
1 for i← 1 to n do
2 w ← ith worker in PT
3 for j ← 1 to |Pw| do
4 t ← Pw(j)
5 if bMt ≥ rt(w) then
6 M(w)← t
7 M(t)←M(t) ∪ {w}
8 bMt ← bMt − rt(w)
9 break
10 returnM
3.3.1 Uniform Task Assignment (UTA) Algorithm
The stable task assignment problem in uniform MCS systems has recently been
investigated in [35], and an ILP-based algorithm with a O(nm2n) time complexity was
proposed to find pairwise stable matchings in MCS systems that are both uniform and
proportional. Here, we propose UTA algorithm that finds pairwise stable matchings in
all uniform MCS systems (i.e., proportional/non-proportional) in only O(n log n+nm)
time.
A pseudo-code description of UTA algorithm is given in Algorithm 2. First,
apart from the set of workers and tasks, UTA algorithm takes the common preference
profile of tasks (PT ) as input, which is simply a sorted version of the worker setW , in
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which workers with higher QoS values precede the others. Formally, it can be defined
as
PT = wi1 , wi2 , . . . , win (3.15)
where ∀w′ = wij , w′′ = wij+1 , qt(w′) ≥ qt(w′′), ∀t ∈ T . Since we assume that the
system is uniform, hence the QoS value of a worker is same for all tasks, it is in fact
possible to create such a list. Then, the algorithm begins to seek the best available
assignment for the workers (w) in order of their appearance in PT (i.e., in decreasing
order of their QoS). To this end, it iterates through the tasks in their preference lists
(Pw) in order to find the first task in their preference lists (i.e., the most preferred)
that has sufficient amount of remaining budget to hire them. If it finds such a task t
for worker w, it updates the matching and the remaining budget of task t, otherwise
it leaves worker w unassigned and continues the assignment process with the next
worker in PT . We now show that the resulting matching will always be pairwise
stable.
Theorem 3. In uniform MCS systems, UTA algorithm always produces a pairwise
stable matching.
Proof. We will prove it by contradiction. Assume that the matchingM returned by
UTA algorithm contains at least one unhappy pair, say ⟨w, t⟩. Since worker w and
task t form an unhappy pair, we know that they are not matched to each other and
worker w prefers task t to his current partner inM. This means when the algorithm
was iterating the preference list of worker w in line 3, it has attempted to match him
with task t, but could not do it due to the limited budget of task t, so that it either
matched worker w with a task that come after t in Pw or left him unmatched. Let A
be the partner set of task t and ρ be her remaining budget when the algorithm tried,
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but failed to assign worker w to her. Then, (i) ρ < rt(w). Since the algorithm matches
the workers in order of their appearance in the common preference list of the tasks,
we have {w} ≻t {w}, ∀w ∈ A. Also, note that once the algorithm matches a worker
and a task, it never unmatches them again. Thus, we have A ⊆M(t). However, for
(w, t) to be an unhappy pair, there should exist a subset S ′ ⊆ M(t) such that (ii)
rt(w) ≤ rt(S ′) + bMt and (iii) {w} ≻t S ′. From (iii), we have {w} ≻t {w}, ∀w ∈ S ′,
which means all workers in S ′ got matched with task t after the algorithm failed to
match worker w and task t, hence we have
ρ ≥ rt(S ′) + bMt (3.16)
ρ ≥ rt(w) (by (ii)) (3.17)
ρ > ρ (by (i)) (3.18)
which is a contradiction.
The following corollary is a direct result of Theorem 3.
Corollary 3.1. In uniform MCS systems, there always exists a pairwise stable match-
ing.
Note that even if an MCS system is not uniform (i.e., ∃(w, t, t′) ∈ W × T 2,
qt(w) ̸= qt′(w)), UTA algorithm can still produce pairwise stable matchings if it
is possible to create a common preference list (PT ) for tasks. In other words, if
∄(w,w′, t, t′) ∈ W2 × T 2, qt(w) > qt(w′), qt′(w) < qt′(w′), UTA algorithm can still be
used to find pairwise stable matchings.
Example. The instance given in Fig. 2 is a uniform MCS system, so UTA
algorithm can be used to find a pairwise stable matching in this instance as fol-
lows. First, we create the common preference list of tasks as PT = 1, 2, 3 since
qx,y(1) > qx,y(2) > qx,y(3). The first worker in PT is worker 1, so the algorithm starts
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the matching process with him. Since the first and only task in his preference list,
task x, has enough budget to hire him (the preference lists of users are given in Ta-
ble 2), it assigns worker 1 to task x, and updates the remaining budget of task x as
7 − 5 = 2. The next worker in PT is worker 2, who also prefers task x to task y,
but task x does not have enough budget to hire him (2 < 4), so the algorithm tries
to match him with task y. Task y has enough budget to hire worker 2, so they get
matched and the remaining budget of task y becomes 5 − 4 = 1. Worker 3 is the
last worker in PT . However, neither task x nor task y has sufficient remaining budget
to hire him, so he will be left unmatched. Thus, the final matching will be (x ↔ 1,
y ↔ 2), and it can easily be checked that it does not contain any unhappy pairs and
hence it is pairwise stable.
Running time. Forming the common preference profile of tasks (PT ) requires to
sort the workers according to their QoS values and thus takes O(n log n). Then, since
the first for loop will iterate n times and the second will iterate at most m times (i.e.,
|Pw| ≤ m,∀w ∈ W), it is straightforward to see that the worst-case running time of
UTA algorithm is O(n log n+ nm).
3.3.2 Pairwise Stable Task Assignment (PSTA) Algorithm
PSTA algorithm is a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm that, unlike UTA algo-
rithm, can be run in any type of MCS system, and aims to produce matchings with as
little pairwise instability as possible (which is why it is named as Pairwise-STA). In
fact, in Theorem 4, we will show that it always produces pairwise stable matchings in
proportional MCS systems. Besides, in non-proportional MCS systems where a pair-
wise stable matching may not exist, it manages to produce matchings with almost
optimal pairwise stability as it will be shown in Section 3.4.
The details of PSTA algorithm are given in Algorithm 3. It follows the classic
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deferred acceptance mechanism [42] but updates the set of workers assigned to a task
optimally from the set of workers currently assigned to the task and the worker under
consideration. It keeps a stack of unmatched workers that still have tasks to propose
to4, pops them one by one (line 3) and lets them (worker w) propose to the next task
(task t) in their preference list (line 5). If task t has enough remaining budget, the
algorithm directly matches them (lines 8-10). Otherwise, it finds the most favorable
worker set (Smax) for task t among the workers in her current partner set and worker w
within her budget constraint (lines 12-13), assigns that worker set as the new partner
set of task t (lines 14-17) and pushes the remaining workers back onto the stack after
setting them free (lines 18-20). If the partner set of task t has not changed, worker w
will be the only worker to be pushed onto the stack, in which case we say that task t
rejected the proposal of worker w. This continues until there is no unmatched worker
that still has a task that he has not yet proposed to in his preference list. In the
following theorem, we prove that the resulting matching is guaranteed to be pairwise
stable if the MCS system is proportional.
Theorem 4. In proportional MCS systems, PSTA algorithm always produces a pair-
wise stable matching.
Proof. We will prove it by contradiction. Assume that in a proportional MCS system
(without loss of generality, let qt(w) = rt(w), ∀w, t), PSTA algorithm produces a
matchingM that contains at least one unhappy pair, say ⟨w, t⟩, which either means
that task t rejected worker w’s proposal and they never got matched, or that task t
accepted worker w’s proposal, but then discarded him (possibly along with a set of
workers) from her partner set to accept the proposal of another worker with a higher
4We use the terminology of the stable marriage problem (i.e., propose, accept,
reject) to indicate that this algorithm can also be run in a distributed manner using
the procedures proposed in [79] to find stable marriages in a distributed manner.
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Algorithm 3: PairwiseStableTaskAssignment(W ,T )
Input: W : The set of workers
T : The set of tasks
1 Stack.push(W)
2 while Stack is not empty do
3 w ← Stack.pop()
4 if Pw is not empty then
5 t ← Pw(1) ; ▷ w proposes to t
6 Pw ← Pw \ {t}
7 if bMt ≥ rt(w) then
8 M(w)← t
9 M(t)←M(t) ∪ {w}
10 bMt ← bMt − rt(w)
11 else
12 S ←M(t) ∪ w
13 Smax ← solve01Knapsack(bt, Rt(S), Qt(S))
14 M(t)← Smax, bMt ← bt − rt(Smax)
15 if w ∈ Smax then
16 M(w)← t
17 foreach w′ ∈ S \ Smax do
18 M(w′)← ∅, Stack.push(w′)
19 returnM
QoS. Let A and ρ denote task t’s partner set and remaining budget at the time
task t and worker w broke up by one of these two cases (i.e., rejected or discarded),
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respectively. Then, we have
∄S ⊆ A : rt(S) < rt(w), rt(w) ≤ rt(S) + ρ (3.19)
because if there were such a subset S, the 0-1 knapsack solution would include worker
w instead of S, and w would not get rejected/discarded.
We define a node as a tuple (x, y), where x and y are the label and length of the
node, respectively. Let A0 = {(w′, rt(w′)) : w′ ∈ A}, so each node in A0 corresponds
to a worker in A. Also, let l(S) be the total length of the nodes in S. Then, from
(3.19), we have
∄S ⊆ A0 : l(S) < rt(w), rt(w)− l(S) ≤ ρ (3.20)
Note that task t will discard a group G of workers from her partner set only when
she is proposed by a worker w′ who has a higher total reward than G and will not
violate her budget constraint when replaced by G. After the break up of worker w
and task t, whenever such a change (say ith change) occurs in the partner set of task
t, we create Ai from Ai−1 as follows:
1. Ai ← Ai−1.
2. Let K be the set of nodes in Ai that have the same label with any worker in G.
3. Change the labels of all nodes in K as w′.
4. Create a new node (w′, rt(w
′) − rt(G)) (note that rt(G) = l(K)) and add it to
Ai.
In other words, we add the new worker to Ai by dividing it into several nodes so that
the node lengths in Ai−1 are preserved. An example is provided in Fig. 3 to illustrate
this process.
Let c be the number of changes occurred in the partner set of task t since her
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break up with worker w until the end. Then, the last node set created, Ac, can be
partitioned into two sets A′0 and B, where A
′
0 contains |A0| nodes that have exactly
the same lengths with the nodes in A0, but possibly have different labels, and B is
the set of newly created nodes such that (i) l(B) + bMt = ρ. Since we assumed that
(w, t) form an unhappy pair in the final matching M, there should exist a subset
S ′ ⊆M(t) such that rt(w) > rt(S ′) and rt(w) ≤ rt(S ′)+ bMt . As Ac has a distinct set
P of nodes that jointly correspond to each worker w′ in M(t) (i.e., l(P ) = rt(w′)),
there should also exist a subset S ⊆ A′0 ∪ B such that (ii) rt(w) > l(S) and (iii)
rt(w) ≤ l(S) + bMt . Then, we have
rt(w)− l(S ∩ A′0) ≤ l(S ∩B) + bMt (by (iii)) (3.21)
ρ < l(S ∩B) + bMt (by (3.20) and (ii)) (3.22)
ρ < ρ (by (i)) (3.23)
which is a contradiction.
A significant result of Theorem 4 is the following corollary.
Corollary 4.1. In proportional MCS systems, there always exists a pairwise stable
matching.
In the following theorem, we show that pairwise stability ensures a certain degree
of coalitional stability in proportional MCS systems.
Theorem 5. In proportional MCS systems, a pairwise stable matching is coalitionally
2-stable.
Proof. We prove by contradiction. LetM be a pairwise stable matching in a propor-
tional MCS system and ⟨S, t⟩ be an unhappy coalition inM such that
rt(S ∪ (M(t) \ S ′)) > 2rt(M(t)) (3.24)
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Fig. 3. An example illustrating the process used in the proof of Theorem 4. A0 is
created right after task t and worker w broke up, so the partner set of task t is
{w3, w2, w5, w7} at that time. A1 is created after the first change in the partner
set of task t, which is the substitution of G = {w5} with w6, and A2 is created
after the second change in the partner set of task t, which is the substitution
of G′ = {w2, w6} with w4. Note that the length of the nodes in A0 are always
preserved throughout the process.
where S ′ ⊆ M(t) satisfies rt(S) > rt(S ′) and (i) rt(S) ≤ bMt + rt(S ′). Thus, ⟨S, t⟩
breaks the coalitional 2-stability of M according to (3.14). First, note that if (ii)
rt(M(t)) ≥ bt/2, we would have
rt(S) + rt(M(t))− rt(S ′) > 2rt(M(t)) (by (3.24)) (3.25)
rt(M(t)) + bMt > 2rt(M(t)) (by (i)) (3.26)
rt(M(t)) + bMt > bt (by (ii)) (3.27)
bt > bt (3.28)
which is false. So, we have rt(M(t)) < bt/2. Let w be any worker in S. If rt(w) ≤
rt(M(t)), then M is not pairwise stable because task t can add worker w to her
partner list without removing anyone as rt(w) + rt(M(t)) < bt. Thus, we have
rt(w) > rt(M(t)), which also implies that M is not a pairwise stable matching as
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task t can simply replaceM(t) with worker w to obtain a better partner set within
her budget constraint (i.e., rt(w) ≤ rt(S) ≤ bMt + rt(S ′) ≤ bt).
From Theorem 3, Theorem 4 and Theorem 5, we obtain the following corollaries.
Corollary 5.1. In MCS systems that are both proportional and uniform, UTA algo-
rithm always returns coalitionally 2-stable matchings.
Corollary 5.2. In proportional MCS systems, PSTA algorithm always returns coali-
tionally 2-stable matchings.
Example. We run PSTA algorithm on the same MCS instance illustrated in
Fig. 2. To make things slightly different, we assume that the workers are pushed onto
the stack in line 1 in increasing order of their identifiers so that the first worker that
is popped in line 3 is worker 3. As shown in Table 2, the first task in the preference
list (P3) of worker 3 is task y, so he first proposes to her (task y gets removed from
P3). Task y has enough budget, so worker 3 and task y get matched to each other
and the remaining budget of task y becomes 2 (line 8-10). The next worker popped
from the stack is worker 2, whose first preference is task x. Thus, worker 2 proposes
to task x (task x gets removed from P2). Since task x also has enough budget, she
gets matched with worker 2, which reduces her remaining budget to 3. Next, worker
1 gets popped and proposes to the only task in his preference list: task x (task x
gets removed from P1, so P1 = ∅). Task x does not have enough remaining budget
to hire worker 1, so the algorithm finds the best set of workers among the workers in
M(x) ∪ {1} = {1, 2} that does not exceed the budget limit of task x by solving the
corresponding 0-1 knapsack problem (line 13). The subset {1} provides the highest
QoS without violating the budget constraints, so worker 1 and task x will get matched
to each other, and worker 2 will be set free and pushed onto the stack. In the next
42
step, worker 2 will be popped and propose to task y (task y gets removed from P2, so
P2 = ∅). Task y does not have sufficient remaining budget, but the algorithm, after
solving the knapsack problem, will replace her current partner, worker 3, with worker
2 as this will increase the total QoS task y gets. Consequently, it will set worker 3
free and push him onto the stack. Then, it will pop him from the stack and let him
propose to task x (task x gets removed from P3, so P3 = ∅). The budget of task x is
not adequate to hire worker 3, and replacing his current partner is also not beneficial,
hence worker 3 will be pushed onto the stack, again. When popped next time, since
there does not remain any other task for worker 3 to propose to in his preference
list, he will not be pushed onto the stack again. This will leave the stack empty, so
the matching (x ↔ 1, y ↔ 2) will be returned by the algorithm, which is the same
pairwise stable matching found by UTA algorithm.
Running time. Note that since the preference list of a worker (w) shrinks in size
by 1 every time he is popped from the stack (line 6) until his preference list becomes
empty (after which he will not be pushed onto the stack ever again), he can be pushed
onto the stack at most O(m) times as |Pw| ≤ m. Thus, the while loop in line 2 will
iterate at most O(nm) times. Since the most costly operation in each iteration is
solving the 0-1 knapsack problem, which takes O(nβ) where β = maxt∈T bt, the time
complexity of PSTA algorithm is O(n2mβ).
3.3.3 Heuristic Algorithm
Heuristic algorithm is a task-oriented, pseudo-polynomial time algorithm that
can also be run in any type of MCS system and is designed in a way that the tasks
in the system take turns at modifying the matching according to their preferences.
That is, each task t, in her turn, changes her partner set to the best feasible set
of workers among all the workers that are already in her partner set, or that prefer
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herself to their current assignments. Thus, Heuristic algorithm ensures that there is
no unhappy coalition ⟨S, t⟩ for any S ⊆ W immediately after the turns of task t.
It can, hence, be expected that as we increase the number of iterations/turns, there
will be fewer unhappy coalitions, which will improve the coalitional stability of the
matching.
The outline of Heuristic algorithm is provided in Algorithm 4. In each of the k
iterations, the algorithm goes through all tasks (t) in the system (line 2) and first finds
all workers that are either already matched with task t or would be better off with
task t compared to their current partners (lines 3-6). Then, among these workers,
it identifies the set Smax of workers that require a total reward of less than bt and
provide as large total QoS as possible for task t by solving the corresponding knapsack
problem (line 7). Finally, it sets the workers that are presently matched with task
t, but are not in Smax free (lines 8-9), and matches task t and the workers in Smax
with each other after removing these workers from the partner sets of the tasks with
whom they were previously matched (lines 10-14).
The fact that a task is perfectly happy (i.e., has a dissatisfaction ratio of 1) right
after her turns indicates that the task that is considered the latest in the for loop
in line 2 will be perfectly happy in the end as well. This nice property of Heuristic
algorithm can be used to make a different task requester happy at each (e.g., hourly,
daily) assignment cycle, and to ensure that all task requesters become perfectly happy
with their assignments periodically. Another useful property of Heuristic algorithm is
that it allows to explore different feasible matchings that are shaped by the preference
profile of a different task, which will become clearer in the toy example provided below.
Example. We once again utilize the MCS instance given in Fig. 2 to show how
Heuristic algorithm functions. Assume that the for loop in line 2 iterates through
the tasks in order of task x and task y. In the first iteration, since all workers are
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Algorithm 4: Heuristic Approach(W , T )
Input: W : The set of workers
T : The set of tasks
k: The number of iterations
1 for i← 1 to k do
2 foreach t ∈ T do
3 S ←M(t)
4 foreach w ∈ W do
5 if t ∈ Pw and t ≻w M(w) then
6 S ← S ∪ {w}
7 Smax ← solve01Knapsack(bt, Rt(S), Qt(S))
8 foreach w′ ∈M(t) \ Smax do
9 M(w′)← ∅
10 foreach w′ ∈ Smax do
11 let t′ denoteM(w′)
12 M(t′)←M(t′) \ w′
13 M(w′)← t
14 M(t)← Smax, bMt ← bt − rt(Smax)
15 returnM
unmatched, task x will be assigned to the best (i.e., with the highest total QoS)
subset of workers in {1, 2, 3} with a total reward of less than 7, which is {2, 3}:
M : x↔ {2, 3}, y ↔ ∅
In this matching. worker 3 is the only one that prefers task y to task x, so when it is
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task y’s turn, she will directly be matched with worker 3:
M : x↔ {2}, y ↔ {3}
In the next iteration, task x will be assigned to the best worker set from {1, 2}, which
are the workers that are either matched with task x (i.e., worker 2) or prefer task
x to their current partners (i.e., worker 1). Since her budget does not allow to hire
both, worker 2 will be replaced by worker 1 who provides a higher QoS:
M : x↔ {1}, y ↔ {3}
At this point, since worker 2 prefers task y to being unassigned, task y will be assigned
to the best feasible worker set from {2, 3} in her turn, which is {2}:
M : x↔ {1}, y ↔ {2}
In this matching, both worker 2 and worker 3 prefers task x to their current partners,
so the algorithm will assign task x the best feasible worker set from {1, 2, 3}, which
is {2,3}:
M : x↔ {2, 3}, y ↔ ∅
Note that this is exactly the same as the first matching we obtained above. In fact,
after this point, the algorithm will repeatedly generate the same matchings, and
return the matching (x ↔ {2}, y ↔ {3}) if k is odd, and the matching (x ↔ {1},
y ↔ {2}), otherwise. The former is the best possible matching in terms of coalitional
stability, as there does not exist any coalitionally stable matching in this instance
(Theorem 2) and this matching contains only one coalitionally unhappy pair (worker
1 and task x). On the other hand, the latter is the same matching as the one found by
UTA and PSTA algorithms and is the optimal matching in terms of pairwise stability.
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Running time. The two outermost loops in line 1 and 2 will iterate k and m
times, respectively. Similar to PSTA algorithm, solving the 0-1 knapsack instance in
line 7 takes O(nβ) where β = maxt∈T bt, and is the most costly operation within the
for loop in line 2. This makes the total running time of Heuristic algorithm O(knmβ).
3.4 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithms in dif-
ferent types of MCS systems.
3.4.1 Simulation Settings
Similar to previous work [29, 80], we utilize a taxi trip dataset [81] in a city (i.e.,
New York City (NYC)) to have a realistic geographic distribution of workers and
tasks. Specifically, we randomly select a day in 2015 and then create a worker at the
most recent drop-off location of each taxi that has become available between 1-2 pm
on the selected day, and a task at the pick-up location of each passenger that has
demanded a taxi in the next hour of the same day. Then, we use random-sampling to
obtain the worker and task sets of certain size based on the experiment requirements.
Note that each of the four types of MCS systems (i.e., proportional (P.) and non-
uniform (N.U.), non-proportional (N.P.) and non-uniform, proportional and uniform
(U.), non-proportional and uniform) necessitates different QoS and reward settings.
Thus, we generate a unique scenario for each MCS system by integrating this infor-
mation on top of the geographical information.
As the default setup for all scenarios, we sample n = 100 workers and m = 50
tasks (an instance is illustrated in Fig. 4), and randomly assign a budget for each
task between Bmin = 100 and Bmax = 1000. Given the distance d between a worker
w and a task t, we let ct(w) = d × C, where C = 20 denotes the cost per kilometer.
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Fig. 4. Distribution of workers (circles) and tasks (triangles) on the NYC map with
different sampling ratios: (a) 100 workers, 50 tasks; (b) 500 workers, 500 tasks.
Below, we describe the typical settings for each scenario.
• Proportional (P.) and uniform (U.): We assign a unique QoS value v to
each worker w randomly from [1, 200] and let qt(w) = v, ∀t ∈ T . Then, the
rewards are set as
rt(w) =

θt × qt(w) if θt × qt(w) ≤ bt
0 otherwise
(3.29)
where θt is randomly selected from [1, 5] for each task t.
• Proportional (P.) and non-uniform (N.U.): Given a worker-task pair
(w, t), we randomly assign the reward rt(w) from [1, bt] (we also examine the
cases where reward values are assigned from [1, bt/2] and [bt/2, bt]), and let
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qt(w) = rt(w)/θt, where θt is set as in the previous scenario, yet its value is
actually arbitrary for all the algorithms considered in this scenario, unlike the
previous scenario where it is unarbitrary for UTA algorithm.
• Non-proportional (N.P.) and uniform (U.): For this scenario, the QoS
information is produced exactly as it is in the proportional and uniform scenario.
The only difference is that for each worker-task pair (w, t), the reward rt(w) is
assigned randomly from [1, bt].
• Non-proportional (N.P.) and non-uniform (N.U.): Given a worker-task
pair (w, t), we randomly assign the reward rt(w) from [1, bt] and qt(w) from
[1, 200].
Given the settings described above, the preference profiles of workers and tasks can be
determined by (3.1) and (3.2), respectively. (Yet it should be noted that in practice
none of the algorithms requires tasks to form their preference lists, which would take
O(n2n) time and space.)
Lastly, we run the simulations 100 times with a different user set in each run and
present the averaged results.
3.4.1.1 Benchmark Algorithms
We compare the performance of our algorithms with the following algorithms
proposed in [35] and [66] (see Table 3 for a comparison of the time complexities of all
algorithms).
• Stable Job Assignment (SJA): This ILP-based algorithm [35] produces pairwise
stable matchings solely in proportional and uniform MCS systems.
• ϕ-Stable Task Assignment (ϕ-STA): Proposed in [66], this approximation algorithm
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Algorithm Time complexity






Table 3. Time complexities of all algorithms considered in the simulations (* indicates
the algorithms proposed in this study).
produces matchings that are guaranteed to be coalitionally ϕ-stable in proportional
matching markets, where ϕ (≈ 1.618) denotes the golden ratio. In this algorithm,
tasks (t) simply run the ϕ-approximation algorithm for the single bin removable
online knapsack problem proposed in [82] to decide whether to accept (and discard
some other workers if needed) or reject the proposing workers (w) using the rewards
rt(w) as the weights of items and bt as the size of the knapsack. The running time
of this algorithm is O(mn log(mn)).
• θ-Stable Task Assignment (θ-STA): This approximation algorithm is also proposed






It follows the classic deferred acceptance mechanism: workers make the proposals,
tasks (t) that have available budget accept the incoming proposals and those that
do not have available budget temporarily add the proposing worker to their partner
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MCS Type UTA PSTA Heuristic SJA ϕ-STA θ-STA
P. & U. ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ *
P. & N.U. ✓ ✓ ✓ *
N.P. & U. ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
N.P. & N.U. ✓ ✓ ✓
Table 4. Mobile crowdsensing scenarios and corresponding applicable algorithms (∗
indicates that the algorithm is applicable but has a very poor performance
since it is not specifically designed for that scenario).
set and then discard the workers (w′) with the lowest qt(w
′)
rt(w′)
ratio until the sum of
rewards to be paid to the remaining workers is less than or equal to bt. As it is shown
in Table 4, although it can be run in all types of MCS systems, we do not provide
results for this algorithm in proportional MCS systems due to its unpredictable
and mostly poor performance in these systems. This is because it randomly selects




ratio for each task t. The time complexity of this algorithm is also
O(mn log(mn)).
Note that neither ϕ-STA nor θ-STA has a performance guarantee in terms of pairwise
stability.
3.4.1.2 Performance Metrics
We utilize the following performance metrics in the evaluations.
• Overall user happiness : This is calculated as
100×
(
1− # of coalitionally unhappy pairs




and expresses the overall user happiness based on the instability of the matching.
Thus, it is the main metric that defines the performance of the algorithms.
• Outward user happiness : This is calculated as
100×
(
1− # of unhappy pairs
# of all matchable worker-task pairs
)
(3.32)
and quantifies the outward user happiness based on the one-dimensional instability
of the matching. The reason it is called outward is that compared to coalitionally
unhappy pairs, unhappy pairs are easier to notice for users, and the users forming an
unhappy pair have a stronger incentive to deviate from (a subset of) their partners
to each other as they do not need a collective agreement that involves other users
(unlike coalitionally unhappy pairs).
• Maximum dissatisfaction ratio: This is the dissatisfaction of the task in the un-
happy coalition with the largest incentive to deviate from the current matching,




Given the maximum dissatisfaction ratio δmax of a matchingM, we can say that
M is coalitionally δmax-stable and is not coalitionally (δmax − ϵ)-stable for any
positive real ϵ. If a matching does not have any unhappy coalition, then δmax = 1
by definition.
• Running time: We also compare the algorithms with respect to their running time,
which might be critical for MCS systems with strict time constraints.
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Fig. 5. Performance comparison of algorithms in proportional and non-uniform sce-
nario with varying number of workers (m = 50 tasks).
3.4.2 Results
We first look at the performance of the proposed algorithms in proportional and
non-uniform scenario. Fig. 5 shows the performance of algorithms with different
number of workers. First, note that Heuristic algorithm (which is run with k = 3 as
default) usually performs the best and produces optimal assignments in terms of both
overall and outward user happiness when the number of workers is larger than 200. It
is interesting that it achieves very similar overall and outward user happiness scores,
which indicates that it yields matchings in which most of the coalitionally unhappy
pairs are also unhappy pairs. Second, we see that despite having a better upper bound
(UB) in terms of maximum dissatisfaction ratio (i.e., the upper bounds for ϕ-STA and
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Fig. 6. Performance comparison of algorithms in proportional and non-uniform sce-
nario with varying number of tasks (n = 100 workers)
PSTA are, respectively, ϕ (≈ 1.618) and 2, while Heuristic algorithm is unbounded),
ϕ-STA mostly performs much worse than our algorithms. Besides, its performance
gets worse as the number of workers increases and it even produces matchings with as
low as 10% overall user happiness. Since the system is proportional, PSTA algorithm
always achieves 100% outward user happiness (Theorem 4), but we still include it
in all figures for completeness. Also, it outperforms Heuristic algorithm when the
number of workers is small and generally achieves a maximum dissatisfaction ratio
that is much smaller than its upper bound and very close to the optimal value (i.e.,
1).
Fig. 6 shows the performance of algorithms with varying number of tasks. As
for the performance of Heuristic algorithm, we see a trend that is similar to what we
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Fig. 7. Performance of Heuristic algorithm with increasing number of iterations in
proportional and non-uniform scenario withm = 50 tasks and n = 100 workers.
have seen in Fig. 5. It performs worse when the number of workers and tasks are
close to each other. On the other hand, ϕ-STA and PSTA algorithms always have a
better performance with increased number of tasks. This is because they are worker-
oriented algorithms where the proposals are made by workers, so the increase in the
number of tasks reduces the competition among workers and results in improved user
happiness. Here, PSTA always performs better than ϕ-STA, and it also outperforms
Heuristic algorithm when the number of tasks get larger than that of workers.
In Fig. 7, we show the performance of Heuristic algorithm when it is run with
different k values. We see that even with a few number of iterations, it achieves about
95% overall user happiness, and that increasing the number of iterations continues to
improve the performance even up until 100 iterations, but it may not be worth the
increase to be seen in the runtime, which is linear to the number of iterations.
In Fig. 8, we look at the impact of C (cost per kilometer) on the performance of
the algorithms. Note that an increased C value can be interpreted as having very se-
lective workers who do not even find most of the tasks acceptable. Thus, it deescalates
the competition among workers and results in an improvement in the performance of
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Fig. 8. Performance comparison of algorithms with varying cost per kilometer values
in proportional and non-uniform scenario with m = 50 tasks and n = 100
workers.
worker-oriented algorithms (ϕ-STA and PSTA). Conversely, it escalates the compe-
tition among tasks as there will be less number of eligible workers for each task, so
the performance of task-oriented Heuristic algorithm gets slightly worse. The simi-
lar outcomes are also seen in Fig. 9 where we look at the impact of reward ranges.
When we lower the reward range from [1, bt] to [1, bt/2], there will be fewer workers
eligible for each task, so the performance of ϕ-STA and PSTA algorithms gets better,
while that of Heuristic algorithm gets worse due to the same reasons pointed out
above. However, when the reward range is made [bt/2, bt], the performance of all
algorithms get better (PSTA and Heuristic algorithms even achieve optimal overall
user happiness) because tasks can now hire at most 2 workers, making it an almost
competition-free setting for both workers and tasks.
Next, we analyze the performance of algorithms in non-proportional and non-
uniform scenario in Fig. 10. Note that since the system is non-proportional, PSTA
algorithm fails to achieve perfect outward user happiness most of the times, but
still manages to outperform the others in terms of outward user happiness. The









































Fig. 9. Performance comparison of algorithms with varying reward ranges in propor-
tional and non-uniform scenario with m = 50 tasks and n = 100 workers.
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Fig. 10. Performance comparison of algorithms in non-proportional and non-uniform
scenario with varying number of workers and tasks.
and non-uniform scenario: it achieves higher than 85% overall/outward user happiness
regardless of the number of workers/tasks and performs the worst when the number
of workers and tasks are similar. However, in this scenario, our algorithms are usually
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PSTA & UTA & SJA (UB)
Fig. 11. Performance comparison of algorithms in proportional and uniform scenario
with varying number of workers (m = 50 tasks).
outperformed by θ-STA algorithm in terms of overall user happiness. In fact, θ-STA
algorithm has a quite reliable performance in this scenario as its overall user happiness
score never drops below 95%.
Fig. 11 and 12 show the performance comparison of algorithms in proportional
and uniform scenario for varying number of workers and tasks, respectively. Here,
Heuristic algorithm always outperforms all other algorithms in terms of overall user
happiness by steadily achieving very close to optimal scores (≥ 97%) regardless of
worker and task counts. On the other hand, ϕ-STA algorithm always has the poorest
performance in terms of all metrics considered here. Since the system is both pro-
portional and uniform, UTA and PSTA algorithms are guaranteed to achieve perfect
outward user happiness due to Theorems 3 and 4, respectively. It is remarkable that
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PSTA & UTA & SJA (UB)
Fig. 12. Performance comparison of algorithms in proportional and uniform scenario
with varying number of tasks (n = 100 workers).
the increase in the number of tasks improves the performance of UTA and PSTA
algorithms in terms of overall user happiness, while it has a detrimental effect on
them in terms of maximum dissatisfaction ratio.
In Fig. 13, we look at the performance of algorithms in non-proportional and
uniform scenario. We first observe that UTA algorithm generally has the worst per-
formance in terms of overall user happiness, yet it is the only algorithm that ensures
a perfect outward user happiness. Second, the performance of Heuristic algorithm
is significantly worse in this scenario compared to that in the others. In fact, this
is the only scenario where it achieves less than 85% overall user happiness. Similar
to the non-proportional and non-uniform scenario, θ-STA algorithm usually manages
to deliver a higher overall user happiness score than the others when there are more
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Fig. 13. Performance comparison of algorithms in non-proportional and uniform sce-
nario with varying number of workers and tasks.
workers than tasks, but its performance is also worse in this scenario. Besides, it is
significantly outperformed by PSTA and UTA algorithms in terms of outward user
happiness for the most part.
Lastly, in Fig. 14a-b, we compare the running time of all algorithms. We only
provide the results for the proportional and uniform scenario as all of the algorithms
can be run in this scenario and those that are also run in different scenarios have an
almost indistinguishable running time in all scenarios they have been used with. First,
note that the objective of SJA algorithm is to obtain assignments with perfect outward
user happiness in proportional and uniform systems. Our UTA algorithm achieves
the same in not only proportional and uniform systems, but also in non-proportional
and uniform systems in an extremely shorter time (by a few orders of magnitude).
Furthermore, it has the lowest running time among all, which is consistent with its
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Fig. 14. Comparison of algorithms in terms of running time (a-b); Impact of Bmax on
the running time of Heuristic and PSTA algorithms (c).
superior time complexity (O(n log n + mn)). Our other algorithms (Heuristic and
PSTA) are also much more time-efficient than SJA algorithm, though they have
notably larger running time compared to the rest of the algorithms. Nonetheless, it
should be noted that we have assumed a pre-scaling will have to be made in case
budgets and rewards are not defined as integers. Therefore, we used relatively large
budget (up to Bmax = 1000) and hence reward values in all experiments. If pre-
scaling can be avoided (or the task requesters in the system have a rather limited
budget), the running time of Heuristic and PSTA algorithms will decrease linearly
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with reduced budget values as shown in Fig. 14c. Finally, we observe that increasing
the number of tasks after when there are equal number of workers and tasks in the
system (n = m = 100) either reduces the running time or the increase in the running
time of all algorithms. This is because when there are more tasks than workers,
workers will be able to find their stable partners in a shorter time as they are more
likely to be matched with a task that is at the top of their preference lists.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we studied the stable task assignment problem in MCS systems.
Different from the classic stable matching problem, the task requesters in an MCS
system may recruit multiple workers within their budget ranges to reinforce the qual-
ity of the sensed data. This makes the generic stability definitions obsolete and the
existing approaches to find stable matchings inapplicable in MCS systems. To address
this problem, we first defined the stability conditions peculiar to MCS systems, and
provided the existence and hardness results for stable task assignments in different
types of MCS systems. Then, we introduced three different stable task assignment
algorithms, namely UTA, PSTA, and Heuristic. We proved that UTA and PSTA algo-
rithms always produce pairwise stable task assignments in uniform and proportional
MCS systems, respectively. Finally, we evaluated the performance of the proposed
algorithms in terms of user happiness through extensive simulations. The results have
shown that our algorithms significantly outperform the state-of-the-art stable task as-
signment algorithms in most scenarios. Specifically, PSTA and Heuristic algorithms
usually achieve the highest outward and overall user happiness, respectively.
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CHAPTER 4
PREFERENCE-AWARE TASK ASSIGNMENT WITH COVERAGE
REQUIREMENTS
4.1 Introduction
In opportunistic mobile crowdsensing, the objective of service requesters is to
have as many of their sensing tasks completed as possible within their budget con-
straints, whereas that of participants (workers) is to collect the highest monetary
reward possible on their trajectories. However, these objectives can conflict and may
result in unhappy service requesters or workers if the matching between them is not
handled carefully. In this chapter, we study the problem of finding task assignments
that fulfill both coverage-aware preferences of service requesters and profit-based pref-
erences of workers in a budget-constrained, opportunistic mobile crowdsensing system.
In the problem studied in the previous chapter, task requesters were assumed to have
additive utility functions based on worker qualities. However, in this study, task re-
questers have non-additive utility functions due to their coverage requirements, which
makes the solutions proposed in the previous chapter inapplicable to the setting con-
sidered here. The key issues that need to be taken into account in this problem and
the studies that partly address them can be summarized as follows:
• Task requester preferences [8, 9, 26]: Each task requester desires to have a
matching that maximizes the coverage over the PoIs that her task needs.
• Budget feasibility [8, 9, 26, 44, 35]: Each task requester has a budget constraint
which should not be violated.
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• Worker preferences [47, 44, 35, 33]: Each worker desires to maximize his net
profit from the system in each task assignment period.
• Stability [47, 44, 35, 33]: Since the objectives above are likely to be in conflict
with each other, they should be achieved in a fair way that results in as few
unhappy users as possible.
In this study, we address all of these issues together and make the following
contributions:
• We formally define the stability conditions for task assignments in coverage-
aware, opportunistic MCS systems with budget constraints.
• We prove that a fully stable task assignment may not exist in some MCS in-
stances, and it is NP-hard even to check whether one exists in a given instance.
• We present a polynomial-time approximation algorithm for the stable task as-
signment problem, and prove that it always produces 4
1−ρ−stable matchings,
where ρ is the largest reward to budget ratio (normalized between 0 and 1) in
the system.
• We show that a variant of our algorithm has an approximation ratio of 5 in
MCS systems with proportional reward schemes, where the rewards offered to
the workers are proportional to the utility they provide for the tasks.
• We compare the performance of our algorithms with two benchmark algorithms
proposed in [8] and [9] via real-data based, extensive simulations, and show that
our algorithms produce significantly better task assignments in terms of both
user happiness (up to 25%) and achieved coverage (up to 18%), and run up to





We assume a system model with a matching platform that receives sensing task
requests T = {t1, t2, . . . , tn} over a set of PoIs P = {p1, p2, . . . , pk}, and determines
the assignments between these tasks and workers (data contributors). Each task t
needs a type of sensed data from a certain subset of PoIs, denoted by P (t) ⊆ P . For
a task, some of the PoIs might be more important than the others due to their spatial
features (e.g., being close to a production plant for an air pollution sensing task),
thus we also let each task t assign a weight vt(p) to each PoI p in P (t).
Let W = {w1, w2, . . . , wm} be the set of registered workers in the system. We
assume that workers are not willing to interrupt their daily schedule, but they accept
to perform the tasks on their trajectories, i.e., opportunistic sensing. According to
the frequency of task assignments and the nature and time sensitivity of tasks in
the system, a different portion and timescale of their future trajectories (e.g., daily,
hourly) can be considered in the task assignment process. Let Xw be the set of all
locations that will be visited by worker w during the considered time frame. Similar
to the previous work [8], we assume that a PoI is covered by worker w if it falls in
the sensing range dw of the worker. Then, the set of PoIs that are covered by worker
w is given by
C(w) = {p ∈ P : d(p, x) ≤ dw,∃x ∈ Xw}, (4.1)
where d(p, x) is the Euclidean distance between the PoI p and x ∈ Xw. The coverage
set of worker w for task t can then be defined as:
Cwt = C(w) ∩ P (t) (4.2)
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If the requester of task t needs to have some of the PoIs sensed by a deadline that is
earlier than the end of the current assignment cycle, and worker w will not arrive at
the corresponding locations in time according to his trajectory, then we can simply
remove these PoIs from Cwt . The total utility of a set S of workers for task t is equal






t = ∪w∈SCwt (4.3)
Consider the instance illustrated in Fig. 15, and let t be a task in this instance with
the following properties:
P (t) = {p1, p2, p3, p4},
vt(pi) = vt(pj) = 1,∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
Then, the individual utilities of workers w1 and w2 for task t would be Ut(w1) = 3
and Ut(w2) = 2, since they cover 3 and 2 of the PoIs requested in task t, respectively.
Their joint utility for task t would be Ut({w1, w2}) = 4, which is evidently less than
the sum of their individual utilities. This demonstrates the non-additiveness of the
utility function given in Eq. 4.3.
Moreover, we assume a budget-constrained system model with monetary incen-
tives, where the requester of task t has a budget bt that limits the amount of monetary
incentives to be spent for the completion of task t, and offers each eligible worker w
a reward rt(w) (≤ bt) to cover the PoIs in Cwt . Let rt(S) be the total rewards offered
to the worker set S (i.e., rt(S) =
∑
w∈S rt(w)). Besides, for each worker w, there is a
cost ct(w) associated with each task t, which worker w can estimate considering the
factors such as cost of delivering the sensed data to the task requester via cellular









Fig. 15. An MCS instance with 2 workers (w1, w2) and 4 PoIs (p1, p2, p3, p4). The
trajectories of workers are shown with solid lines.
Let M be a matching between the tasks and the workers in the system. Also,
letM(u) denote the assigned task (worker set) to worker (task) u inM. In order for
M to be a feasible and individually rational matching, it should satisfy the following
conditions:
• a worker w is either unmatched or matched with a task, i.e.,
M(w) = ∅ orM(w) ∈ T , (4.4)
• a task is matched with a subset of workers (which may be ∅), i.e.,
M(t) ⊆ W , (4.5)
• if worker w is matched with task t, the worker set of task t also includes worker
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w, and vice versa, i.e.,
M(w) = t iff w ∈M(t), (4.6)
• no worker w is matched with a task that is not economically beneficial for him,
i.e.,
rt(w) > ct(w) ifM(w) = t, (4.7)
• and, no task t is matched with a set of workers that she cannot afford, i.e.,
∑
w∈M(t)
rt(w) ≤ bt. (4.8)
The worker-task pair (w, t) is said to be a qualified pair if there exists a feasible and
individually rational matching, in which worker w is matched with task t.
Reward schemes. In this study, we consider two different reward schemes: general
and proportional. In the general scheme, there is not any assumed relation between
the rewards a task requester offers to workers and the utility they provide for the
relevant task. However, based on the common practice seen in most of the real-world
applications (e.g., Amazon MTurk [83]), it is natural to see a correlation between the
two. Hence, in the proportional scheme, we assume that for each task t, the amount
of rewards offered to the workers are proportional to their utility. That is
rt(w) = θt × Ut(w), (4.9)
where θt denotes the reward per utility value for task t. It should be noted that a
different task t′ may have a different reward per utility value (i.e., θt ̸= θt′).
A summary of the key notations used in this chapter is presented in Table 5.
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Notation Description
W , T , P Set of workers, tasks and PoIs, respectively
m, n, k Number of workers, tasks and PoIs, respectively
M A feasible & individually rational task assignment
M(u) Assigned task (worker set) to worker (task) u inM
ct(w) Cost of performing task t for worker w
rt(w) Reward offered to worker w to perform task t




P (t) PoI set of task t
vt(p) Weight of PoI p ∈ P (t) for task t
C(w) Set of PoIs covered by worker w
Cwt C(w) ∩ P (t)
Ut(S) Utility of S ⊆ W for task t
bt Budget of task t
bMt Remaining budget of task t inM
δt Dissatisfaction ratio of task t
Lw Preference list of worker w
dw Sensing range of worker w
ρ maxw∈W,t∈T rt(w)/bt
Table 5. Notations used in Chapter 4.
4.2.2 Problem Formulation
Below, we formally define the stability conditions for our settings.
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Definition 10 (Unhappy coalition). Given a matching M, a task t and a subset S
of workers form an unhappy coalition (denoted by ⟨S, t⟩) if the following conditions
hold for a subset S ′ of the workers assigned to task t inM:
• task t would be better off with S than with S ′, i.e.,
Ut(S ∪ (M(t) \ S ′)) > Ut(M(t)), (4.10)
• task t can replace S ′ with S without violating her budget constraint, i.e.,
rt(S)− rt(S ′) ≤ bMt , (4.11)
where bMt is the remaining budget of task t inM (i.e., bMt = bt−
∑
w∈M(t) rt(w)),
• every worker w in S prefers task t to task t′ to whom he is currently assigned
inM, i.e.,
∀w ∈ S, gt(w) > gt′(w), (4.12)
where gt(w) = rt(w)− ct(w) is the net profit of performing task t for worker w,
and gt′(w) = 0 if worker w is currently unmatched (i.e.,M(w) = t′ = ∅).
Given a worker-task pair (w, t), if there exists an unhappy coalition ⟨S, t⟩ such
that w ∈ S, we call this pair a coalitionally unhappy pair.
Definition 11 (Stable matching). A matching M is (coalitionally) stable if it does
not contain any unhappy coalitions.
Note that this is the strongest stability definition in many-to-one matching prob-
lems (see [65] for weaker stability definitions). Therefore, if a matching is stable, no
one in the matching has even a small incentive to deviate from their current assign-
ment. However, even with additive utilities where the total utility of a set of workers
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for a task is simply the sum of their individual utilities, a stable matching may not
exist, and checking the existence (and finding one if exists) is NP-hard [65]. Since
non-additive utilities are a more generalized form of additive utilities (i.e., a prob-
lem instance with additive utilities can easily be converted to one with non-additive
utilities, but not vice versa), we conclude that the same existence and hardness re-
sults also apply to the problem of finding stable matchings in our settings where the
utilities of workers for tasks are non-additive as we have
Ut({wi, wj}) < Ut({wi}) + Ut({wj}). (4.13)
when Ct(wi) ∩ Ct(wj) ̸= ∅. The following theorem formally proves nonexistence of
optimal solutions in some MCS instances.
Theorem 6. There exist MCS instances that do not allow for a stable matching.
Proof. We prove by giving an example, which is described in Table 6. All of the
feasible and individually rational matchings that can be defined on this instance is
also provided in Table 7. Since each matching contains at least one unhappy coalition,
we conclude that no stable matching exists in this instance.
Due to the nonexistence and hardness results for stable matchings, we consider
the following relaxation. First, let St be the set of all worker sets that form an
unhappy coalition with task t in a given matchingM. Formally,
St = {G ⊆ W : ⟨G, t⟩ is an unhappy coalition}. (4.14)
Also, ∀S ∈ St, let
ES = {E ⊆M(t) : rt(S) ≤ bMt + rt(E)}, (4.15)
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Rewards
W C(w) t1 t2 T P (t) bt
w1 p1, p2, p3, p4 4 0 t1 p1−9 5
w2 p5, p6, p7, p10, p11 3 2 t2 p10−12 3
w3 p8, p9, p12 2 3
Table 6. An MCS instance where no fully optimal or stable task assignment exists.
The weights of the PoIs are identical for both tasks, and cw(t) = 0 for all
(w, t) pairs.
M Unhappy coalition δt1 δt2
t1 → ∅; t2 → ∅ ⟨{w1}, t1⟩ ∞ ∞
t1 → ∅; t2 → w2 ⟨{w1}, t1⟩ ∞ 1
t1 → ∅; t2 → w3 ⟨{w1}, t1⟩ ∞ 2
t1 → w1; t2 → ∅ ⟨{w2}, t2⟩ 5/4 ∞
t1 → w2; t2 → ∅ ⟨{w3}, t2⟩ 5/3 ∞
t1 → w3; t2 → ∅ ⟨{w2}, t2⟩ 5/2 ∞
t1 → w2, w3; t2 → ∅ ⟨{w3}, t2⟩ 1 ∞
t1 → w1, t2 → w2 ⟨{w2, w3}, t1⟩ 5/4 1
t1 → w1, t2 → w3 ⟨{w2}, t2⟩ 1 2
t1 → w2, t2 → w3 ⟨{w1}, t1⟩ 4/3 1
t1 → w3, t2 → w2 ⟨{w2}, t1⟩ 5/2 1
Table 7. All feasible matchings that can be defined on the instance given in Table 6






Ut(E \ (S ∪M(t))). (4.16)
That is, SR ⊆M(t) is the minimum loss worker set that can be replaced by S within
the budget constraint of task t. Then, we can calculate the dissatisfaction ratio of
task t in this matching by:
δt =

1, if St = ∅









Note that the minimum value that δt can have is 1, which indicates that task t







Consider the instance given in Table 6. Based on the dissatisfaction ratios of
tasks in different feasible matchings provided in Table 7, the optimal matching with
respect to (4.18) is t1 → w1, t2 → w2 where the value of (4.18) is 0.8. The following
definition will be used hereafter to signify how optimal a matching is in terms of
stability.
Definition 12 (α-stable matching). A matchingM is α-stable (α ≥ 1) if
max
t∈T
δt ≤ α. (4.19)
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Algorithm 5: Initialize (W , T ),M
Input: W : Set of workers
T : Set of tasks
M: Matching between W and T
1 foreach w ∈ W do
2 Lw ← order T by non-increasing value of gt(w)
3 Lw ← Lw \ {t ∈ Lw | gt(w) ≤ 0}
4 indexw = 1
5 M(w) = ∅
6 foreach t ∈ T do
7 foreach w ∈ W do
8 xt(w) = 0, ηt(w) = 0
9 foreach p ∈ P (t) do
10 zt(p, w) = 0
11 Ht = ∅
12 M(t) = ∅
13 At = false
4.3 Proposed Solution
The outline of our polynomial-time approximation algorithm is presented in Al-
gorithm 6. The main idea behind it is to check the potential assignments between
the qualified pairs following the order in the preference lists of the workers, and make
matching decisions by converting the worker selection problem to an online optimiza-
tion problem. It begins by calling Algorithm 5, which forms the preference list Lw
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Algorithm 6: StableTaskAssignment (W , T , σ)
Input: W : Set of workers
T : Set of tasks
σ: Reward scheme (general or proportional)
1 LetM be a matching between W and R
2 Initialize(W , T ,M)
3 Stack.push(W)
4 while Stack is not empty do
5 w ← Stack.pop()
6 if indexw ≤ |Lw| then
7 t ← (indexw)th task in Lw
8 indexw = indexw + 1
9 M(w) = t,M(t) =M(t) ∪ {w}
10 if σ is general then
11 R ←WorkerSelection(t, w,M)
12 else
13 R ←WorkerSelectionProportional(t, w,M)
14 foreach w′ ∈ R do
15 M(t)←M(t) \ w′,M(w′) = ∅
16 Stack.push(w′)
17 returnM
of each worker w5 (i.e., tasks in non-increasing order of profits they will provide to
5A worker can also form his preference list himself and submit only this list to the
platform, if he does not like to disclose his cost (or profit) for each task.
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worker w), and initializes the matching and the other required variables. Throughout
its execution, our algorithm maintains a stack that consists of the workers that are
unmatched and whose preference lists have not been entirely traversed by the algo-
rithm (i.e., indexw ≤ |Lw|). In each iteration of the while loop, it pops one (w) of
these workers from the stack and attempts to assign him to the next task (t) in his
preference list. Although the matching is temporarily updated by assigning worker
w to task t (line 9), the actual decision of acceptance is made by calling Algorithm
7 or Algorithm 8 (which are described later in this section) according to the adopted
reward scheme. These algorithms return the workers (R) that are removed from the
current assignment set of task t. Then, the algorithm sets these workers free again
and pushes them back onto the stack (lines 14-16).
Below, we present the performance guarantees of the algorithm with both gen-
eral and proportional reward schemes by leveraging the analogy between the worker
selection step of the algorithm (lines 11 and 13) and the online budgeted maximum
coverage (OBMC) problem. To this end, we first give a brief description of this
problem.
OBMC problem: Assume that a predefined budget B and a universal set U =
{u1, u2, . . . , up̂} with associated weights {v̂i : i = 1, . . . , p̂} are given. In each iteration
i, a set Si ⊆ U with a cost of ci is introduced in an online manner, and the objective
is to maximize the weighted coverage over U within the budget constraint by keeping
a certain subset of the introduced sets S = {S1, S2, . . . , Sn̂}. However, the budget
limit cannot be exceeded at any time (i.e., the total cost of the retained sets should
always be less than B), and a set that has been rejected/preempted at some point
cannot be included in the solution later.
Theorem 7. (Rawitz and Rosen [84]) There is a 4
1−r -competitive online deterministic
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4.3.1 General Reward Scheme
We first describe the task selection mechanism for the general reward scheme by
giving a pseudo-code description in Algorithm 7. This algorithm is adapted from the
OBMC algorithm mentioned in Theorem 7 to our setting (also optimized for running
time, which was not a primary concern in [84])). It accepts a new set if the ratio of
the additional utility (i.e., weighted coverage) the set will provide to its cost is larger
than 2 times the ratio of the total utility to the total cost in the current solution (line
6). If accepting the set violates the budget constraint, the sets in the current solution
are discarded one by one in non-decreasing order of efficiency (utility provided per
cost) until the budget constraint is satisfied. Another unique aspect of this algorithm
is that when it calculates the total utility in the current solution, it also accounts for
the distinct utility that was provided by the set that was discarded the latest as if it
had been partially kept in the solution. For each task t, the workers in this imaginary
solution are stored in Ht, the fraction of C
w
t used in the imaginary solution is stored
in xt(w), the efficiency of a worker w in Ht is stored in ηt(w), and the fraction of a
PoI p covered by Cwt is stored in zt(p, w). Interested readers are referred to [84] for
more detailed descriptions of these variables.
Theorem 8. Algorithm 6 always produces 4
1−ρ-stable matchings in an MCS system







Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Assume that there is an unhappy coalition
⟨Ŝ, t̂⟩ that prevents the final matching produced by the algorithm from being a 4
1−ρ -
stable matching. Thus, based on Definition 12, there must be a set S ′ ⊆ M(t̂) such
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Algorithm 7: WorkerSelection (t, w,M)
Input: t, w,M: task evaluating worker w, candidate worker, current
matching
1 xt(w) = 1
2 foreach p ∈ Cwt do




4 ηt(w) = ηt(w) + zt(p, w)vt(p)
5 ηt(w) = ηt(w)× bt/rt(w)





′)vt(p) then return {w}
7 insert w to Ht by maintaining the order, i.e., Ht = {ŵ1, ŵ2, .., ŵq} s.t.
ηt(ŵi) ≥ ηt(ŵi+1), ∀i < q
8 k ← max{k′ ≤ |Ht| : γ =
∑k−1
i=1 rt(w) < bt}
9 bMt = bt − γ
10 w′ ← kth worker in Ht
11 β = min{bMt /rt(w′), 1}





13 R = ∅
14 if xt(w
′) = 1 and β < 1 then R ← {w′}
15 xt(w
′) = β
16 for i← |Ht| down to k + 1 do
17 ŵ ← ith worker in Ht
18 Ht.remove(ŵ)








and rt̂(Ŝ) ≤ bMt̂ + rt̂(S
′).
LetW = {w1, w2, . . . , wl} be the set of workers that have been matched to task t̂
at some point during the course of the execution of Algorithm 6. The corresponding
coverage sets of these workers are C t̂ = {C
wi
t̂
: 1 ≤ i ≤ l}, and the rewards offered to
these workers by task t̂ are given as Rt̂ = {rt̂(wi) : 1 ≤ i ≤ l}.
Note also that the algorithm attempts to match a single worker-task pair at a
time, and if a worker w is first matched with a task t (line 9) and then removed from
M(t) at some point (lines 14-16), the algorithm will never attempt to match him
with task t afterwards, instead it will try to match him with other tasks which come
after task t in his preference list Lw. Thus, from a task’s perspective, say task t̂,
this is exactly the same problem with the OBMC problem, as we have a collection C t̂
of sets with associated costs Rt̂ that arrive one at a time, and that cannot be later
included to the solutionM(t̂) after they are discarded, and the goal of task t̂ is also
to maximize the weighted coverage within the budget. In fact, we can map the two
problems to each other as follows:
U ←→ P (t̂),
S ←→ C t̂,




For this reason, Algorithm 6 runs the adapted version of the OBMC algorithm (i.e.,
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Algorithm 7) as a subroutine (line 11) to decide which workers to keep in the worker
set of a task after the algorithm attempts to assign another worker to her. Then, by





where Sbest ⊆ W is the best set that could be assigned to task t̂ providing the highest
total weighted coverage within the budget constraint (i.e., an optimal solution of the




Note that Ŝ cannot include a worker that is not in W , thus we have
(
Ŝ ∪ (M(t̂) \ S ′)
)
⊆ W . (4.24)
That is because, by Definition 10, all workers in Ŝ must be preferring task t̂ to the
tasks they are currently assigned. However, if a worker w is currently matched with
task t′, the algorithm should have attempted to assign him all the other tasks that
precede task t′ in his preference list. Then, if worker w prefers task t̂ to task t′, which
means that task t̂ also precedes task t′ in his preference list, we must have w ∈ W .
Due to (4.24) and the fact that Sbest is the best feasible set in W for task t̂, we
have
Ut̂(Sbest) ≥ Ut̂(Ŝ ∪ (M(t̂) \ S ′)). (4.25)







which is a contradiction as ρ ≥ ρt̂.
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Algorithm 8: WorkerSelectionProportional (t,w,M)
Input: t: Task evaluating worker w
w: Candidate worker
M: Current matching
1 if At is false and rt(w) ≥ 0.2× bt then
2 At ← true
3 µ←M(t)
4 M(t)← {w}
5 bt = bt − rt(w)






8 Ht ← ∅
9 R ← ∅
10 foreach w′ ∈ µ do
11 M(t) =M(t) ∪ {w′}
12 ηt(w
′) = 0
13 R← R ∪ WorkerSelection(t, w′,M)
14 return R
15 else
16 return WorkerSelection(t, w,M)
4.3.2 Proportional Reward Scheme
We propose Algorithm 8 for the proportional reward scheme. It directly runs
Algorithm 7 (line 16) for task t until the main algorithm attempts to assign her a
worker w that satisfies rt(w) ≥ 0.2×bt. When this happens, the algorithm finalizes the
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assignment of worker w to task t (i.e., in the end, they will be matched to each other),
and updates the budget of task t (line 5) and coverage sets of workers (lines 6-7) to
reflect the fact that a certain proportion of task t’s budget is not available anymore,
and that the utility of the other workers should be computed considering only the
PoIs that are not covered by worker w. It also attempts to re-assign the previous
worker set of task t to her considering the modified budget and coverage sets (lines
10-14). In the subsequent iterations in which the main algorithm attempts to assign
another worker to task t, since At is previously set to true (line 2), the algorithm
continues to run Algorithm 7 with the modified budget of task t and coverage sets of
workers (line 16).
Theorem 9. Algorithm 6 always produces 5-stable matchings in the presence of a
proportional reward scheme.
Proof. We prove it by contradiction. LetM be the returned matching by the algo-
rithm, and ⟨Ŝ, t̂⟩ be an unhappy coalition inM that, for some S ′ ⊆M(t̂), satisfies
Ut̂(Ŝ ∪ (M(t̂) \ S ′)) > 5× Ut̂(M(t̂)) (4.27)
and rt̂(Ŝ) ≤ bMt̂ + rt̂(S
′).
Thus, ⟨Ŝ, t̂⟩ preventsM from being a 5-stable matching according to Definition 12.
If At̂ is true in the end, thenM(t̂) includes a worker w such that
rt̂(w) ≥ 0.2× bt̂. (4.28)
Since the utility Ut̂(w) of worker w is proportional to his reward rt̂(w), we have
Ut̂(M(t̂)) ≥ Ut̂(w) = θt × rt̂(w) (4.29)
Also, given the budget limit of task t̂, the total weighted coverage that the best
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feasible worker set can provide for task t̂ is at most
Umax = θt × bt̂. (4.30)
Then, by (4.28), (4.29) and (4.30), we get
5× Ut̂(M(t̂)) ≥ Umax (4.31)
≥ Ut̂(Ŝ ∪ (M(t̂) \ S ′)) (4.32)
which contradicts (4.27).
On the other hand, if At̂ is false in the end, then only Algorithm 7 has been run
for task t, similar to the case with the general reward scheme, thus the inequality
(4.23) must hold here as well. Since the inside of the if block in Algorithm 8 is never
executed, we have rt̂(w) < 0.2× bt̂, for all w ∈ W . Then, (4.23) becomes
Ut̂(Sbest) < 5× Ut̂(M(t̂)) (4.33)
Following the same steps ((4.24) and (4.25)) in the proof of Theorem 8, we obtain
5× Ut̂(M(t̂)) > 5× Ut̂(M(t̂)) (4.34)
which is also false and completes the proof.
4.3.3 Feasibility, Rationality and Efficiency Analysis
We lastly show that the proposed algorithms always produce individually rational
and feasible matchings, and analyze their asymptotic running times.
Theorem 10. Algorithm 6 always produces individually rational and feasible match-
ings.
Proof. Note that a worker can only get matched with a task in his preference list
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(line 7), and matching with any of the tasks in his preference list is profitable for him
since those that are not so are removed from his preference list in Algorithm 5 (line
3). Thus, we conclude that the produced matchings are individually rational. It is
clear from lines 9 & 15 of Algorithm 6 that the produced matchings are feasible in
terms of mutual partnership. As for the budget feasibility, when the reward scheme
is general, Algorithm 7 returns (line 8) the set of the least efficient workers that need
to be removed from the worker set of task t to stay within the budget constraint
bt, which are then actually removed from the worker set of task t in lines 14-16 of
Algorithm 6. When the reward scheme is proportional, Algorithm 8 either only runs
Algorithm 7 (line 16), or executes the inside of the if block beginning in line 1 at
most once for each task t, where the budget of task t is decreased (line 5) by the
reward amount that will be paid to the accepted worker w. After that, it always runs
Algorithm 7 for task t. Therefore, the produced matchings are also feasible.
We note that similar to the PSTA algorithm of Chapter 3, Algorithm 6 can
also be run in a distributed manner [79], because in each iteration of the main while
loop, the matching is updated according to the preference relation between a single
worker-task pair (w, t), so the changes in the matching can be communicated by this
worker-task pair to the other users that get affected by these changes (i.e., workers
in the set R computed in line 11 or 13 based on the reward scheme).
Running time. The initialization (i.e., running Algorithm 5) takes O(knm +
mn log(n)), where the latter term is due to sorting T for each worker. In Algorithm
6, each worker w is pushed onto the stack at most |Lw| ≤ T times, thus the while loop
iterates at most nm times. The costliest operations in the while loop for the general
and proportional reward schemes are running Algorithm 7 (line 11) and Algorithm
8 (line 13), respectively. Algorithm 7 runs in O(km) time. Since the inside of the if
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block in Algorithm 8 will be run at most once and hence Algorithm 7 will be called
at most 2 times for each worker-task pair (from lines 13 and 16 in Algorithm 8),
the amortized cost of Algorithm 8 also becomes O(km). Therefore, the worst-case
running time of our approximation algorithm is O(knm2 + mn log(n)) regardless of
the reward scheme.
4.4 Evaluation
In this section, we present an extensive evaluation of the proposed algorithms in
MCS systems with both general and proportional reward schemes.
4.4.1 Simulation Settings
Similar to [8], we utilize two real data sets [85, 86] that consist of the trajectories
of 39 and 92 participants from New York City (NYC) and the campus of the Korea
Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST), respectively. We create 300
PoIs at random locations that are on the trajectory (i.e., within 50 meters) of at least
one participant. Fig. 16 and 17 show the trajectories in the data sets and an example
of PoI distribution. Note that the way we determine PoI locations ensures that PoIs
are, as it can be seen in both figures, mostly in hot spots that are visited frequently
by participants as we would expect to see in a real-world scenario.
We let the trajectories in the data sets to be the trajectories of the workers in our
system. To look at the impact of the number of workers, we use random-sampling
to obtain a worker set of certain size. According to the experiment requirements,
we create n tasks whose budgets are assigned randomly from [10, 100]. In order to
determine the PoI list of a task t, we first select a random number s from [1, 25]. Then,
we randomly insert s of the all PoIs to P (t) after assigning a random weight value
from (0, 1]. Since we utilize deterministic trajectories, the lists of PoIs to be visited
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Fig. 16. Trajectories of the workers in the KAIST data set (circles denote the PoIs).
Fig. 17. Trajectories of the workers in the NYC data set (circles denote the PoIs).
by workers and the tasks they can complete are known in advance. The assignment
of the rewards for different reward schemes is made as follows:
• General reward scheme: For each worker-task pair (w, t), we assign the
reward rt(w) randomly from the range [0.05× bt, 0.95× bt]. If Cwt = ∅, we set
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rt(w) = 0.
• Proportional reward scheme: For each worker-task pair (w, t), the reward
is set as






Since the rewards are already determined based on the randomly assigned budget
values, we let ct(w) = 0 for all worker-task pairs (w, t)
6.
4.4.1.1 Benchmark Algorithms
In the simulations, we let CSTAG and CSTAP denote the execution of the pro-
posed Coverage-aware S table Task Assignment algorithm with general and propor-
tional reward schemes, respectively. We compare the performance of these algorithms
with that of Maximum Coverage Quality Assignment (or MCQA) algorithm proposed
in [8] and Greedy algorithm proposed in [9] for the problem of finding the worker set
with the maximum total weighted coverage over a given set of PoIs. They both are
originally proposed for the MCS systems with only a single task requester, m work-
ers, and k PoIs. The MCQA algorithm has an approximation ratio of (1 − 1/e) for
the aforementioned optimization problem and a time complexity of O(kn5). On the
other hand, the Greedy algorithm does not have a theoretical performance guarantee
and runs in O(knm2). We adapt them to our settings with multiple task requesters
as follows. For each task t in the system, we first find the set S of workers that,
among all the tasks in the system, prefer task t the most. Then, we separately run
the MCQA/Greedy algorithm for each such (t, S) pair with P (t) being the set of
6Introducing extra, random cost values naturally reduces the number of qualified
pairs and consequently the average coverage quality, but it does not have a notable
effect on the relative performance of the algorithms.
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PoIs, and finalize the assignments made in each run. Lastly, for each worker w that
is still unmatched, we traverse his preference list Lw from the beginning, and match
him with the first task that benefits from hiring him (i.e., worker w increases the
coverage quality of task t) and has sufficient budget to do so. These adapted versions
are denoted by MCQA* and Greedy* in the simulations.
4.4.1.2 Performance Metrics
Here, we introduce the performance metrics that will be used in the evaluation
of the results.
• Stability success ratio (%): This metric shows how often an algorithm achieves
the best known upper-bound in terms of stability in different settings. Specifi-
cally, letM1,M2, . . . ,M100 be the matchings produced by an algorithm A in 100
consecutive runs on different MCS instances. Also let
s(Mi, α) =

1, ifMi is an α-stable matching,
0, otherwise.
(4.36)











for the MCS systems with a proportional reward scheme.
• User happiness (%): This quantifies the user happiness based on the stability of
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the matching as follows:
100×
(
1− # of coalitionally unhappy pairs
# of qualified pairs
)
(4.39)
• Stability (σ): This is the value of the objective function defined in (4.18), and in-
dicates that the produced matching is (1/σ)-stable. If there is not any unhappy
coalition in the matching, then σ = 1 (by definition of δt).
• Average coverage quality (%): This is the average weighted coverage that the pro-









• Running time: In order to show the scalability of the algorithms, we also present
their running times with increasing number of workers/tasks/PoIs on an Intel core
i7 processor with 16 GB memory and 2.5 GHz speed.
Lastly, we note that all results provided in this section are the average of the
results obtained in 100 runs (each with a different MCS instance).
4.4.2 Results
We first analyze the results for the KAIST data set. Fig. 18 & 19 show the
impact of the number of tasks n on the performance of the algorithms with general
and proportional reward schemes, respectively. First, note that the performances of
the MCQA* and Greedy* algorithms in terms of stability (Fig. 18b and Fig. 19b)
deteriorate significantly as n increases. This is due to the fact that these algorithms
do not consider the system as a whole, and aim to maximize the coverage for each
task separately. However, since they optimize the assignments for individual tasks
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Fig. 18. General setting: performance comparison against varying number of tasks in
the KAIST data set (m = 92).
extensively (which, in turn, increases their running time significantly as can be seen
in Fig. 26), they outperform the other algorithms when n is small in terms of user
happiness (Fig. 18c and Fig. 19c) and average coverage quality (Fig. 19d).
In terms of stability success ratio, the CSTAG and CSTAP algorithms produce
perfect task assignments in the general and proportional settings, respectively, as
expected (due to Theorem 8 & 9), and vastly outperform the other algorithms. We see
that the CSTAG algorithm occasionally fails to produce perfect assignments in terms
of stability success ratio in the proportional setting, which indicates that assigning a
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Fig. 19. Proportional setting: performance comparison against varying number of
tasks in the KAIST data set (m = 92).
task t with the first worker w such that rt(w) ≥ 0.2 × bt (lines 1-14 in the CSTAP
algorithm) is required to achieve 5-stable matchings. Yet, this comes with a trade-off
as the CSTAP algorithm yields significantly lower stability scores (σ) compared to the
CSTAG algorithm as seen in Fig. 19b. Since the Greedy* algorithm selects workers
according to the ratio of how much utility they will bring for the tasks to the reward
they will be paid, its performance is much better than the MCQA* algorithm in the
proportional setting where the value of the proposed reward per utility is constant
for all workers.
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Fig. 20. General setting: performance comparison against varying number of workers
in the KAIST data set (n = 15).
In the average coverage quality graphs (Fig. 18d and 19d), we see that the
average coverage decreases for all algorithms with increasing n as there will be fewer
workers assigned to each task. We also see that the coverage scores in the proportional
setting are remarkably larger than those in the general setting mainly because of the
discrepancy between reward and utility values in the latter setting (i.e., a high reward
does not indicate a high utility for tasks, unlike the proportional setting). It is also
noteworthy that in terms of coverage, the proposed algorithms mostly outperform the
MCQA* and Greedy* algorithms, whose sole objective is to maximize the coverage.
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Fig. 21. Proportional setting: performance comparison against varying number of
workers in the KAIST data set (n = 15).
This demonstrates that taking user preferences into account does not necessarily yield
less efficient assignments in terms of system-level utility metrics such as coverage.
Next, we look at the performance of the algorithms with varying number of
workers in Fig. 20 & 21. Except for the user happiness results, we observe that
increasing the number of workers m has a similar impact on the performance of the
MCQA* algorithm with decreasing the number of tasks n. This is because both
changes result in a smaller ratio of n to m (i.e., task scarcity), which alleviates the
deficiency of the MCQA* algorithm in handling multi-task assignments. This is also
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Fig. 22. General setting: performance comparison against varying number of tasks in
the NYC data set (m = 39).
mostly true for the Greedy* algorithm, however its performance in terms of stability
success ratio in the proportional setting is more stable. We note that the changes in
the number of tasks or workers do not have a significant impact on the stability and
stability success ratio scores of the proposed algorithms in the proportional setting
as seen in Fig. 19a-b and 21a-b. Another remarkable point is that the MCQA*
and Greedy* algorithms have almost identical performance in the general setting
with varying n and m values, yet their performance in the proportional setting is
quite different. Specifically, in terms of stability success ratio and user happiness,
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Fig. 23. Proportional setting: performance comparison against varying number of
tasks in the NYC data set (m = 39).
the Greedy* algorithm mostly outperforms the MCQA* algorithm, while it is the
opposite in terms of stability and average coverage quality.
Fig. 20 & 21 show that the CSTAG algorithm always outperforms the MCQA*
algorithm in terms of user happiness (by up to 25%) regardless of the number of
workers, but it is slightly outperformed by the Greedy* algorithm when m is larger
than 70 in the proportional setting, and that the performance of the proposed algo-
rithms mostly degrades as m increases. We observe that all algorithms achieve higher
coverage scores with increasing m values, which is naturally the opposite of what we
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Fig. 24. General setting: performance comparison against varying number of workers
in the NYC data set (n = 10).
see with increasing n values. This is because if there are more workers per task in
the system, the competition between tasks will be less severe, and each task will be
assigned to a higher number of workers, on average. However, the budget constraints
of the tasks limit the number of workers that can be assigned to them, hence we
start to see a smaller or no increase in coverage after some point, especially in the
proportional setting. We also note that the stability of the matchings produced by
the proposed algorithms is significantly higher than the theoretical upper-bound (0.2)
in the proportional settings (Fig. 19b & 21b). Besides, Fig. 20b & 21b demonstrate
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Fig. 25. Proportional setting: performance comparison against varying number of
workers in the NYC data set (n = 10).
that our algorithms always significantly outperform the MCQA* and Greedy* algo-
rithm in terms of σ. The difference in σ is especially big (up to 0.6) when the ratio
of n to m is larger.
In order to demonstrate that the results provided above are not specific to a
data set, we also examine the performance of the algorithms in the NYC data set in
Fig. 22, 23, 24 & 25. The proposed algorithms in general perform better than the
benchmark algorithm as in the KAIST data set. The results in both data sets are
similar, thus the majority of our comments above for the KAIST data set also apply
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to the results for the NYC data set. However, there are some differences in results
we see in the NYC data set. The first significant difference can be seen between Fig.
21c and Fig. 25c. Here, we see that increasing the number of workers continues to
improve the achieved coverage in the NYC data set, while there is mostly little to
no improvement in the KAIST data set. This is primarily because of the limited
number of workers (39) available in the NYC data set. That is, since the tasks still
have budget for more workers, adding new workers to the system simply expands the
coverage. This can also be partially observed in Fig. 21 up until m = 60. Another
noteworthy difference is in the user happiness results in proportional setting. All
algorithms accomplish better user happiness scores (up to 20%) in the NYC data set
compared to those in KAIST data set (i.e., Fig. 19b vs. Fig. 23b and Fig. 21b vs.
Fig. 25b). This might be because the trajectories of the workers in the NYC data
set are more dispersed than those in the KAIST data set (see Fig. 16 & 17), which,
in turn, reduces the overall competition between the tasks as such a difference in the
trajectories implies that the PoIs covered by the workers differ more in the NYC data
set, and the workers are hence favored by different tasks.
Lastly, we compare the running times of the algorithms in Fig. 26. In order to
show the scalability of the algorithms for large numbers of tasks, workers and PoIs, we
generated a synthetic data set in a 3,000 m × 3,000 m area with k randomly located
PoIs, m workers whose trajectories are created using the random-walk mobility model
(as in [8]) for 2,000 meters (with a direction change at every 200 meters), and n tasks
whose PoI sets and budgets are determined exactly as in the real data sets. Since
the proportional setting allows us to compare the running times of all algorithms, the
rewards are assigned using the proportional reward mechanism (the running times of
the MCQA*, Greedy* and CSTAG algorithms in proportional setting are similar to
their running times in the general setting).
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Recall that in the MCQA* algorithm, the original MCQA algorithm is run sep-
arately for each task t and the set Qt of workers that prefer task t the most, and
the time complexity of each such run is O(k̂m̂5), where k̂ = |P (t)| and m̂ = |Qt|.
Since fewer tasks in the system means that for each task t, there will be more workers
that prefer t the most (i.e., a larger |Qt|), the running time of the MCQA* algorithm
increases when n decreases (Fig. 26a) or m increases (Fig. 26b). The time com-
plexity of the original Greedy algorithm is O(knm2), and its running time decreases
with increasing n values up until n = 25 due to the same reason (i.e., fewer workers
per task). After this point, the second phase of the Greedy* algorithm, which also
has a time complexity of O(knm2) and is where the algorithm tries to match the
workers that could not get matched with any tasks during the first phase as pro-
posed in our adaptation, starts to dominate the running time and we begin to see
a linear growth. In these figures, we also see that the running times of the CSTAG
and CSTAP algorithms are mostly a few orders of magnitude smaller than that of
the MCQA* algorithm. This is simply because of the superior time complexity of
these algorithms: O(knm2 +mn log(n)). They also run significantly faster than the
Greedy* algorithm. Note that while the complexity of proposed algorithms will be
the same as the Greedy* algorithm, because log(n) ≪ km for most values used in
practice, their actual running times are less than that of the Greedy* algorithm. This
is because the preference list of each worker in the proposed algorithms contains only
a limited number of tasks as a rational worker will accept only the tasks that request
data from some of the PoIs on his trajectory (line 3 of Algorithm 1). So, the number
of times workers are pushed onto the stack is generally much smaller than n × m,
making O(knm2) not tight. Finally, we note that the running times of all algorithms
increase linearly with the increasing number of PoIs k as seen in Fig. 26c, which is
in accordance with the influence of k in their asymptotic running times.
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Fig. 26. Running times of the algorithms with varying number of (a) tasks (m = 200,
k = 300); (b) workers (n = 20, k = 300); and (c) PoIs (n = 20, m = 200)
with the proportional reward scheme in the synthetic data set.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we studied the problem of finding stable multi-task assignments
with weighted coverage-based utility functions in a budget-constrained and oppor-
tunistic mobile crowdsensing scenario. We first defined the stability (or user happi-
ness) conditions within this scenario, and pointed out the hardness of the problem
and nonexistence of optimal solutions in some cases. We then presented two ap-
proximation algorithms and derived their approximation ratios in different settings.
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Finally, we provided an extensive evaluation of the proposed algorithms, and showed
that they largely outperform the considered benchmark algorithms in terms of both
user happiness and coverage quality while having significantly smaller running times
(up to 4 orders of magnitude).
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CHAPTER 5
ONLINE PREFERENCE-AWARE TASK ASSIGNMENT WITH
UNCERTAIN WORKER TRAJECTORIES
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we focus on the online task assignment problem in opportunistic
MCS. Here, different from the previous two chapters, we consider uncertain and
uncontrollable worker trajectories, and simple tasks, which do not have coverage
requirements and can be efficiently completed by a single worker. The three key
issues that need to be addressed in this problem are (i) preference-awareness, (ii)
uncertainty in worker trajectories, and (iii) capacity constraints. Below, we explore
each of these issues along with the challenges they present, how they have been so
far addressed in the MCS literature, and the key contributions of this study on each
of these issues.
(i) Preference-awareness: A task assignment strategy is said to be preference-aware
if its primary objective is to make all workers and task requesters in the system
happy with their assignments based on their individual preferences. A preference-
aware mechanism should ensure that the produced assignments are fair and do not
sacrifice the utility of a group of workers and task requesters in favor of some others.
(ii) Uncertainty in worker trajectories: This issue arises in MCS systems, where
workers prefer not to disclose their exact trajectories due to privacy concerns, or their
trajectories change dynamically due to traffic/road conditions or individual factors












Fig. 27. An MCS instance with three tasks and two workers. Some possible worker
trajectories for w1 and w2 are shown with solid and dashed lines, respectively,
and task regions are enclosed with circles.
gers). This issue is partly investigated in the MCS literature [31, 30], but without
considering the preferences of workers and task requesters.
(iii) Capacity constraints: In order to avoid disruptions to their daily schedule, work-
ers in opportunistic MCS campaigns may choose to bound the number of tasks they
accept to perform for each assignment period. The classic deferred-acceptance mech-
anism proposed by Gale and Shapley [42] can be used to find preference-aware assign-
ments in general matching problems even in presence of capacity constraints, but it
works only in offline settings, where the eligibility of every (worker-task) pair is known
and fixed. This is not the case in our setting, where the trajectories of workers, hence
which tasks they can perform, are uncertain. On the other hand, the studies that
consider capacity (or budget) constraints for workers in the MCS literature [38, 87]
neglect to address the previous two issues.
As summarized above, these three issues have yet to be studied together, de-
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spite being crucial for the success of an opportunistic MCS campaign. To fill this
gap, in this chapter, we study the preference-aware task assignment problem within
an opportunistic MCS model with uncertain worker trajectories and given capacity
constraints. To point out some of the challenges this problem entails, let us analyze
a few different scenarios in the MCS instance illustrated in Fig. 27, which consists
of two workers (w1, w2) and three tasks (t1, t2, t3) scattered in the area. Assume that
w1 can potentially visit all three task regions, while w2 can visit only t3’s region, but
it is not known in advance if they will actually do so. Consider the three (p1, p2, p3)
and two (p4, p5) of possible trajectories and visit scenarios for w1 and w2, respectively,
shown in Fig. 27. If the workers do not have a capacity constraint (i.e., can perform
every task on their way) or have a capacity of at least three, then w1 should always be
matched with tasks t1 and t2 if he visits their regions, as w1 is the only worker that can
perform these tasks. However, since the region of t3 can be visited by both workers,
it is not trivial to decide an assignment for t3 even if there is no capacity constraint
for workers. This is because the preference of t3 based on the worker qualities needs
to be considered along with how likely the workers will be visiting the region of t3.
On the other hand, the preferences of workers become important when they are
constrained by a capacity. For instance, assume that the capacity of w1 is one, and
the probability of p3 is negligible. Then, when worker w1 visits the region of t1 and
a matching decision needs to be made between w1 and t1, we need to consider the
preference of w1 on tasks t1 and t2 based on their rewards as well as the likelihood
of p1 and p2. For example, even if p1 is more probable than p2, it may still be more
profitable to skip t1 if the reward of t2 is significantly larger than that of t1. In such
scenarios, the matching decisions should be made according to the expected utilities
of workers and task requesters to consider their preferences.
Let us consider another scenario, in which worker w1 has a capacity of one and is
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more likely to take path p3, and the reward of t3 is much greater than that of t1 and
t2. Then, in order for the decision of skipping the potential matching opportunities
with t1 and t2 to be justifiable for w1, either the probability of p5 should be low, or
the quality of w1 should be substantially better than that of w2 so that task t3 would
be willing to skip the opportunity to match with w2 if he ended up taking path p5.
Here, the timeliness of the visits also plays a major role. If the quality scores of the
workers are very close to each other, the best strategy for the tasks would be to get
matched with the first worker that visits their regions, because the risk of losing a
matching opportunity at hand to wait for another worker would not be worth the
extra benefit that they may possibly get by waiting. Therefore, the actual number of
scenarios that needs to be examined to make an optimal task assignment gets much
larger when we take the timeliness of worker visits into consideration.
Moreover, in real instances, the uncertainty in worker visits may be even more
severe, in which case the number of possible scenarios is likely to grow exponentially
with the number of participants and the campaign duration. In this study, we address
these issues and provide polynomial-time algorithms that produce task assignments
that maximize the happiness of users with their assignments with respect to their
preferences by considering all possible scenarios in an efficient manner. Our primary
contributions in this study can be summarized as follows:
• We introduce the preference-aware task assignment problem in opportunistic
MCS systems, where task assignments need to be made in an online manner
due to uncertain worker trajectories.
• We formulate the criteria for preference-awareness in this problem after showing
that the existing preference-awareness objectives used in the literature (e.g.,
minimizing the number of unhappy pairs) do not work when worker trajectories
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are uncertain.
• We study the problem in MCS systems with and without capacity constraints,
and propose a polynomial-time online algorithm for each case, which we then
show to be preference-aware by theoretical analysis.
• We perform extensive simulations with both real and synthetic data sets, and




At the center of our system model is a service provider (SP) that receives the
sensing task inquiries from different requesters and assigns them to appropriate par-
ticipants. Formally, in each (hourly, daily, weekly) assignment period that is di-
vided into discretized time-steps (0, 1, .., T ), the responsibility of SP is to assign a
set of sensing tasks T = {t1, t2, . . . , tm} to a set of workers registered to the system
W = {w1, w2, . . . , wn} in a way that will satisfy both parties (user satisfaction criteria
will be described below).
Each task t has spatio-temporal constraints for successful completion. Let t.r and
[t.b, t.d] denote the geographic region and the time frame (between the beginning time
and deadline) in which task t should be performed, respectively. Tasks are assumed to
require simple sensing activity such as taking pictures [88], recording noise levels [89],
and reporting traffic volume [78] or crowdedness [90]. Thus, they take a few seconds to
complete (thus neglected for simplicity), and they can be completed anytime during
the specified time frame. Each task t is also associated with a monetary reward m(t)
that is paid to the worker who performs it by the task requester upon successful
106
delivery of the sensed data.
The workers in our system model perform opportunistic sensing, so they do not
travel to the task locations by interrupting their own schedules. Instead, they get
assigned to a task only when they happen to be in the task region. Therefore, there
is no travel cost associated with the tasks. Each worker w has a capacity c(w),
which indicates the maximum number of tasks worker w is willing to perform in a
single assignment period. This can be a necessary constraint if the tasks require a
certain level of involvement, causing the workers to lose some time. However, we
also investigate task assignments in MCS systems that do not require involvement of
workers and hence have no capacity constraints. Each worker w also has a quality
score q(w), which may refer to the likelihood of completing the assigned tasks as
in [91], the expected quality of the sensed data [44], or the trustworthiness of the
worker [92]. Some real-world mobile crowdsensing/sourcing systems that use a single
numerical value to specify the qualification of workers include Waze [78] and Uber
[93], which, respectively, utilize what is called Waze points and a five-star quality
rating system.
In order to simplify our analysis, we rearrange the worker and task sets in de-
creasing order of the quality scores of workers and rewards of tasks, respectively.
Thus, hereafter we have
q(wi) > q(wi+1), 1 ≤ i < n, (5.1)
and
m(tj) > m(tj+1), 1 ≤ j < m. (5.2)
If there are ties, we assume they are either broken by secondary factors such as
registration time, or in an arbitrary manner so that there is only one possible order
for both sets. Here, we note that the results of this study hold as long as the sets of
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workers and tasks can be ordered as in (5.1) and (5.2). Within this constraint, it is
possible to have non-uniform worker qualities and task rewards. For example, a task
requester can offer a larger reward to workers with a higher quality score, as long
as the rewards offered for a task t are always greater or always smaller than those
offered for another task t′. This makes it possible to form a universal preference list
for workers based on task rewards.
We assume that the trajectories of workers are uncertain but predictable, and
revealed in real-time during the assignment period, so the task assignments have to
be made in an online manner. However, the set of agents (i.e., workers and tasks)
and all other parameters in the system such as task rewards and worker quality scores
are certain and known to SP by the beginning of each assignment period. Let λi,j
be the average inter-visit time of worker wi to the region tj.r. Then, assuming an
exponential distribution (similar to [30, 50, 51, 52]), the probability that worker wi
visits tj.r in a time frame of length L is computed as follows:
Vi,j(L) = 1− e−L/λi,j (5.3)
The results of this study, however, do not depend on the underlying distribution
model, and other probability functions including those produced by machine learning
methods [94], which can integrate any dependency between the visits of a worker to
different regions, can be used as well.
Once the task set for the current assignment period is determined, each worker wi
will be asked to provide SP with λi,j values for the region of each task tj ∈ T . To this
end, workers should be maintaining their visit records with a sufficient geographic
density, as task regions may differ between assignment periods. They can submit
arbitrarily large numbers for regions they have not visited, or for which they do not
feel comfortable disclosing their true visit frequency for privacy-related reasons. Also,
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they can always inform SP of the regions they will definitely visit if certain parts of
their trajectories are (or become) fixed. A legitimate concern here would be the
possibility of receiving fabricated λi,j values from some workers aiming to increase
their gains from the system in a malicious manner. However, workers are required to
inform SP when they enter one of the task regions to be considered for the assignment
of the corresponding task, as a task may be assigned to a worker only when the worker
is in the task region. Thus, SP can easily verify the accuracy of the received λi,j values
based on the visit frequencies of worker wi, and reduce the quality scores of dishonest
workers.
5.2.2 Problem Formulation
We represent the task assignments in our model with a matchingM between the
sets W and T , whereM(w) andM(t) denote the set of tasks assigned to worker w
and the worker assigned to task t, respectively. If user (worker or task) u is unassigned
inM, thenM(u) = ∅. For a matching to be feasible according to our system model,
it should satisfy the following constraints for each w ∈ W and t ∈ T :
• M(t) ∈ W ∪ {∅},
• M(w) ⊆ T ,
• |M(w)| ≤ c(w),
• M(t) = w ⇔ t ∈M(w).
We assume a transparent SP whose decisions are visible to the users so that each
user can see with whom they could be matched, but did not. In such a setting, it is
crucial to produce impartial and satisfactory task assignments that do not sacrifice
the benefit of some users for the others or for maximizing the overall matching utility
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according to some system-level metric such as the number of completed tasks. We
will use the following definitions to refer to the user happiness in a matching.
Definition 13 (Unhappy pair). A worker-task pair (w, t) is said to be unhappy in a
matchingM if
• worker w has visited region t.r between the time frame [t.b, t.d],
• task t is either unmatched or matched to a worker w′ with a smaller QoS score
than worker w (i.e., prefers w to w′),
• worker w has unused capacity (i.e., |M(w)| < c(w)), or the reward of at least
one task t′ inM(w) is smaller than that of task t (i.e., prefers t to t′).
From the perspective of worker w and task t, the first condition in the definition
indicates that there was in fact an opportunity for them to get matched, and the last
two indicate that SP instead matched them with some other users that they rationally
prefer less, or left them unmatched/with an unused capacity.
Definition 14 (Stable matching). A matchingM is stable if it contains no unhappy
pairs.
Although we can always find a stable matching in an offline setting (as it will be
shown in the next section), it may not be possible to do so in an online setting where
we do not know whether and when a worker will visit a region. Consider the instance
in Fig. 28. Given that worker w1 is currently in t2.r, SP should decide whether to
assign him to task t2.
• If it assigns worker w1 to task t2, but then worker w1 visits t1.r, (w1, t1) will be
an unhappy pair because worker w1 prefers task t1 to task t2 as m(t1) > m(t2),













𝑚(𝑡1) = 1 𝑚(𝑡2) = 0.8
Fig. 28. An instance with a worker and two tasks. Let the probability of w1 visiting
t1.r before the deadline of t1 be 0.6, and the probability of w1 revisiting t2.r
before the deadline of t2 be 0. Also, let q(w1) = c(w1) = 1.
• If it does not assign worker w1 to task t2, and worker w1 does not visit t1.r,
then (w1, t2) will be an unhappy pair because worker w1 and task t2 prefer being
matched to each other to being unmatched.
Thus, it is not possible to ensure perfect user happiness without knowing the exact
worker trajectories.
Besides, in an online setting, minimizing the expected number of unhappy pairs
may not actually maximize user happiness. Again, in the instance in Fig. 28, SP
should avoid matching worker w1 to task t2 in order to minimize the expected number
of unhappy pairs, because as shown in Table 8, the expected number of unhappy pairs
is larger when they get matched (w1 ⇒ t2). Yet the expected profit of worker w1 in
case he is not matched to task t2 is m(t1)×0.6 = 0.6, which is smaller than the profit
he would make if he was matched to t2 (m(t2) = 0.8). So, worker w1 would prefer to
be matched to task t2 despite the increase in the expected number of unhappy pairs
he will form.
The example discussed above demonstrates that, in an online setting, user hap-
piness should be measured in an online manner and by considering the impact of
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Decision Scenario # of UPs Expected # of UPs
w1 ⇒ t2




w1 visits t1.r 0
0.4
otherwise 1
Table 8. Analysis of all possible scenarios in the instance illustrated in Fig. 28. (UP
is short for unhappy pair.)
each matching-related decision of SP on the overall benefit that users will get from
the system. In MCS systems without capacity constraints, there is no competition
among task requesters, because workers would like to and can get matched with all
tasks on their trajectory. Therefore, the stability of the assignments and preference-
awareness in such systems can be ensured by maximizing the expected assignment






where Ej is the expected assignment quality of task tj. Then, a task assignment
mechanism is said to be optimal in terms of preference-awareness in these systems
if its all matching decisions for each task t in the system maximizes the expected
assignment quality of t based on the quality score of the readily available worker and
the quality scores of the workers that could probably visit t.r in future.
However, in the presence of capacity constraints, there is a competition among
both workers and task requesters, because the fact that workers are able to perform
only a limited number of tasks transforms the task assignment problem into a limited
resource allocation problem. In this setting, the expected utilities of users become
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interdependent, and get affected by each matching decision of SP. Consequently, the
expected utility of a worker or a task after a certain time-step depends on the decision
mechanism that will be used by SP in that time frame. Besides, the number of possible
visit scenarios increases exponentially with respect to the length of the assignment
period and the number of users. To address these challenges, we map all possible
(exponentially many) visit scenarios that can happen after time-step s to all possible
stable matchings in these scenarios along with their likelihood of occurrence, which
we can analyze in polynomial-time and use to estimate the expected user utilities for
the time period [s, T ].
Suppose that a worker wi with a remaining capacity of c
s
i ≥ 1 is in the region
of a currently unassigned task tj at time-step s : tj.b ≤ s ≤ tj.d, so SP has to
make a matching decision for the pair. Let As = {A1s, A2s, . . . , Aks} be the set of all
possible worker visit scenarios that can happen in the time frame [s, T ] given the visit
probabilities of the workers for all task regions. That is,
As = Rs1 ×Rs2 × ..×Rsn, (5.5)
where Rsi is the set of all possible spatiotemporal trajectories of worker wi after time-
step s. Let p(Als) denote the probability that the scenario A
l




p(Als) = 1. (5.6)
Let M ls be the stable matching in the scenario A
l
s between the tasks that are unas-
signed and the workers that have a positive remaining capacity at time-step s (since
the visits in Als are known, a stable matching can be found using the offline stable
matching algorithm that will be described in Section 5.3.2.1). Also, let M̂ ls be the
stable matching in the same scenario assuming that wi is matched to tj. Then, as-
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suming SP is making optimal assignments in terms of stability, the expected total
reward worker wi would get in time frame [s, T ] if he was not assigned to task tj at








and that if he was assigned to task tj by:







Analogously, the expected sensing quality to be received by task tj if it is not





p(Als)× q(M ls(tj)), (5.9)
and
T′j,i(s) = q(wi). (5.10)
Then, we can define a decision-time unhappy pair as follows.
Definition 15 (Decision-time unhappy pair). A worker-task pair (wi, tj) is said to
be a decision-time unhappy pair if the following conditions hold for any time-step s
in [tj.b, tj.d]:
• worker wi has a positive remaining capacity,
• task tj is unassigned,
• worker wi is in region tj.r, and
• either (i) SP matches worker wi to task tj, but at least one of them would be
114
better off otherwise, i.e.,
Wi(s) > W
′
i,j(s) or Tj(s) > T
′
j,i(s), (5.11)
• or (ii) SP does not match worker wi to task tj, but they both would be better off
otherwise, i.e.,
W′i,j(s) > Wi(s) and T
′
j,i(s) > Tj(s). (5.12)
In our example illustrated in Fig. 28, assuming s is the current time-step, we
have two possible trajectories that can be seen after s (i.e., w1 visits t1.r or he does
not; |As| = 2) with the given probabilities. This yields W′1,2(s) = 0.8 > W1(s) = 0.6
and T′2,1(s) = 1 > T2(s) = 0. Hence, worker w1 and task t2 will, as desired, form a
decision-time unhappy pair due to (5.12) if SP fails to match them.
Definition 16 (Online stable matching). A matching M is called an online stable
matching if it does not admit any decision-time unhappy pairs.
Consequently, our objective in the MCS systems with capacity constraints is to
find an online stable matching, and we call such a matching optimal in terms of
preference-awareness. It is straightforward to see that the optimal matching strategy
to this end would be to match a worker-task pair if (5.12) holds. However, the
difficult part is to compute the values of Wi(s), W
′
i,j(s) and Tj(s), because As grows
exponentially with the number of workers (n) and length of the assignment period
(T ). In the following section, we will show how to compute these values efficiently
without actually forming the set As.




T , W Set of tasks and workers, respectively
m, n Number of tasks and workers, respectively
M A many-to-one matching between T and W
M(u) Assigned worker (task set) to task (worker) u inM
[0, T ] Current assignment period
t.r Region of task t
[t.b, t.d] Time interval in which t should be performed
m(t) Reward associated with task t
c(w) Capacity of worker w
q(w) Quality score of worker w
λi,j Average time between the visits of wi to tj.r
Vi,j(L) Probability that wi visits tj.r in a time frame of length L
Table 9. Notations used in Chapter 5.
5.3 Proposed Solution
In this section, we begin by considering a simpler, but still practical version of
the problem. Then, we investigate the generic version of the problem, and provide
preference-aware task assignment algorithms and their theoretical analysis for both
versions.
5.3.1 Task Assignment in Systems without Capacity Constraints
In MCS systems with small sensing tasks that require no interaction from the
workers, it is safe to disregard the capacity constraints of workers as carrying out a
task does not put a load on them. Moreover, in the case of uniformly distributed
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tasks in an area or short assignment periods, since workers could visit only a limited
number of task regions, it would still be safe to disregard the capacity constraints.
In other words, even if workers had capacity constraints in any of these cases, they
would be overshadowed by the spatiotemporal constraints and can hence be ignored
during the task assignment process (at least until the point where assigning another
task to a worker would violate his capacity constraint).
An example of an MCS system without capacity constraints would be a traffic
monitoring system such as Waze [78], where the speed of traffic, which can be esti-
mated by the speed of change in the GPS coordinates of workers, can be sensed and
transmitted to SP automatically by workers’ mobile devices without requiring active
involvement of workers.
In this type of MCS systems, workers would like to perform each and every
task that is on their trajectory and does not conflict with their preferences in order
to maximize their profits. However, task requesters would still desire to have their
sensing tasks performed by workers with the highest quality scores. Thus, the problem
transforms into a one-sided matching problem in terms of user preferences. That is, to
find optimal task assignments we just need to maximize the sensing quality received
by task requesters. Moreover, we can consider each task separately, because the
assignment quality of a task tj depends only on which workers will visit the task
region tj.r and the time of their visits, and is independent of the visits of workers to
the other task regions due to the absence of capacity constraints.
To solve this problem, we utilize Optimal Stopping Theory (OST) [95], which
provides a dynamic programming based framework for the decision problems with a
finite horizon (e.g., the secretary hiring problem). This is suitable for our problem,
because for each task tj there will be a number of decision points at the times tj.r
is visited by any worker, and at each of these we should decide whether to wait for
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a higher quality worker or to assign task tj to the worker wi who is currently in the
region tj.r based on the quality of wi and the expected quality to be achieved if we
choose to wait instead.
Let Ej(s) be the expected assignment quality for task tj after the time-step s.
Since task tj can only be performed between [tj.b, tj.d], we have
Ej(s) = Ej(tj.b), s < tj.b, (5.13)
and
Ej(s) = 0, s ≥ tj.d. (5.14)
Since each worker wi will visit the region tj.r in the time frame [s, s + 1) with the












+ Ej(s+ 1)× ρj(n+ 1),
(5.15)
where ρj(i) is the probability that no worker with an index smaller than i visits
tj.r within a time frame of length 1. Since the smallest worker index is 1, we have
ρj(1) = 1, and the value of ρj(i) for 2 ≤ i ≤ n+ 1 can be computed by:





Note that although there are 2n possible scenarios (i.e., each worker being within
or outside of the task region) for each time frame of length 1 in terms of worker visits
to a task region, we consider only n of them to calculate (5.15), because if wi is in
the region, whether wi+1, .., wn are within or outside of the region is irrelevant as they
are preferred less than wi. Therefore, using the base cases Ej(t.d) = 0 and ρj(1) = 1,
we can recursively compute all values of Ej(s) for tj.b ≤ s < tj.d in polynomial time
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Algorithm 9: Calculation of Ej(s) for all practical values of time-step s
1 Ej(tj.d)← 0
2 for s← tj.d− 1 down to tj.b do
3 Ej(s)← q(w1)× V1,j(1)
4 ρ← 1− V1,i(1)
5 for i← 2 to n do
6 if q(wi) ≥ Ej(s+ 1) then
7 Ej(s)← Ej(s) + q(wi)× Vi,j(1)× ρ
8 ρ← ρ× (1− Vi,j(1))
9 else
10 break
11 Ej(s)← Ej(s) + Ej(s+ 1)× ρ
as described in Algorithm 9.
In this algorithm, when we calculate Ej(s), we utilize the fact that task tj would
like to match only with workers with a quality score that is greater than or equal to
Ej(s + 1) (line 6) at time-step s because, otherwise, it would be more advantageous
for it to wait for the next time-step. Thus, we consider only these workers in lines
3-10 in decreasing order of their quality scores to compute the expected utility of
task tj based on the visit probabilities of these workers to its region in case it will be
matched with one of these workers at time-step s. Since the expected utility of task
tj at time-step s will be the same as that at time-step s+ 1 if none of these workers
visits the region of task tj between time-steps s and s+1, we finally increase the value
of Ej(s) by Ej(s + 1) × ρ in line 11, where ρ is calculated between lines 4-10 as the
probability that tj.r will not be visited by any of these workers between time-steps s
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Algorithm 10: OST-based Algorithm (OSTA) at time-step s
1 if q(wi) ≥ Ej(s) then
2 match wi to tj
3 terminate the algorithm for tj
and s+ 1.
A summary of the optimal decision mechanism that will be run for each task tj
whenever tj.r is visited by a worker wi is given in Algorithm 10. We assume all Ej(s)
values for s : tj.b ≤ s ≤ tj.d are precomputed and stored in a lookup table, but it is
also possible to compute only Ej(s) for s : ŝ ≤ s ≤ tj.d at the first time (ŝ) a worker
visits tj.r to avoid computing Ej(s) values that will never be used. The algorithm
simply checks whether it is more advantageous to match with the visiting worker or
to skip the opportunity (line 1), and makes a matching decision accordingly. Due
to sparse nature of visits in mobile networks, we assume that there will be a single
matching decision to make at each time-step. However, if there are multiple workers
that visit the region of a task at a certain time-step, it suffices to run Algorithm 10
for the worker with the highest quality score. For each task tj, the algorithm will
be run until either task tj gets matched, or it expires. Since we are able to compute
the expected utilities of task requesters precisely, and make decisions in a way to
maximize their utilities during the matching process, we have the following result.
Corollary 10.1. Algorithm 10 always makes the optimal matching decisions for task
requesters when workers do not have capacity constraints (i.e., maximizes the expected
assignment quality q(M(t)) for each task t).
Running time. Algorithm 10 obviously has a time complexity of O(1), however
Ej(s) needs to be precomputed for all feasible j and s values by running Algorithm 9.
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For each task tj, we precompute Ej(s) values for all s : tj.b ≤ s ≤ tj.d, and computing




5.3.2 Task Assignment in Systems with Capacity Constraints
In this section, we first describe an optimal algorithm to find stable matchings
in offline settings where the trajectory of each worker is known in advance. Then,
exploiting the ideas behind the offline algorithm, we provide our algorithm for the
online settings. We begin with the following definition.
Definition 17 (Pair priority). The priority of a worker-task pair (wi, tj) refers to the
relative importance of the pair in terms of stability, and can be defined as
ϕ(wi, tj) = max(m,n)×min(i, j) + max(i, j) (5.17)
where a smaller value indicates a higher priority.
If the worker and task indices were to start at 0 in the sets W and T , the
priority of a worker-task pair p would be equal to the number of worker-task pairs
with a higher priority than p.
5.3.2.1 Offline Algorithm
In Algorithm 11, we present a pseudo-code description of the offline algorithm.
In line 1, it finds the set A of all eligible worker-task pairs that can be matched to
each other (i.e., the task region visited by the worker). Then, in each step, it finds
(line 3) and matches (lines 4-5) the worker-task pair with the highest priority in A,
which is followed by removing all pairs that become infeasible due to the most recent
pair assignment (lines 6-8). This continues until the set A becomes empty. In the
following theorem, we prove the optimality of this algorithm.
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Algorithm 11: Offline SM Algorithm
1 A ← {(w, t) : w visits t.r in [t.b, t.d]}
2 while A ≠ ∅ do
3 (wi, tj)← argmin(w,t)∈A ϕ(w, t)
4 M(wi)←M(wi) ∪ tj
5 M(tj) = wi
6 if |M(wi)| = c(wi) then
7 A ← A \ {(w, t) : w = wi}
8 A ← A \ {(w, t) : t = tj}
9 returnM
Theorem 11. Algorithm 11 always produces a stable matching in offline settings.
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Assume that there is an unhappy pair (wi, tj)
in the final matching M produced by the algorithm. According to Definition 13,
worker wi has visited tj.r within the time frame of task tj, so (wi, tj) is in A in the
beginning.
• If |M(wi)| < c(wi) andM(tj) = ∅, then the pair (wi, tj) should still be in A,
which indicates that A is non-empty, contradicting the termination condition
of the algorithm.
• If |M(wi)| < c(wi) and M(tj) = wk, then for (wi, tj) to be an unhappy pair,
we should have q(wi) > q(wk), hence
i < k and ϕ(wi, tj) < ϕ(wk, tj). (5.18)
Since at the time the pair (wk, tj) was selected by the algorithm, the pair (wi, tj)
was still in A (as |M(wi)| < c(wi)) and has a higher priority than (wk, tj), the
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algorithm should have selected (wi, tj), which is a contradiction.
• If |M(wi)| = c(wi) andM(tj) = ∅, then for (wi, tj) to be an unhappy pair, we
should have m(tk) < m(tj) for at least one task tk ∈M(wi). Thus,
j < k and ϕ(wi, tj) < ϕ(wi, tk). (5.19)
As in the previous scenario, this indicates that the pair (wi, tj) should have been
selected prior to (wi, tk), which is a contradiction.
• If |M(wi)| = c(wi) and M(tj) = wk, then for (wi, tj) to be an unhappy pair,
we should have
q(wi) > q(wk) and m(tj) > m(tl) (5.20)
for at least one task tl ∈M(wi). This yields
i < k and j < l, (5.21)
and hence
ϕ(wi, tj) < ϕ(wk, tj) and ϕ(wi, tj) < ϕ(wi, tl). (5.22)
This means the pair (wi, tj) should have been selected prior to both (wi, tl) and
(wk, tj), which is also a contradiction and completes the proof.
5.3.2.2 Online Algorithm
Theorem 11 shows that in the presence of capacity constraints, a worker-task pair
dominates the pairs with lower priority scores if it is in the set A, which implies that
the highest priority pair will be matched with the same probability of being in the
set A. Likewise, the next highest priority pair will be matched with the probability
of being in the set A in case it is not eliminated by the higher priority pair, and so
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on. We utilize this observation to find the matching probability of a worker-task pair
in the stable matchings for all possible scenarios (As) that can occur after a certain
time-step (s), and use it to make decisions in online setting.
Lemma 1. Given a worker-task pair (wi, tj) and time-step s at which wi has a re-
maining capacity of csi and tj is unmatched, the probability of wi and tj being matched
in a stable matching in any of the possible scenarios that can occur between time-steps
















1, if j = 1, k = csi
0, if j = 1, k ̸= csi
Qsi,j−1[k] +Q
s
i,j−1[k + 1]× ηsi,j−1, if j > 1, k = 0
Qsi,j−1[k]× ηsi,j−1, if j > 1, k = csi
Qsi,j−1[k + 1]× ηsi,j−1 +Qsi,j−1[k]× ηsi,j−1, otherwise
(5.24)
and ηsi,j = 1− ηsi,j. If tj was matched before time-step s, or s ≥ tj.d, Ps(i, j) = 0.
Proof. In order for worker wi and task tj to be matched in a stable matchingM in
a given scenario (e.g., Als ∈ As), the following three conditions should be satisfied:
• at most csi − 1 of the higher priority pairs in the set
Fi,j = {(wi, tk) : ϕ(wi, tk) < ϕ(wi, tj)}
= {(wi, tk) : k < j}
(5.25)
should be matched inM (i.e., wi should be matched with at most csi − 1 of the
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tasks that he prefers more than tj), because, otherwise, the pair (wi, tj) will be




where Qsi,j[k] is the probability that worker i will be matched to exactly c
s
i − k
of the tasks in Fi,j, and thus will have a remaining capacity of k. Thus, (5.26)
is the probability that worker wi will have a positive remaining capacity and
be able to match with task tj. The calculation of the Q
s
i,j[k] values is realized
in a recursive manner as described in (5.24). Since Fi,1 = ∅, we initially have
Qsi,1[c
s









on the probability (ηsi,j) that worker wi matches with task tj. An illustration of
this recursive procedure is given in Fig. 29.
• none of the higher priority pairs in
Gi,j = {(wk, tj) : ϕ(wk, tj) < ϕ(wi, tj)}
= {(wk, tj) : k < i}
(5.27)
should be matched in M, because, otherwise, task tj will already be matched
with a more favorable worker, hence the pair (wi, tj) will be eliminated. In
(5.23), this is given in a recursive fashion as follows:
i−1∏
k=1
1− Ps(k, j). (5.28)
• worker wi should visit the region of task tj between [s, tj.d]. That is, the pair
(wi, tj) should be in the set A of Algorithm 11. This occurs with the probability
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𝑠-2 𝑐𝑖
𝑠-3
Fig. 29. Illustration of the update procedure for the remaining capacity probabilities
defined in (5.24). Each of the dashed and solid edges indicates a contribution
with a factor of 1−ηsi,j and ηsi,j, respectively, while the rightmost, dotted edge
indicates a direct addition.
Algorithm 12 summarizes the procedure to calculate Ps(i, j) values for all 1 ≤
i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ m values. In this algorithm, we maintain a variable uj for each task tj,
which refers to the probability of task tj not being matched to any of the workers that
considered so far in the algorithm, hence initialized to be 0 in line 1 if tj is already
matched before time-step s, and 1 otherwise. Note that once Ps(i, j) is calculated,
the values of Ps(k, j) for k > i and Ps(i, l) for l > j are independent of each other.
Thus, we can first compute Ps(1, j) starting from j = 1 to j = m, then Ps(2, j) for all
j values in the same order, and so on. This ensures that the matching probabilities
of all interdependent worker-task pairs will be calculated following the priority order.
According to Lemma 1, we can express Ps(i, j) as the ratio of the number of
stable matchings that worker wi and task tj are matched to each other to the total
number of stable matchings in all possible scenarios after time-step s. Thus, given








Ps(k, j)× q(wk). (5.30)
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Algorithm 12: Calculation of Ps(i, j) for all i, j
1 for j ← 1 to m do uj ← 1− |M(tj)|
2 for i← 1 to n do
3 compute Qsi,1 according to (5.24)
4 for j ← 1 to m do
5 vp ← Vi,j(tj.d− s)
6 ηsi,j ← vp× uj





8 compute Qsi,j+1 from Q
s
i,j according to (5.24)
9 uj ← uj − Ps(i, j)
On the other hand, the value of W
′
i,j(s) depends on the probability of worker wi being
matched with each task tk in the stable matchings that can be seen after time-step
s assuming worker wi and task tj will be matched at s. This probability is denoted
by P̂s(i, k), and can simply be calculated by assuming task tj is already matched and
replacing csi with c
s
i − 1 in (5.23) and (5.24) (and running Algorithm 12 accordingly).
Then, we can compute W
′
i,j(s) as:







Lastly, we have T′j,i(s) = q(wi). Using these values, we can make an optimal matching
decision for the worker-task pair (wi, tj) in terms of online stable matchings at any
time-step s worker wi is in the region of task tj.
A summary of the decision process is described in Algorithm 13. In line 1, we
compute the matching probabilities for all worker-task pairs by calling Algorithm 12,
and then, based on these probabilities, we compute the expected utilities of worker
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Algorithm 13: PRobabilistic Stable Task Assignment (PRSTA)α(wi, tj)
at time-step s
1 Compute Ps(k, l) and P̂s(k, l), ∀k, l, via Algorithm 12
2 Compute Wi(s) according to (5.29)
3 Compute Tj(s) according to (5.30)
4 Compute W′i,j(s) according to (5.31)
5 T′j,i(s)← q(wi)
6 if W′i,j(s) > α×Wi(s) then
7 if T′j,i(s) > α×Tj(s) then
8 match wi to tj
wi and task tj at time-step s for the scenarios they do and do not get matched with
each other in lines 2-5. If getting matched with each other is more preferable for both
worker wi (line 6) and task tj (line 7) by a constant factor α (which will be discussed
below), then a positive matching decision is made in line 8. As earlier, we assume at
most one matching decision is being made at each time-step, but multiple worker-task
pairs can be processed in the order of pair priority if needed. Given Definition 15 &
16, since the proposed algorithm makes a positive matching decision for a worker-task
pair if (5.12) holds when α = 1, we have the following result.
Corollary 11.1. PRSTA1.0 algorithm always produces online stable matchings.
It should, however, be noted that the proposed method to compute expected
user utilities does not consider the order of visits of workers to the task regions.
Let us consider the instance given in Fig. 30 to explain this issue and why it is
necessary to incorporate a constant α factor in the matching decisions of Algorithm
















Fig. 30. Four of the possible visit orders of two workers (w1, w2) to the region of task
t in an MCS instance with an assignment period of length two. For example,
in scenario (c), the task region is visited by w2 in time-step 1, and by w1 in
time-step 2.
of worker w1 to the region of task t is quite high, and his quality score is significantly
larger than that of worker w2 so that even if worker w2 visits the task region in time-
step 1, it is advantageous for task t to wait for worker w1. Thus, in all four scenarios,
the decision at time-step 1 when worker w2 visits the task region should be not to
assign him to the task.
However, when we compute the expected utilities of users considering all possible
stable matchings and their probability of occurrence, worker w2 should be assigned to
task t in scenarios (a) and (b) given that worker w1 does not visit the task region in
either time-step in these scenarios. Therefore, Algorithm 13 considers the matching
(w2, t) for scenarios (a) and (b) during computation of expected user utilities, and the
matching (w1, t) for the other scenarios. Yet when we see a similar visit pattern for
time-step 1 in the online setting, since we do not in advance know the visit pattern
for time-step 2, we need to either assign worker w2 to task t or not. Consequently,
the utility of the task will inevitably be overestimated, because if it gets assigned
to worker w2, its actual utility will also be q(w2) in scenarios (c) and (d), which is
smaller than its expected utility q(w1) based on the stable matching (w1, t) of these
scenarios. On the other hand, if it does not get assigned to worker w2, then it will
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be left unmatched in scenario (a), and its actual utility (0) will be worse than its
expected utility q(w2) based on the stable matching (w2, t) of this scenario.
To alleviate the impact of these overestimations on the performance of the al-
gorithm, we require (in lines 6-7 of Algorithm 13) that the expected utility of a user
after the current time-step s is at least 1/α times better than the utility he can get at
time-step s to skip the existing matching opportunity. Here, we note that using such
a constant factor does not favor any groups of users in the system, and hence does not
invalidate its preference-awareness, in general, as long as a single, universal α factor
is used for all decisions to ensure fairness towards different users. We empirically
examine the algorithm’s performance with various α values in the next section.
Running time. The time complexity of Algorithm 12 is O(mncmax), where
cmax = maxw∈W c(w). Since the most expensive operation in Algorithm 13 is to
run Algorithm 12 to find the matching probabilities, the worst-case running time of
Algorithm 13 is also O(mncmax). This can also be expressed as O(nm
2), as the largest
feasible cmax = m.
5.4 Evaluation
In this section, we present the empirical evaluation of the proposed algorithms.
5.4.1 Simulation Settings
We perform simulations utilizing both a real data set and a synthetic data set.
The latter is performed to understand the impact of the accuracy of the distribution
model used to estimate the visit probabilities of workers on the performance of the
proposed algorithms.
The synthetic data set is generated using 60 workers and 100 tasks in a 4 hours
long assignment period. We randomly set the quality scores of the workers and the
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task rewards from the range (0, 1), and assign a capacity to each worker between 1
and 10 (we also look at the case without capacity constraints). For each worker-
task pair (wi, tj), we randomly set the value of λi,j between 8 to 24 hours. This
generates instances where each worker visits, on average, 23% of all task regions in
an assignment period. We examine the performance of the algorithms in instances
with different worker/task counts, capacity constraints, and inter-visit times as well.
For the real data set, we utilize the San Francisco taxi data set [96], which
contains the traces of 536 yellow cabs during May of 2018. For each instance, we
randomly select a day as the assignment period, and then pick 60 taxis and use their
traces on that day as worker trajectories. We divide the SF city into 121×100 regions
of approximately 102×102 square meters, and create a task on randomly selected 100
regions that have at least 1000 traces in the whole data set. The average daily travel
by the cabs is approximately 280 km, and the cabs visit about 20% of all regions at
least once, on average. The other parameters are assigned similarly with the synthetic
data set, and for each worker-task pair (wi, tj), the value of λi,j is extracted from the
traces.
To avoid introducing arbitrary random values for parameters that do not affect
the performance of the algorithms in a notable way, we let the time frame of each
task be the same as the duration of the assignment period in both data sets. Also,
the assignment period is divided into a minute long time-steps in both data sets.
Following the procedures described above, we generate 100 different instances of both
synthetic and real data sets, and present the averaged results.
5.4.1.1 Benchmark Algorithms
We compare the performance of the proposed algorithms with a greedy algorithm
and the well-known Gale-Shapley (GS ) algorithm [42] by adapting it to our setting.
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The former simply matches a task greedily with the first worker that visits its re-
gion with a positive remaining capacity. The latter is normally used to find stable
matchings when the preference lists of individuals are static and known in advance.
In our setting, however, it is neither possible nor desirable to match a worker-task
pair if the worker does not visit the task region even if they happen to prefer each
other the most. Since worker visits are uncertain in our setting, user preferences
change dynamically based on worker trajectories, thus the GS algorithm cannot be
used directly. We adapt it to our setting as follows. When a matching decision needs
to be made at a time-step s for a worker-task pair, we form the preference lists of all
workers with a positive remaining capacity and all unmatched tasks based on how
likely they will have a chance to match and how beneficial they are to each other.
Specifically, the preference list of each worker wi is formed as tσ1 , tσ2 , .., tσk in order
of non-increasing preference such that
m(tσj)× Vi,σj(tσj .d− s) ≥ m(tσj+1)× Vi,σj+1(tσj+1 .d− s) (5.32)
for all j : 1 ≤ j < k. The preference lists of tasks are formed similarly using the quality
scores of the workers. Then, the GS algorithm is run to find a stable matching for
these preference lists. If the currently examined worker-task pair is matched in this
stable matching, we also match them in the real matching problem, otherwise we
leave them unmatched for that time-step. For the PRSTAα algorithm, we present
the results for α = 1.0 and α = 0.9 in general as PRSTA1.0 guarantees to produce
online stable matchings, and PRSTA0.9 is empirically shown to produce high quality
final assignments with respect to the other performance metrics. However, we also
examine the performance of the PRSTAα algorithm with different values of α.
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5.4.1.2 Performance Metrics
In order to evaluate and compare the performance of the algorithms, we uti-
lize the following metrics, which capture different aspects of user satisfaction and
efficiency.




where a is the number of unhappy pairs, and b is the number of worker-task
pairs (w, t) that had at least one matching opportunity during the assignment
period, i.e., w visits t.r between [t.b, t.d], and at the time of the visit, w has a
non-zero remaining capacity and t is unmatched.
• Average user happiness (%): Given a matching M, let Su be the set of tasks
(workers) with whom worker (task) u forms an unhappy pair. Then, we can
define the happiness ratio of user u as follows:
θu =

1, if Su = ∅


















, if u ∈ W
(5.35)
and f(v) = m(v) if v is a task, and f(v) = q(v) if it is a worker. Here, θu = 1 if
user u does not form any unhappy pairs, and θu = 0 if he forms unhappy pairs
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and is unmatched (i.e., since his current utility is 0, he is infinitely unhappy).
Otherwise, its happiness is computed as the ratio of his current utility to the
maximum utility he could achieve if he was matched to one of the users in the








• Average quality of sensing: This is the average quality of sensing/service pro-







where q(M(t)) = 0 ifM(t) = ∅.
• Online user happiness: To show the optimality of the PRSTA1.0 algorithm
empirically, we look at the happiness of the users with the matching decisions
in capacity-constrained settings. This is computed similarly to pairwise user
happiness, but a and b in (5.33) are set, respectively, as the number of decision-
time unhappy pairs and the number of times the algorithm is run to make a
matching decision, which can be different for each algorithm.
• Running time: We also look at the running times of the algorithms to analyze
how quickly they make the matching decisions, which is particularly important
in MCS systems with high mobility.
5.4.2 Results
We first look at the results in the synthetic data set without capacity constraints.
Fig. 31 shows the impact of the number of workers on the performance of the al-
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Fig. 31. Performance comparison of the algorithms against varying number of workers
in systems without capacity constraints in the synthetic data set (m = 100).
gorithms. We see that the proposed algorithms substantially outperform the others,
and the OSTA algorithm has the best performance for the most part, as expected.
In fact, it is only slightly outperformed by the PRSTA0.9 algorithm in terms of aver-
age user happiness. This indicates that despite producing matchings with marginally
worse pairwise user happiness, the PRSTA0.9 algorithm can produce more balanced
matchings, in which the degree of unhappiness of the users that form at least one
unhappy pair is lower. This is simply because of reducing the risk levels by setting
α = 0.9, and seeking to match users with possibly not perfect, but good enough
candidates.
135
25 50 75 100 125 150





































25 50 75 100 125 150



































25 50 75 100 125 150

































Fig. 32. Performance comparison of the algorithms against varying number of tasks in
systems without capacity constraints in the synthetic data set (n = 60).
In Fig. 31c, we see that the proposed algorithms achieve better average qual-
ity of sensing scores with increasing number of workers, because as the number of
workers increases, there will also be more high-quality workers. However, the GS and
Greedy algorithms do not benefit much from this significantly as the former uses an
inaccurate approximation for the expected user utilities, and the latter simply ignores
the matching opportunities that may come in the future.
In Fig. 32, we examine the performance of the algorithms with various task
counts in the systems without capacity constraints. Since the workers do not have a
capacity constraint, increasing the number of tasks does not escalate the competition
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Fig. 33. Performance comparison of the algorithms against varying degree of mo-
bility in systems without capacity constraints in the synthetic data set
(m = 100, n = 60).
between tasks (unlike what we will see in the presence of capacity constraints), thus
we do not see big differences in the performance of the algorithms with the exception
that the proposed algorithms perform slightly worse, and the others slightly better in
terms of average user happiness.
Next, in Fig. 33, we look at the performance of the algorithms against varying
degree of mobility, which is defined as the average percentage of the task regions
visited by each worker. We generate instances with different mobility levels (i.e.,
percentage of all task regions visited by each worker, on average) by adjusting the
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Fig. 34. Performance comparison of the algorithms against varying number of workers
in systems with capacity constraints in the synthetic data set (m = 100).
range of the λi,j values for worker-task pairs (e.g., increasing the average value of λi,j
results in lower mobility). As expected, with higher mobility, the high-quality workers
visit more task regions, hence we see a profound increase in the average quality of
sensing scores of the proposed algorithms. A remarkable point is that the GS and
Greedy algorithms produce matchings with worse pairwise/average user happiness
scores with increasing mobility, because the amount of better matching opportunities
to be seen in the future, which are mostly neglected by these algorithms, becomes
larger with increasing mobility.
In Fig. 34, 35, and 36, we present the performance comparison of the algorithms
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Fig. 35. Performance comparison of the algorithms against varying number of tasks in
systems with capacity constraints in the synthetic data set (n = 60).
in the MCS systems with capacity constraints (note that there is no result for the
OSTA algorithm, as it can only be run in the systems without capacity constraints).
Fig. 34 shows the performance of the algorithms with various worker counts. Al-
though the relative performance of the algorithms is similar to the case without
capacity constraints (Fig. 31), the quality of the produced matchings is generally
slightly worse in terms of all performance metrics. This is because the high-quality
workers will not be able to perform as many tasks as possible in this scenario, and the
propriety of each matching decision becomes more important as there will be only a
limited number of opportunities to make up for the previous decisions.
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Fig. 36. Performance comparison of the algorithms against varying ranges of worker
capacities in the synthetic data set (m = 100, n = 60).
We inspect how the algorithms perform with varying number of tasks in presence
of capacity constraints in Fig. 35. Different from the case without capacity constraints
(Fig. 32), the user happiness and average quality of sensing achieved by the proposed
algorithms get worse with increasing task counts, because, in this case, there is a
competition between tasks as the high-quality workers can be matched to only a
small number of tasks.
Another noteworthy point is that increasing the number of tasks has a different
impact on the performance of the proposed algorithms and the others in terms of
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Average quality of sensing ( 100)
Online user happiness
Fig. 37. The impact of α on the performance of the PRSTAα algorithm in the synthetic
data set without capacity constraints (m = 100, n = 60).
average user happiness. That is, the proposed algorithms perform slightly worse,
while the GS and Greedy algorithms perform slightly better. This is due to the fact
that the tasks will be, on average, matched to the workers with low quality scores
or will be even unmatched when the number of tasks is large. This makes the cost
of missing a present matching opportunity in terms of user happiness bigger, and
the proposed algorithms consequently suffer as they frequently disregard the present
matching opportunities to wait for better ones.
In Fig. 36, we analyze the effect of extending the worker capacity ranges on
the performance of the algorithms. We observe that the proposed algorithms always
outperform the others in terms of pairwise user happiness, and the performance dif-
ference becomes more significant with increasing worker capacities. However, when
each worker can be matched with only a single worker, the GS algorithm has a similar
performance with the PRSTA0.9 algorithm in terms of average user happiness. Be-
sides, the GS and Greedy algorithms achieve comparable average quality of sensing
scores with the proposed algorithms when each worker has a capacity of one. This is
because they have a lower risk of leaving the workers completely unmatched by skip-
ping the existing matching opportunities, and this compensates for the loss of quality
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Fig. 38. Performance comparison of the algorithms in the SF taxi data set without
capacity constraints (m = 100, n = 60).
of sensing caused by the poor matching decisions they otherwise tend to make (as we
see with larger worker capacities).
In the synthetic data set, we lastly look at the performance of the PRSTAα
algorithm with various values of α parameter as shown in Fig. 37. We see that the
algorithm produces optimal task assignments in terms of online user happiness when
α = 1 (as proven in Corollary 11.1), and that it achieves the best performance in
terms of all other metrics when α is between 0.8 and 1. When we further decrease
the value of α, the algorithm starts to match the worker-task pairs greedily (when
α = 0, it is in fact practically the same with the Greedy algorithm), while it misses
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Fig. 39. Performance comparison of the algorithms in the SF taxi data set with ca-
pacity constraints (m = 100, n = 60).
too many existing matching opportunities to wait for substantially better ones when
we use an α value greater than 1.
In Fig. 38, 39, & 40, we present the performance of the algorithms in terms of
pairwise user happiness in the real data set without and with capacity constraints,
respectively. In both figures, the performance of the proposed algorithms and GS
algorithm mostly improve with the extended campaign duration, yet that of the
Greedy algorithm gets consistently worse as it makes almost all of the assignments
right in the beginning of the campaign without considering potential opportunities
that may come later. In Fig. 38a & 39a, we see a slight fluctuation in the performance
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Fig. 40. Performance comparison of the algorithms with varying capacity ranges in
the SF taxi data set (m = 100, n = 60).
of the PRSTA1.0 algorithm when the campaign duration is between 20-30 hours. This
is mostly because of the changes in the movement patterns of the taxis between two
consecutive days. For instance, the taxis are likely to have different visit patterns on
Friday and Saturday as the former is a business day and the latter is not.
In Fig. 38, we observe that the relative performance of the algorithms and the
impact of worker/task counts on the performance of all algorithms are quite similar
to what we have seen in the synthetic data set (Fig. 31 & 32). In fact, the only major
difference is that the GS algorithm achieves notably higher pairwise user happiness
scores (by about 10%) in the real data set. Moreover, its performance is also signifi-
cantly better with capacity constraints (Fig. 39) so that it even slightly outperforms
the PRSTA1.0 algorithm when the ratio of the number of tasks to the number of
workers is larger than 2. Yet it should be noted that it is always outperformed by
the PRSTA0.9 algorithm.
Finally, in Fig. 41, we look at the running times of the algorithms with varying
worker/task counts and capacity ranges on an Intel core i7 processor with a memory
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Fig. 41. Running times of the algorithms with varying worker (a) and task (b) counts;
and varying ranges [1,cmax] of worker capacities with m = 100, n = 60 (c) .
The total and average running times refer to the total time spent in making
matching decisions throughout the campaign, and the average time spent per
matching decision, respectively.
of 16 GB and a speed of 2.5 GHz7. We only present the running times for the synthetic
data set as the comparison of running times of algorithms in the real data set does
not exhibit any remarkable difference (except for the naturally larger total running
7Since the OSTA and Greedy algorithms make the matching decisions in constant
time, we do not present their running times. One-time cost of obtaining Ej(s) values
for the OSTA algorithm is also very small (e.g., 32 ms, which is about 10% of the
total running time of the GS algorithm, when m = 150 and n = 60) in the setting
without capacity constraints.
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times due to the longer campaign duration). Recall that the worst-case running time
of the PRSTAα algorithm is O(nmcmax) (or O(nm
2)), and that of the GS algorithm
is O(mn). We first note that in all cases the total running time of the GS algorithm
is lower than the PRSTAα algorithms, while its average running time per decision is
higher. This is because the GS algorithm makes the matching decisions more greedily
compared to the PRSTAα algorithms, thus it matches most of the workers and tasks
in the beginning of the campaign, which means that it will not be run again for these
users, reducing the number of times it will be run in total. On the other hand, the
PRSTAα algorithms have smaller average running times per decision, because they
are run much more frequently after the first part of the campaign where there are
generally fewer worker-task pairs that can still get matched.
Moreover, the PRSTA1.0 algorithm has a significantly larger total running time
than the PRSTA0.9 algorithm as the former has a stronger requirement to match a
pair, and consequently will be run considerably more times compared to the latter.
This is also the reason behind why we see an almost quadratic increase in the total
running time of the PRSTA1.0 algorithm with increasing worker and task counts. That
is, when the number of workers/tasks increases, there will be more visits, and the
PRSTA1.0 algorithm will need to be run even more frequently. Lastly, since workers
will be less selective when they have higher capacities, and accordingly tasks will end
up getting matched earlier, the total/average running times of the algorithms do not
get significantly larger with increasing capacities as seen in Fig. 41c, even though the
worst-case running time of the PRSTAα algorithm (i.e., O(nmcmax)) hints at a linear
grow with increasing worker capacities.
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5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we studied the task assignment problem in opportunistic MCS.
First, we presented a complete system model considering the uncertainty in worker
trajectories and capacity constraints of workers, and formally defined the preference-
aware/stable task assignment problem. We then demonstrated how to efficiently
examine all practical scenarios for assignment opportunities, which arise when the
workers visit the task regions, to compute the expected utilities of the task requesters
and workers with and without capacity constraints. Finally, we proposed polynomial-
time task assignment algorithms that are proven to be preference-aware, and showed
via extensive simulations that they significantly outperform the existing solutions in
terms of worker/task requester happiness and quality of sensing.
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CHAPTER 6
THREE-DIMENSIONAL TASK ASSIGNMENT IN
SEMI-OPPORTUNISTIC MOBILE CROWDSENSING
6.1 Introduction
As we have seen in the previous chapters, the key issue in the participatory
sensing is that the paths assigned to workers are likely to disturb their daily schedules
and to introduce significant additional travel costs, whereas the opportunistic sensing
mainly suffers from the issue of poor coverage, as a task cannot be carried out if its
region will not be visited in time by any worker in the system during their self-defined
trips.
To address these issues and find a middle ground between the participatory
and opportunistic sensing, a new sensing mode, namely semi-opportunistic, has been
proposed recently [38]. In this novel mode, workers provide the matching platform
with alternative paths they would be willing to take within their comfort zones in
addition to the path they would normally take (e.g., dashed lines in Fig. 42). This
yields a wider range of task assignment options for both workers and tasks, and hence
not only improves the task coverage, but also expands the set of tasks workers can
carry out, allowing them to increase their profits by performing more tasks.
In this chapter, we study the preference-aware task assignment problem in a
semi-opportunistic mobile crowdsensing (SO-MCS) setting. The key challenge in this
problem is to satisfy the preferences of all users in a three-dimensional matching
setting, where each worker is to be matched with one of his acceptable paths, and






Fig. 42. Example paths of a user for different sensing modes.
strongly interdependent, and must be compatible with each other. Besides, various
factors such as task rewards, worker qualities and the number of tasks that workers
can carry out on each of their paths (i.e., a worker may choose to perform fewer tasks
on a longer path) need to be considered together to achieve a preference-aware task
assignment. Our main contributions in this chapter can be summarized as follows:
• We provide a formal definition of the preference-aware task assignment problem
in an SO-MCS system, and show that a task assignment that satisfies all user
preferences does not exist in some instances.
• We design two different task assignment algorithms, and prove their (near)
optimality for different settings.
• We carry out extensive simulations, and demonstrate the superiority of our
algorithms over the existing solutions.
6.2 System Model
6.2.1 Assumptions
We assume a system model with a set of location-dependent sensing tasks T =
{t1, t2, . . . , tn} and a set of workers W = {w1, w2, . . . , wm} that accept to perform
tasks in a semi-opportunistic setting. Each worker wi provides the service provider
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(SP) with a set of paths Pi = {pi,1, pi,2, . . . , pi,ai} that he finds acceptable from his
current location to his destination. In each assignment period, it is the responsibility
of SP to find a satisfactory assignment between workers and tasks by matching workers
to one of their acceptable paths, and assigning a subset of tasks on their selected paths.
Each path pi,j has a capacity ci,j associated with it, which indicates the maximum
number of tasks that worker wi is willing to perform if he is assigned to path pi,j. The
ability to specify a capacity for each path enables workers to avoid any unacceptable
delays in their daily schedule by controlling their sensing activity. Since acceptable
paths of a worker may have different conditions (e.g., traffic, security) that can affect
the comfort level of the worker for sensing, or may be of different lengths, it is crucial
to allow workers to assign different capacities to their paths. For simplicity, we let
the path set Pi of each worker wi be in non-increasing order of path capacities. That
is, we have ci,j ≥ ci,j+1 for all j values between 1 and ai − 1. Besides, if the region of
task tk resides on path pi,j (i.e., worker wi can perform task tk if he takes path pi,j),
we say tk is on pi,j and let
Ti,j = {tk : tk ∈ T and tk is on pi,j}. (6.1)
Our system model is also QoS-aware. That is, each worker wi has a QoS score
qi,j for each task tj, which specifies the level of competence of worker wi for task
tj, and can be determined based on various factors such as quality of the sensing
equipment and trustworthiness or seniority of the worker. Moreover, we look at the
task assignment problem in both uniform and general QoS settings. In the uniform
QoS setting, each worker has a universal QoS score that applies for all tasks, i.e.,
qi,j = qi,k for all 1 ≤ j, k ≤ n. On the other hand, in the general QoS setting, a
worker may have different QoS scores for different tasks. For convenience, we simply
call MCS instances with uniform and general QoS settings as uniform and general
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MCS instances, respectively.
Another important feature of our system model is that the task assignments are
optimized with respect to the preferences of workers and tasks. Each task (requester)
tj would like to be matched with a worker with a high QoS score, thus prefers worker
wi to all workers with a QoS score smaller than qi,j. Then, we can define the preference
list Ltj of task tj for the general QoS setting as follows:
Ltj = wσ1 , wσ2 , . . . , wσk where qσi,j ≥ qσi+1,j. (6.2)
Note that Ltj may not contain all workers if tj finds some workers unacceptable (e.g.,
workers with a QoS score smaller than a certain value). In the uniform QoS setting,
assuming L̂tj is the preference list formed for task tj according to (6.2) without leaving






2 = · · · = L̂tn. (6.3)
On the other hand, the requester of each task tj offers a monetary reward of
rj,i to each worker wi to encourage worker participation. As rational individuals, the
workers in our system aim to maximize their profits. Thus, the preference list Lwi of
worker wi can be formed as:
Lwi = tσ1 , tσ2 , . . . , tσk where rσi,i ≥ rσi+1,i. (6.4)
The preference list of a worker also does not need to contain all tasks in the system.
Given a worker-task pair (wi, tj), if wi ̸∈ Ltj and tj ∈ Lwi , we remove tj from Lwi as
worker wi is not an acceptable partner for task tj. Similarly, if tj ̸∈ Lwi and wi ∈ Ltj,
we remove wi from L
t
j.
We let M denote a feasible three-dimensional matching (task assignment) in
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our system model. For each worker wi,M(wi) = (A, pi,j) denotes the assignment of
worker wi in this matching, where pi,j is the path selected for worker wi and A is
the set of tasks that are assigned to worker wi through path pi,j. To be a feasible
assignment, A and pi,j must satisfy the following conditions:
• capacity constraint : |A| ≤ ci,j,
• acceptability constraint : A ⊆ Lwi ,
• regional constraint : A ⊆ Ti,j.
On the other hand, the assignment of each task tk in this matching is denoted by
M(tk) = (wi, pi,j), where wi is the worker that is assigned to perform task tk and pi,j
is the path that is selected for worker wi. The following conditions must be satisfied
for feasibility:
• acceptability constraint : wi ∈ Ltk.
• regional constraint : tk ∈ Ti,j,
If a user (worker or task) v is left unmatched in M, we let M(v) = (∅,−). Also,
given the assignmentM(v) = (X, Y ) of user v, we letMu(v) andMp(v) denote X
and Y , respectively.
6.2.2 Problem Statement
Our main objective in this chapter is to find a preference-aware, feasible matching
according to our system model where the users are happy with their assignments
according to their preferences. Below, we give the necessary definitions to formally
evaluate the happiness of the users with a matching.
Definition 18 (Unhappy triad). Given a matching M, worker wi, path pi,j and a
set S of tasks form an unhappy triad denoted by ⟨wi, pi,j, S⟩ if
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• S is an acceptable assignment for wi, i.e.,
1 ≤ |S| ≤ ci,j, S ⊆ Lwi , and S ⊆ Ti,j, (6.5)
• wi is an acceptable assignment for each tk ∈ S, i.e.,
wi ∈ Lk and tk ∈ Ti,j, (6.6)
• each task tk ∈ S either prefers worker wi to their current assignment wh inM,
i.e.,
qi,k > qh,k where qh,k = 0 if wh = ∅, (6.7)
or is already assigned to worker wi, i.e.,Mu(tk) = wi.







Thus, given an unhappy triad ⟨wi, pi,j, S⟩, we see from the first two conditions
that it is possible to assign the tasks in the set S to worker wi through path pi,j
without violating any feasibility constraints, and see from the last two conditions
that this would make at least one task in S and worker wi strictly better off without
making any task in S worse off.
Definition 19 (3D-Stable matching). A matching is said to be stable if it does not
contain any unhappy triads.
In order for a matching to be perfect in terms of preference-awareness, it should
be stable. However, as we prove in the following theorem, it is not possible to construct
a stable matching in all MCS instances.
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Fig. 43. An MCS instance for which no stable matching exists. There is an edge from
a path pi,j to a task tk if tk ∈ Ti,j.
Theorem 12. There exist MCS instances with a general QoS setting, in which all
feasible matchings are unstable (i.e., contain at least one unhappy triad).
Proof. We prove it by showing such an instance, which is illustrated in Fig. 43. There
are 11 possible task assignments in this instance, and, as shown in Fig. 44, every one
of them contains at least one unhappy triad. Thus, no stable matching exists for this
instance, which completes our proof.
On the other hand, a stable matching always exists in the uniformMCS instances,
which we will prove in the following section by giving an algorithm that produces a
stable matching for such instances.
Due to the nonexistence of stable matchings in general MCS systems, we formu-






where U(M) denotes the set of unhappy triads in the produced matchingM, and δx
denotes the dissatisfaction ratio of a given unhappy triad x = ⟨wi, pi,j, S⟩, which is
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Fig. 44. Proof of Theorem 12. All possible matchings for the instance in Fig. 43 are
shown with boxes. There is an edge k from matching (box) m to matching







if Mu(wi) ̸= ∅, otherwise δx = ∞. So, the dissatisfaction ratio of x quantifies the
utility difference between the current matching and the matching, in which worker w
and the unhappy tasks in S are matched with each other, and do not form an unhappy
triad. Consequently, our goal is to optimize the worst-case performance by minimizing
the maximum dissatisfaction ratio in the final matching. Note that the value of (6.9)
ranges between 0 and 1, where it is 1 when the matching is perfect/stable (i.e.,
U(M) = ∅), and decreases as the unhappiness of the users in the matching grows.
Definition 20 (α-stable matching). A matchingM is said to be α-stable if
max
x∈U(M)
δx ≤ α. (6.11)




W , T Set of workers and tasks, respectively
m, n Number of workers and tasks, respectively
Pi Set of acceptable paths of worker wi
ai Number of acceptable paths of worker wi
ci,j Capacity of path pi,j
Ti,j Set of tasks that reside on path pi,j
qi,j QoS of worker wi for task tj
rj,i Reward offered to worker wi for task tj
Ltj Preference list of task tj
LT Global preference list of tasks in uniform systems
Lwi Preference list of worker wi
M A feasible matching (task assignment)
M(v) Assignment of worker/task v inM
Mu(wi) Set of tasks assigned to worker wi inM
Mp(wi) Path selected for worker wi inM
Mu(tj) Worker assigned to task tj inM
Mp(tj) Path selected for the partner of task tj inM
δx Dissatisfaction ratio of unhappy triad x
U(M) Set of unhappy triads inM
Table 10. Notations used in Chapter 6.
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6.3 Proposed Solution
In this section, we first present an algorithm that finds stable matchings in uni-
form MCS instances. Then, we consider general MCS instances where stable match-
ings may not exist, and propose an approximation algorithm that finds near-optimal
matchings in terms of stability.
6.3.1 Stable Task Assignment in Uniform MCS Systems
In Algorithm 14, we describe our algorithm that finds stable matchings in uniform
systems. In line 1, we initialize the matchingM. Then, we form the global preference
list of tasks according to (6.3) in line 2. In the for loop starting at line 3, we iterate
the workers in LT from beginning to end, and find an assignment for the ith worker
(wh) in LT in the ith iteration. To this end, we first form the preference list L
w
h of
worker wh in line 5. Then, in the for loop starting at line 7, we find the best feasible
task set A′ for each of his acceptable paths ph,j among the tasks that have not been
matched yet. To find the best task set for ph,j, we iterate the preference list of worker
wh in the for loop in lines 9-15, and add the tasks that are on path ph,j and currently
unmatched (line 11) to A′ until we reach the capacity limit ch,j of path ph,j (line 14).
We keep the best task set found so far in A, the index of the corresponding path in
r, and the sum of the rewards offered to worker wh by the tasks in A in s (line 17).
Finally, we match the tasks in A and worker wh with each other (lines 18-20).
Theorem 13. Algorithm 14 always produces a stable matching for uniform MCS
instances.
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Assume the final matching contains an un-
happy triad ⟨wh, ph,j, S⟩. Let T ′i denote the set of tasks that are unmatched in the
beginning of the ith iteration of the for loop starting at line 3, so we have T ′1 = T .
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Algorithm 14: UniformSTA
1 letM(u) = (∅,−) for all u ∈ W ∪ T
2 form LT by (6.3)
3 for i← 1 to m do
4 let wh be the ith worker in LT
5 form Lwh by (6.4)
6 A← {}, s← 0, r ← 0
7 for j ← 1 to ah do
8 A′ ← {}, s′ ← 0
9 for l← 1 to |Lwh | do
10 let tk be the lth task in L
w
h
11 if tk ∈ Th,j andMu(tk) = ∅ then
12 append tk to A
′
13 s′ ← s′ + rk,h
14 if |A′| = ch,j then
15 break
16 if s′ > s then
17 A← A′, s← s′, r ← j
18 M(wh)← (A, ph,r)
19 foreach t ∈ A do
20 M(t)← (wh, ph,r)
21 returnM
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Also, let wh be the kth worker in LT , i.e., the worker that is considered in the kth
iteration. We first note that T \ T ′k is the set of tasks that have been matched before
the kth iteration, and
S ∩ (T \ T ′k) = ∅. (6.12)
That is, S cannot contain any task that was matched before the kth iteration, because
all tasks that were matched before the kth iteration were matched to a worker that
precedes the worker wh in LT . Therefore, the QoS scores of their partners must be
equal to or greater than the QoS score of wh due to (6.2) and (6.3), which contradicts
the unhappy triad definition due to (6.7). Then, by (6.12), we have S ⊆ T ′k, i.e., all
tasks in S were unmatched in the beginning of the kth iteration. However, we match
worker wh with the best feasible task set in T
′






This also contradicts the unhappy triad definition due to (6.8), hence we conclude that
such an unhappy triad cannot exist in the matching produced by Algorithm 14.
As a result of Theorem 13, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 13.1. A stable matching always exists in all MCS instances with a uniform
QoS setting.
Running time. Forming the global preference list of tasks LT in line 2 takes
O(m logm) time. In each iteration of the for loop starting at line 3, we form the
preference list of a worker (line 5) and iterate it once for each of his acceptable paths
(lines 7-17), which respectively take O(n log n) and O(namax) time, where amax =
max1≤i≤m ai. Thus, the overall time complexity of Algorithm 14 is O(mnamax +
mn log n+m logm).
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6.3.2 Stable Task Assignment in General MCS Systems
In Algorithm 15, we present a pseudo-code description of our approximation
algorithm for general MCS systems. In this algorithm, we attempt to match the
tasks with their best preferences, but when we need to choose between the tasks that
want to be matched with a worker due to the capacity or regional constraint (i.e.,
when we reach the capacity limit, or have tasks that are on different acceptable paths
of the worker and hence cannot be matched to the worker at the same time), we
choose a subset of these tasks that, though may not be optimal locally, have the best
potential to yield the maximum total reward for the worker in the end based on the
rewards they individually provide to the worker and the capacity of the corresponding
path of the worker. Below, we first describe the steps of the algorithm, and then prove
that it produces near-optimal matchings in terms of stability.
The algorithm begins by initializing the matching M in line 1, and three key
variables xi, σi and indexk for each worker wi and task tk in line 2. The variable
σi keeps the value of the total reward to be obtained by worker wi in the current
matching, and xi keeps the value of rk,i × ci,j for each worker wi, where rk,i is the
reward offered to worker wi by the task (tk) that has the maximum reward among
the tasks that are currently matched to worker wi, and ci,j is the capacity of the path
pi,j currently selected for worker wi. Thus, both xi and σi are initialized to 0 in line
2. The variable indexk keeps the index of the first worker in L
t
k that was not yet
attempted to be matched to task tk, so it is initially set to 1 for all tasks.
During the execution of the algorithm, all tasks that are currently unmatched
and are not yet attempted to be matched to each worker in their preference lists, i.e.,
∀tk ∈ T :Mu(tk) = ∅ and indexk ≤ |Ltk|, (6.14)
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Algorithm 15: GeneralSTA (W , T )
1 letM(u) = (∅,−) for all u ∈ W ∪ T
2 let xi = σi = 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and indexk = 1 for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n
3 Stack.push(T )
4 while Stack is not empty do
5 tk ← Stack.pop()
6 if indexk ≤ |Ltk| then
7 let wi be the (indexk)th worker in Lk
8 indexk ← indexk + 1
9 A← {}, R← {}, r ← 0
10 for j ← 1 to ai do
11 if tk ̸∈ Ti,j then continue;
12 A′, R′, σ′ ← FindPathOptimal(i, j, k,M)
13 let th be the first task in A
′
14 if rh,i × ci,j > xi or (rh,i × ci,j = xi and σ′ > σi) then
15 xi ← rh,i × ci,j, A← A′, R← R′, σi ← σ′, r ← j
16 if |A| > 0 then
17 letM(wi) = (A, pi,r), andM(t) = (wi, pi,r) for all t ∈ A






Algorithm 16: FindPathOptimal (i, j, k,M)
1 A′ ← {}, R′ ← {}, σ′ ← 0
2 for l← 1 to |Mu(wi)| do
3 let th be the lth task inMu(wi)
4 if th ∈ Ti,j and |A′| < ci,j then
5 append th to A
′
6 σ′ ← σ′ + rh,i
7 else
8 append th to R
′
9 insert tk into A
′ by maintaining non-increasing order of task rewards
10 σ′ ← σ′ + rk,i
11 if |A′| > ci,j then
12 let th be the last task in A
13 remove th from A
′
14 append th to R
′
15 σ′ ← σ′ − rh,i
16 return (A′, R′, σ′)
reside in a stack that is initialized in line 3. In the while loop starting in line 4,
we attempt to match one (tk) of the tasks in the stack with the next worker (wi) in
its preference list (Ltk) until there is no task left in the stack. When we attempt to
match task tk to worker wi, we check each of the acceptable paths of worker wi in
non-increasing order of path capacities (i.e., pi,1, pi,2, .., pi,ai) in the for loop starting in
line 10. During this process, we respectively maintain the task set and the path that
we would like to assign to worker wi after checking each path in the variables A and
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r, and maintain the set of tasks that are currently matched to worker wi, but need to
be removed from his assignment set for worker wi to be able to match with A in the
variable R. For each path pi,j : tk ∈ Ti,j (lines 10-11), we first find the best task set A′
among the tasks inMu(wi)∪{tk} within the capacity constraint of pi,j by running an
algorithm called FindPathOptimal (line 12), which is described in Algorithm 16. We
then choose the task set A′ over the task set A, and update the variables A,R, xi, σi,
and r accordingly (lines 14-15) if one of the following two conditions is satisfied:
• xi increases (regardless of the change in the total reward σi to be collected by
worker wi),
• xi remains unchanged, but σi increases.
Finally, in lines 16-21, if A is non-empty, we match worker wi and the tasks in A with
each other, set the tasks in R free, and push them back onto the stack. Otherwise,
we only push task tk onto the stack.
Theorem 14. Algorithm 15 always produces a κ-stable matching for a general MCS





Proof. We prove this by contradiction as well. Assume that there is a unhappy triad
⟨wi, pi,j, S⟩ in the final matching M produced by the algorithm, which breaks the
κ-stability of the matching. Thus, we must have
∑
tx∈Mu(wi)




We first note that all tasks in S must have been attempted to be matched to worker
wi at some point during the execution of the algorithm, because, by definition of
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unhappy triad (6.7), they must either currently be matched to worker wi, or prefer
worker wi to their current assignments inM. The latter case indicates that worker
wi precedes their current assignments in their preference lists (line 7), thus they have
been attempted to matched worker wi before they ended up getting matched with
their current assignments.
We then note that every time a task that would increase the value of xi (line
14) is being attempted to match to worker wi, it will certainly be matched to worker
wi in that iteration, and increase xi (line 15), which will have the maximum value
possible in the end. Thus, we have
∀te ∈ E : xi ≥ re,i × max
1≤h≤ai
ci,h, (6.17)
where E is the set of tasks that were attempted to matched to worker wi during the
execution of the algorithm. Since S ⊆ E, we have
∀ts ∈ S : xi ≥ rs,i × max
1≤h≤ai
ci,h,
≥ rs,i × ci,j.
(6.18)
Recall that xi = rm,i × ci,g, where (i) rm,i is the reward of task tm ∈ Mu(wi),
which has the highest reward among the tasks inMu(wi), and ci,g is the capacity of
pi,g =Mp(wi). Then, by (6.18), we get
∀ts ∈ S : rm,i × ci,g ≥ rs,i × ci,j. (6.19)
For the condition in (6.16) to hold, we must have
∑
tx∈Mu(wi)





because max{ci,g, ci,j} ≤ κ. If ci,g > ci,j, we would have
∑
tx∈Mu(wi)




rm,i × ci,g <
∑
ty∈S
ry,i (by (i)) (6.21b)
∀ts ∈ S : rs,i × ci,j <
∑
ty∈S
ry,i (by (6.19)). (6.21c)
For the task ts′ with the highest reward in S, (6.21c) yields




which is a contradiction, because S cannot contain more than ci,j tasks due to the
capacity constraint of path pi,j.
On the other hand, if (ii) ci,g ≤ ci,j, we would have
∑
tx∈Mu(wi)




rm,i × ci,j <
∑
ty∈S
ry,i (by (i)) (6.23b)
rm,i × ci,g <
∑
ty∈S
ry,i (by (ii)) (6.23c)
which also leads to a contradiction, as (6.23c) is identical to (6.21b). Therefore, we
conclude that there cannot exist any unhappy triad that violates κ-stability in the
matching produced by Algorithm 15, and it is always κ-stable.
Running time. Algorithm 15 requires to form only the preference lists of the
tasks, which takes O(nm logm) time. During the execution of the algorithm, each
task tk can be pushed on the stack at most |Ltk| ≤ m times, so the while loop starting
in line 4 will iterate O(mn) times. The for loop starting in line 10 will iterate at
most amax = max1≤i≤m ai times, and the most expensive operation in it is running
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Algorithm 16, which has a cost of O(cmax), where cmax = max1≤i≤m ai, as the size of
the assignment setMu(wi) iterated in line 2 of this algorithm cannot be larger than
the maximum path capacity cmax in the given instance. Thus, the worst-case running
time of Algorithm 15 is O(nm logm+ nmcmaxamax).
6.4 Evaluation
In this section, we present the empirical evaluation of the proposed algorithms.
6.4.1 Simulation Settings
For our simulations, we generate an SO-MCS instance in a real environment as
follows. We randomly select n places of interest (PoI) in Lower Manhattan from the
PoI list [97] provided by the City of New York, and create a task at each of these
places. For each (wi) of m workers in the instance, we randomly select two PoIs that
are [2-4] kilometers away from each other from the same PoI set, and use these as their
starting points and destinations. We then get ai ∼ U{4, 6} different routes between
these two PoIs using the Google’s Directions API [98]. We obtain the best (shortest)
path of wi, which has the maximum capacity ci,1 ∼ U{3, 5}, by requesting a direct
route, and obtain the remaining paths by requesting a route with a waypoint at one
of the PoIs located in the smallest circle that encloses the bird-eye route between the
starting point and destination. The capacity of each pi,j of the latter paths is set
as ci,1 − ⌊d/300⌋, where d is the route length difference (in meters) between pi,1 and
pi,j. For each task-path pair (tk, pi,j), we add tk to Ti,j if and only if tk is within 50
meters of any point on pi,j. Lastly, to create a uniform instance, we assign a global
QoS score qi ∼ U{50, 100} to each worker, and let qi,j = qi, ∀tj ∈ T . On the other
hand, to create a general (non-uniform) instance, we simply let qi,j ∼ U{50, 100}
for all worker-task pairs (wi, tj). Task requesters are assumed to be offering rewards
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Fig. 45. Performance of algorithms with varying task counts in uniform MCS instances
(m=30).
proportional to the QoS they will get from each worker, thus we let rj,i = qi,j × bj,
where bj ∼ U(0.2, 1) is the reward to QoS ratio of task tj.
6.4.1.1 Benchmark Algorithms
We compare the proposed algorithms (i.e., UniformSTA and GeneralSTA) with
the following algorithms.
• OprtSTA: This algorithm finds the optimal solution in terms of stability in
opportunistic MCS systems. We transform our semi-opportunistic instances to
opportunistic ones by only considering the shortest path of each worker (which
has the largest capacity). In the resulting instance, a stable matching can be
found by the classic Gale-Shapley [42] algorithm in O(mn) time.
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Fig. 46. Performance of algorithms with varying worker counts in uniform MCS in-
stances (n=100).
• LPR-QoS [38]: This algorithm uses the linear programming relaxation (LPR)
technique, and finds a task assignment for SO-MCS systems based on the solu-
tion of the relaxed version of the integer program that maximizes the total QoS
of the workers assigned to the tasks. We use Google OR-Tools [99] to implement
this algorithm.
6.4.1.2 Performance Metrics
• User happiness ratio: The ratio of the number of unhappy triads to the total
number of triads that can be matched in any feasible matching.
• Worst-case user happiness: This is the value of the objective function defined
168
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Fig. 47. Performance of algorithms with varying task counts in general MCS instances
(m=30).
in (6.9), i.e., the α-stability of the produced matching.





δimax is the dissatisfaction ratio of the unhappy triad that causes the largest
utility loss for worker wi (δ
i
max = 1 if wi does not form any unhappy triads).
We also analyze the average QoS provided to task requesters and the running times
of the algorithms.
6.4.2 Results
We first look at the performance of the algorithms in the uniform instances
with varying numbers of tasks (Fig. 45) and workers (Fig. 46). As expected (due
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to Theorem 13), our UniformSTA algorithm always achieves perfect user happiness
scores, and greatly outperforms the benchmark algorithms. Moreover, it achieves to
deliver a comparable average QoS score with the LPR-QoS algorithm. On the other
hand, the OprtSTA algorithm mostly produces task assignments with the lowest
user happiness scores, despite considering the user preferences during the matching
process. This is because it disregards the alternative paths of workers along with
the additional matching options they provide, and thus demonstrates the advantage
of semi-opportunistic sensing over opportunistic sensing. However, with increasing
task counts, we observe a notable decrease in the ratio of unhappy triads in the
matchings produced by the OprtSTA algorithm, as each worker is likely to have
more assignment opportunities on their optimal path (i.e., only path considered in
opportunistic sensing), hence is less likely to form unhappy triads with the tasks
on their alternative paths. We observe the exact opposite of this for the LPR-QoS
algorithm, because this algorithm does not consider worker preferences whatsoever,
and consequently produces task assignments with more unhappy worker-task pairs
as the number of tasks in the instance increases, and it ends up disregarding worker
preferences over a larger set of tasks.
In Fig. 47 & 48, we look at the results on the general (non-uniform) MCS in-
stances, which clearly show the superiority of our GeneralSTA algorithm over the
other algorithms in terms of user happiness, particularly in terms of worst-case user
happiness. On the other hand, in this setting, our algorithm provides slightly lower
average quality of sensing than LPR-QoS algorithm. Also, in both uniform and gen-
eral MCS instances, the QoS scores achieved by all algorithms generally grow with
increasing worker density, as tasks are more likely to get assigned to a worker when
there is a larger number of workers in the instance.
Next, we analyze the performance of the algorithms with varying ranges of al-
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Fig. 48. Performance of algorithms with varying worker counts in general MCS in-
stances (n=100).
ternative path counts (ai − 1) and path capacities (ci,1) in Fig. 49. We observe that
our GeneralSTA algorithm generally has a stable performance, and maintains its su-
periority in terms of user happiness regardless of the changes in these parameters.
The performance of the OprtSTA algorithm is usually worse when workers have more
alternative paths (and a higher task performing capacity on these paths), because, in
these scenarios, the OprtSTA algorithm ends up failing to take advantage of a larger
number of assignment possibilities created by alternative paths.
Finally, in Fig. 50, we present the running times of the algorithms on uniform
instances (this is to show the results for all four algorithms) with different worker-
task counts. We note that the LPR-QoS algorithm has an excessive running time,
which is a few orders of magnitude larger than that of the other algorithms. On the
171
2 3 4 5 6





























3 4 5 6 7





























Fig. 49. User happiness (n=80, m=30) with varying path counts and capacities.
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Fig. 50. Running times of algorithms with varying worker/task counts.
other hand, the OprtSTA algorithm has the shortest running time despite its poor
performance in terms of user happiness and average QoS in most settings. Lastly, our
algorithms have a comparable running time, with the GeneralSTA algorithm being
slightly faster.
6.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have introduced the preference-aware task assignment prob-
lem in a semi-opportunistic mobile crowdsensing setting. We have formally defined
the requirements for preference-awareness (or user happiness), and shown that it is
not possible to generate a perfectly preference-aware task assignment that satisfies all
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users in some instances. We have studied the problem in a system model with uniform
worker qualities as well as in a non-restricted model, and presented an exact and an
approximation task assignment algorithm, both with a polynomial-time complexity,
for these models, respectively. Results of the simulations, which are performed on
instances using real routes from Google Maps, have shown that the proposed algo-
rithms achieve to produce task assignments with significantly larger user happiness
scores compared to the benchmark algorithms.
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CHAPTER 7
PREFERENCE-AWARE MAXIMUM SYSTEM UTILITY TASK
ASSIGNMENT
7.1 Introduction
In most of the studies in the MCS literature, the objective in the task alloca-
tion process is set as finding a maximum system utility (e.g., number of completed
tasks, quality of completed tasks, time needed to complete given tasks) assignment,
and user preferences are overlooked. However, users may not want to sacrifice their
individual convenience for the system utility, and thus such task assignments may not
be appealing to users (i.e., both task requesters and workers) and impair their future
participation. On the other hand, satisfying user preferences perfectly may make
it impossible to achieve a maximum system utility assignment (e.g., the number of
matched users may decrease in preference-aware task assignments).
We illustrate this trade-off between user happiness and system utility through
an example MCS scenario with 5 tasks and 5 workers shown in Fig.51a, which will be
referenced throughout this chapter to describe the problem and proposed solutions
for convenience. We assume that workers have some serving region and they are only
eligible for the tasks in that region. The preference orders of the workers and the
task requesters are also provided in Fig.51b (we will talk about how users define their
preferences in Section 7.2). A matching that satisfies all users based on their prefer-
ences in the sense that they cannot claim to have deserved a better assignment than
their assigned partners can be found via the well-known Gale-Shapley algorithm [42].
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Fig. 51. An MCS scenario with 5 workers and 5 tasks, which are respectively denoted
by numbers and letters. (a) Task and worker locations on the map (work-
ers eligible to perform a task is connected with an edge to that task); (b)
corresponding bipartite graph with the preference lists (from left to right)
of workers and tasks; (c) a stable matching that leaves 4 and b unassigned,
yielding a lower system utility; and (d) a task assignment that maximizes the
system utility but yielding unhappy users (shown with dashed edges).
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size, but there is only one in our example which is shown in Fig.51c. Thus, any other
matching will make at least two users unhappy. On the other hand, the issue with this
matching is that it leaves a worker (4) and a task (b) unassigned and hence diminishes
the system utility. However, the foremost objective of a reasonable platform would
be to maximize its own utility by assigning as many tasks as possible (as in Fig.51d),
since it is typically paid a brokerage fee for each assignment it makes. Yet it is for the
platform’s own benefit to also take the preferences of users into consideration and aim
to decrease the number of unhappy users with their assignments, because a user that
continuously gets unhappy with his assignments is likely to abandon the platform at
some point, which might have a more significant and permanent detrimental effect
on the system utility.
Therefore, the platform should aim to find the matching with the minimum
number of unhappy pairs (i.e., a worker-task pair preferring each other more than their
current partners) without sacrificing from its own utility. For example, a matching
that also achieves the maximum system utility, but with only one unhappy pair is
possible in the given scenario; thus, the platform should try to produce this matching
instead of the one given in Fig.51d, which contains 4 unhappy pairs. In this chapter,
we address this problem of finding a maximum size task assignment with as few
unhappy pairs as possible, which turns out to be NP-complete, and propose two
polynomial time heuristic algorithms. Our key contributions are listed below:
• We formulate the user satisfaction aware maximum utility task assignment prob-
lem, and describe an Integer Linear Programming (ILP) model to solve it opti-
mally.
• We propose a method that reduces the user unhappiness in a given task assign-
ment without affecting the system utility (or the size of the assignment), and
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another method that improves the system utility in a given task assignment
in a way that causes as little increase in user unhappiness as possible. Then,
we present two different polynomial-time task assignment algorithms based on
these two new methods.
• We perform extensive simulations using a real data set, and show that our




LetW = {w1, w2, . . . ,wn} denote the set of |W| = n workers and T = {t1, t2, . . . ,tm}
denote the set of |T | = m tasks in the system. Also, let cij denote the cost8 of as-
signing worker wi to task tj and rj denote the reward of completing the task tj. We
assume that workers are rational, hence they do not perform a task if its cost is higher
than the reward of the task. The set of eligible tasks that worker wi can perform are
defined as:
E(wi) = {tj|rj ≥ cij, ∀j ∈ [1, . . . ,m]} (7.1)
As workers aim to increase the profit from the tasks they complete, they prefer the
tasks with higher rj − cij value. We use tj ≻wi tj′ notation to express that wi prefers
tj to tj′ , which happens when rj − cij > rj′ − cij′ .
8Note that cost can be defined with a complicated function that considers the
worker’s traveling and task completion duration due to spatiotemporal constraints,
energy consumption on the worker’s device due to sensing, and privacy risks to the
worker. Similarly, reward can be defined based on several factors such as the quality
of sensed data and the trustworthiness of the users.
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The task requesters cannot also hire a worker if the cost of hiring that worker is
more than the reward the requester can provide (which could also be considered as
the budget of the requester). The set of eligible workers that can perform the task tj
is then similarly defined as:
E(tj) = {wi|rj ≥ cij, ∀i ∈ [1, . . . ,n]} (7.2)
Similarly, the task requester can have preferences on the eligible set of workers. For
example, if the cost of assigning a worker to a task is dependent on the traveling
distance from the worker location to the task location [100, 101], the task requester
may prefer the workers who have less cost, as they indicate quicker arrival of the
worker to the task location and early completion of the task. It could also be a
totally location-independent cost function and the preference of the task requester
can be determined by other factors such as the quality of the sensed data the worker
can provide. Given the eligibility relations, the corresponding undirected bipartite
graph G = (V,E) can be defined as
G.V =W ∪ T
G.E = {(u, v)|u, v ∈ G.V, u ∈ E(v), v ∈ E(u)}
(7.3)
Lastly, we use wi ≻tj wi′ notation to express that tj prefers wi to wi′ , and we assume
that the preference list of a user u is the ordered list of E(u) in which a more favorable
candidate precedes the less favorable ones, and is denoted by Pu. The notations used
throughout this chapter are summarized in Table 11.
7.2.2 Problem Formulation
Given the set of eligible workers for each task and eligible tasks for each worker,
the platform can assign the tasks to the workers with some optimization goal. An as-
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Notation Description
W , T Set of workers and tasks, respectively.
n, m Number of workers and tasks, respectively.
N max{m,n}.
M Matching between workers and tasks.
M(u) Task/worker assigned for user (worker/task) u.
U(M) The set of unhappy pairs in matchingM.
|U(M)| Unhappiness Index (UI).
E(u) Eligible tasks/workers for worker/task u.
|E| Average eligible task/worker size.
Pu Preference list of user u.
cij Cost for worker wi to perform task tj.
rj Reward of completing task tj.
wi ≻tj wi′ Task tj prefers worker wi to worker wi′ .
G = (V,E) Bipartite graph between workers and tasks.
Table 11. Notations used in Chapter 7.
signment aiming to maximize the system utility9 can be obtained by constructing the
corresponding maximum bipartite matching instance between workers and tasks, and
solving it using the Hungarian [102] algorithm or the Ford-Fulkerson [103] method.
Similarly, an assignment aiming to satisfy users with their assignments can be ob-
tained using the deferred acceptance mechanism in the Gale-Shapley algorithm [42].
However, achieving both may not be possible at the same time, and there is a trade-off
9Since we assume that the platform is paid a brokerage fee for each assignment it
makes, this refers to the number of worker-task pairs assigned.
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between system utility and user satisfaction.
Let M = {(wi1 , tj1), . . . ,(wik , tjk)}, k ≤ min{m,n} denote the set of (worker,
task) pairs assigned to each other depending on the task requirements and worker
skills. We denote the task assigned to a worker w in a matching M by M(w). We
sayM(w) = ∅, if w is not matched inM. Analogously, we denote the user assigned
to a task t byM(t).
In order for a matchingM to be stable it should not admit any unhappy (i.e.,
blocking) pair ⟨w, t⟩ such that t ∈ E(w), w ∈ E(t), and
• t ≻w M(w) and w ≻tM(t), or
• t ≻w M(w) andM(t) = ∅, or
• w ≻tM(t) andM(w) = ∅, or
• M(w) = ∅ andM(t) = ∅.
If M, however, contains such pairs, we say that M is unstable and denote the set
of unhappy pairs in M by U(M). The number of unhappy pairs, |U(M)|, (which
we also call as unhappiness index (UI)) in a matching has been a recognized way of
measuring the instability of the matching [62].
In Section 7.1, the instance in Fig. 51 is used to show that there can be a trade-
off between system utility and user satisfaction, which are respectively measured by
the number of assigned users and UI. In order to quantify the loss in system utility
and user satisfaction, respectively, in stable matchings and maximum system utility
matchings in general, we run a series of experiments with 50 workers and 50 tasks
randomly deployed in a 1 km by 1 km region. Eligibility conditions for workers and
tasks are defined in two ways. In the local case, we assume that each worker can only
travel up to a distance with travel cost less than the task reward and a worker prefers
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Max System Utility - Local
Max System Utility - Random
Fig. 52. Percentage of decrease in the number of assigned workers/tasks in stable
matching compared to maximum system utility matching (upper) and un-
happiness index in maximum system utility matching (lower) with varying
size of eligible worker/task sets in the local and random settings.
the task closer to the worker’s location and vice versa. In the random case, since each
user may have a distinct and unique set of criteria to determine the eligibility, we
randomly decide the eligible user sets. We then obtained the task assignments with
maximum system utility and stable matching procedures for eligibility sets of different
density (obtained by adjusting the rewards in the local case and the probability of
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eligibility in the random case).
Fig. 52 shows the unhappiness index obtained with maximum system utility
matching and the percentage of decrease in the number of assigned workers and tasks
in stable matching (MSM) compared to maximum system utility matching (MMM),
which can formally be defined as
100× |MMM | − |MSM |
|MMM |
. (7.4)
For all results in this and the following sections, we take the average of 100 differ-
ent runs for statistical significance. We observe that up to 17% more users are left
unassigned with stable matching, while maximum system utility matching yields a
massively larger unhappiness index (i.e., by definition, the unhappiness index is 0 in
stable matching). Although one can carefully use the appropriate algorithm in the
extreme cases (e.g., stable matching when all workers are eligible for all tasks, and
maximum system utility matching when only a few workers are eligible for each task
provided that small number of unhappy pairs is acceptable), neither algorithm pro-
vides efficient results for most scenarios. In Fig. 53, the same trade-off is also obtained
for different ratios of worker and task ratios with an average eligible worker/task size
of 3. The highest decrease in the number of unassigned workers/tasks by stable
matching is observed when the ratio is 1, where we see the minimum unhappiness
index obtained by maximum system utility matching.
In this study, we aim to address this trade-off and develop a task assignment
algorithm that reaches the maximum possible system utility (i.e., number of matched
workers/tasks) while satisfying the users as much as possible, thus minimizing the
unhappiness index. A brute force method to solve this problem would be to enumerate
all maximum cardinality matchings, and pick the one with the smallest unhappiness
index. However, this would be too costly since the number of maximum cardinality
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Max System Utility - Local
Max System Utility - Random
Fig. 53. Percentage of decrease in the number of assigned workers/tasks in stable
matching compared to maximum system utility matching (upper) and un-
happiness index in maximum system utility matching (lower) with different
ratios of worker and task set sizes. We use an average eligible worker/task set
size of 3 with the total number of tasks and workers fixed at 100.
matchings grows exponentially with the number of nodes. Moreover, this problem can
be reduced to the problem of finding a maximum cardinality matching with minimum
number of blocking pairs, which is proven to be NP-complete [62], even when the size
of eligible worker/task sets is 3.
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7.3 Proposed Solution
In this section, we first model the problem using Integer Linear Programming
(ILP) to find the optimal solution for a given set of tasks and workers with their
restrictions and eligibility. Then, we present two different heuristic-based cost-efficient
solutions.
7.3.1 ILP Model
Our objective is to find a maximum size matching between workers and tasks











Xij ≤ 1 ∀j (7.6)
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∀j
Xij ≤ 1 ∀i (7.7)















1, if (wi, tj) is an unhappy pair
0, otherwise
(7.11)
Note that the number of unhappy pairs can be at most mn. Increasing the
assigned pair count by one will increase the value of objective function (7.5) more
than removing all unhappy pairs. Thus, it produces an assignment with maximum
system utility, then reduces the unhappiness index as much as possible.
7.3.2 Maximum to Stable Reduction Algorithm
Our first algorithm initially finds a maximum system utility matching, and then
attempts to decrease the number of unhappy pairs in it one by one without altering
the total utility of the matching. Before elaborating on the algorithm steps, we first
describe happify procedure, which constitutes the core part of the algorithm.
7.3.2.1 Happify Procedure
The purpose of the happify procedure is to get rid of a specific unhappy pair
by re-matching the worker and the task that form it with each other. Consider the
example in Fig. 54a, in which worker 1 and task a form an unhappy pair, denoted by
⟨1, a⟩. We happify ⟨1, a⟩ by matching 1 with a. In order to maintain the utility of the
matching, we also attempt to match their former partners, b and 2, with each other
(and form the matching M′). Yet this is not always feasible, because b and 2 may
be considering each other unacceptable (i.e., 2 ̸∈ E(b) and b ̸∈ E(2)). In this case,
since leaving b and 2 unmatched would decrease the utility of the matching, we avoid
performing the happify procedure on such pairs.
On the other hand, even if b and 2 consider each other as acceptable, happifying






























Fig. 54. An instance of happify procedure. (a) the initial matchingM; (b) the match-
ingM′ after happifying the unhappy pair ⟨1, a⟩ inM; (c) 1’s preference list,
P1; (d) 2’s possible preference list, P
′
2; (e) 2’s alternative preference list, P
′′
2 .
Ri’s are defined in (7.12).
the number of unhappy pairs can decrease, remain unchanged, or even increase. To
figure that out, we need to check the preference lists of these four nodes, and identify
the nodes in their preference lists, which can be potentially affected by partner change.
To illustrate this, we will analyze the possible scenarios that can arise after happifying
⟨1, a⟩. Since the relationship between the tasks and workers is symmetric as seen in
Fig. 54a, 1 and a will have similar scenarios, as do 2 and b. Therefore, the examination
of scenarios for nodes 1 and 2 should be sufficiently descriptive.
First of all, since ⟨1, a⟩ is given as an unhappy pair, we can deduce that a ≻1
(M(1) = b). Then, we divide P1 (i.e., preference list of worker 1 on eligible tasks in
E(1)) into regions as R1 ∪ {a} ∪ R2 ∪ {b} ∪ R3 such that
(∀x ∈ R1) ≻1 a ≻1 (∀x ∈ R2) ≻1 b ≻1 (∀x ∈ R3) (7.12)
as illustrated in Fig. 54c. Note that the partner change of 1, from M(1) = b to
M′(1) = a, will result in clearing all unhappy pairs in
{⟨1, x⟩ | x ∈ R2, ⟨1, x⟩ ∈ U(M)}, (7.13)
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if any, because for all x ∈ R2, a ≻1 x. The set of other unhappy pairs formed as
{⟨1, x⟩ | x ∈ R1, ⟨1, x⟩ ∈ U(M)} (7.14)
will remain unchanged inM′, as ∀x ∈ R1, x ≻1 (a =M′(1)). Lastly, there cannot
exist any unhappy pairs
{⟨1, x⟩ | x ∈ R3} (7.15)
in neitherM norM′, since (b =M(1)) ≻1 x and (a =M′(1)) ≻1 x, for all x ∈ R3.
Although we know how a and b are ranked in P1, we do not have any data to infer
that for P2. Therefore, we must consider both possibilities, namely P
′
2 if a ≻2 b and
P ′′2 if b ≻2 a, which are also partitioned into regions as shown in Fig. 54d and Fig. 54e.
Note that, regardless of P ′2 or P
′′
2 , happifying ⟨1, a⟩ will not affect the unhappy pairs
in
{⟨2, x⟩ | x ∈ R1, ⟨2, x⟩ ∈ U(M)}, (7.16)
so that they will still be present inM′, and
{⟨2, x⟩ | x ∈ R3, ⟨2, x⟩ ∈ U(M) ∪ U(M′)} = ∅, (7.17)
due to the same reasons pointed out above. As for R2, we face two different scenarios.
Considering P2 = P
′
2, since happifying ⟨1, a⟩ forces 2 to match with b, which it prefers
less than its former partner a, a new set of unhappy pairs
{⟨2, x⟩ | x ∈ R2, 2 ≻xM′(x)} (7.18)
will arise inM′. Contrary to this, matching 2 with b is for the benefit of 2 if P2 = P ′′2
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and will indirectly happify all the unhappy pairs, if any, in
{⟨2, x⟩ | x ∈ R2, ⟨2, x⟩ ∈ U(M)}. (7.19)
We next show how the set of unhappy pairs in M and M′ are related. Let
U denote the subset of unhappy pairs in M that will be happified and M′ be the
resulting matching. The set of unhappy pairs, which were not present inM, however
will arise inM′ is
UN =
{
⟨x, y⟩ ̸∈ U(M) | y ≻xM′(x), x ≻y M′(y)
}
, (7.20)
and the set of unhappy pairs that were found inM, but will disappear inM′ is
UO =
{
⟨x, y⟩ ∈ U(M) | M′(x) ≻x y orM′(y) ≻y x
}
. (7.21)






Thus, to find the new set of unhappy pairs, U(M′), we need to identify UN and
UO, for which we just need to check whether the users (i.e., x) whose partners have
changed due to the happify procedure form an unhappy pair with those (i.e., y) who
are betweenM(x) andM′(x) in Px. Note that only the users that are in at least one
of the pairs in U will get matched with a different user. Thus, for each worker w and
task t, for whichM(w) ̸=M′(w) andM(t) ̸=M′(t) (i.e., there are at most 4 of them
within a single round of happify procedure), we need to check at most |T | − 2 and
|W| − 2 worker-task pairs to find U(M′), respectively. Thus, each happify operation
has O(N) complexity, where N = max{m,n}.
The proposed algorithm aims to reduce the number of unhappy pairs greedily











































































Fig. 55. Some possible happify attempts that can occur in Phase 2. Unhappy pairs
are shown with red dotted lines.
unhappy pair that reduces the total number of unhappy pairs the most when it gets
happified (if possible), and happify it. However, it is possible that none of the happify
operations at the current iteration is able to reduce the unhappy pair count as the
result of hitting a local minimum. To address this, we introduce a hop-based approach
and give chance to reduction in the unhappy pair count up to k consecutive happify
operations. That is, even though the happify operation that results in the minimum
unhappy pair count increases the current unhappy pair count, the process continues
up to k tries expecting that there will be a decrease.
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Algorithm 17: Maximum to Stable Reduction (W , T , k)
Input: W , T , k: Set of workers, set of tasks, and number of hops
1 M← Find a maximum cardinality matching between W and T .
2 U(M) ← Identify the unhappy pairs inM.
3 Mbest ←M
4 for i← 1 to 2 do
5 if i == 2 then
6 j ← k
7 else
8 j ← 1
9 while j > 0 do
10 M′ ← ∅ ; ▷ |U(M′)| =∞
11 S ← {A ⊆ U(M) : |A| = i}
12 for U ∈ S do
13 forMnew ∈ Happify(M, U) do
14 if |U(Mnew)| < |U(M′)| then M′ ←Mnew
15 if |U(M′)| < |U(Mbest)| then
16 j ← k
17 Mbest ←M′
18 else





Algorithm 18: Happify (M, U)
Input:M: A matching between W and T
U : The set of unhappy pairs to be happified
1 LetMS be the set of all matchings that can be obtained by happifying the
unhappy pairs in U (as shown in Fig. 54 & 55).
2 foreach µ ∈MS do
3 Find UN and UO by Eq. 7.20 & 7.21.
4 |U(µ)| = |U(M)|+ |UN | − |UO|
5 returnMS
Another consideration is rather than happifying the unhappy pairs individually,
we can happify them in groups simultaneously. In that case, former partners of
nodes comprising the unhappy pairs will have more options to be matched. For
example, Fig. 55 shows some possible re-matchings of former partners for different
cases observed when two unhappy pairs are happified simultaneously. While this
extension will increase the likelihood of reducing the unhappy pair count without
affecting the matching utility at each iteration, it increases the complexity of the
algorithm due to more permutations to be checked.
In order to address all these points, we propose a phased approach. That is,
we begin by considering unhappy pairs individually in the happify procedure, and
when this fails to provide further improvement, we start to happify them in groups of
two (it can also be extended to groups of three or more). However, with the phased
approach, we consider the hop-based happify operations only for the last phase to
avoid hitting the local minimum earlier. Algorithm 17 shows a two-phase instance
of the proposed solution. The phases are iterated by the for loop in line 4. The
algorithm makes use of a subroutine, happify, that takes a matchingM and a set U
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of unhappy pairs inM as input and returns the set of all possible matchings that can
arise by happifying U . A pseudo-code of the happify procedure is given in Algorithm
18.
Maximum to Stable Reduction algorithm, shown in Algorithm 17, begins with
finding a maximum utility (i.e., cardinality) matchingM. In the first phase (i = 1),
we find the best matching,M′, amongst a set of matchings, each of which is obtained
fromM by happifying a single, different unhappy pair in U(M) (i.e., the set S in line
12 consists of the subsets A of unhappy pairs with size 1). We updateMbest, which
denotes the best matching that is ever reached by the algorithm, ifM′ is better than
Mbest. Note that since all the matchings that are scanned by the algorithm are of
maximum utility, the goodness of a matching depends only on the number of unhappy
pairs it has. The same process is then repeated for the new matchingM′ in the same
manner as long as an improvement in the number of unhappy pairs is observed in at
least one of k consecutive steps. Note that in the first phase, k is set to 1 as explained
above. In the second phase (i = 2), our algorithm tries to relax two unhappy pairs
simultaneously (happify in line 13 returns all possible variations). If no improvement
is achieved in the unhappy pair count in k hops, the algorithm terminates.
Example. We provide a sample run of Algorithm 17 on the instance in Fig. 51 to
demonstrate how it gradually decreases the number of unhappy pairs while preserving
the maximum system utility. Firstly, a maximum matching is found, which, as shown
in Fig. 56a, turns out to have 4 unhappy pairs, namely ⟨1, a⟩, ⟨2, c⟩, ⟨3, d⟩, and ⟨5, c⟩.
We try to happify each of these unhappy pairs individually and find the one that
leads to a better matching when happified. The new set of unhappy pairs that could
be obtained by happifying each unhappy pair is given in Table 12.
Note that we cannot happify ⟨1, a⟩ and ⟨3, d⟩, because their current partners




































































Fig. 56. Steps of running Algorithm 17 on the instance given in Fig. 51. (a) the ini-
tial maximum matching; (b) the best matching reached by the end of the
first phase; (c) the best matching ever found by the algorithm, also an op-
timal solution; (d) happifying ⟨2, c⟩ on the matching in (a); (e) happifying
{⟨1, a⟩, ⟨3, d⟩} on the matching in (b).
Table 12. Matchings to be obtained by happifying each unhappy pair in Fig. 56a.
Unhappy pair U(Mnew)
⟨1, a⟩ cannot be happified
⟨2, c⟩ ⟨1, a⟩, ⟨3, d⟩
⟨3, d⟩ cannot be happified
⟨5, c⟩ ⟨1, a⟩, ⟨2, c⟩, ⟨3, a⟩, ⟨3, d⟩
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unacceptable, therefore, we skip these unhappy pairs. Since the matching obtained
by happifying ⟨2, c⟩ has the minimum number of unhappy pairs among all, we proceed
with it (Fig. 56b) to the second phase (any further attempt in phase 1 would not
decrease the unhappy pair count, as neither ⟨1, a⟩ nor ⟨3, d⟩ can be happified due
to partner incompatibility as above). In the second phase, since there are only two
unhappy pairs in the matching, we will have only one subset of unhappy pairs of size
2 that we will, if possible, happify simultaneously, which is {⟨1, a⟩, ⟨3, d⟩}. Indeed,
these two unhappy pairs, which could not be happified separately, can be jointly
happified as in Fig. 56e. Besides, this yields a matching with just one unhappy pair,
⟨5, e⟩, as shown in Fig. 56c, which, having less than 2 unhappy pairs, cannot be
improved furthermore by the second phase. Even if we run the first phase again on
this final matching, it would make no difference since ⟨5, e⟩ cannot be happified due
to partner incompatibility. Actually, this final matching is identical to the optimal
solution found via ILP, and is the only optimal solution possible.
Running time. Let E be the number of eligible pairs in a given matching instance,
and N = max(m,n). In line 1, we can find a maximum size matching in O(NE) time
using the Ford-Fulkerson method [103]. Then, for the first phase, since the loop
starting in line 12 may iterate at most E times, as the number of unhappy pairs in
any matching is at most E, and the computation of the benefit that can be obtained
by happifying each unhappy pair takes O(N) time (see Section 7.3.2.1), the time
complexity of the first phase of our algorithm is O(NE2) or O(N5). Similarly, the
time complexity of the second phase is O(B3N), where B is the number of unhappy
pairs in the final matching produced by the first phase. By using an extra O(N2) space
to store the benefits of happifying each unhappy pair and updating these benefits after
each happify procedure in constant time for N2−4N pairs that are indirectly affected
by the last happify procedure and in O(N) time for 4N pairs that are directly affected
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by the last happify procedure (i.e., the pairs whose partners have changed), we can
reduce10 the time complexity of the first phase to O(N4). Using the same strategy,
we can also reduce the time complexity of the second phase to O(B2N) by using an
extra O(B4) space (to store the benefit of happifying every pair of unhappy pairs).
However, this may not be practical for large MCS instances, as B can be as large as
N2.
7.3.3 Stable to Maximum Convergence Algorithm
In our second algorithm, we propose a reversed approach. That is, we first obtain
a stable matching, where every user is perfectly happy. Then, we update it iteratively
to obtain an assignment with maximum system utility while keeping the number of
unhappy pairs as low as possible. We find paths with certain properties in the given
bipartite graph (7.3) at every step that will increase the number of assigned pairs
with respect to the current assignment. We simply call these paths beneficial paths.
Given a matching M in a given bipartite graph G, a path p = {p1, p2, . . . p2j+2} is
considered a beneficial path if its both endpoints are not matched with any node in
M, and its edges alternate between the edges inM and the other edges not included
M. More formally,
M(p1) = ∅, i.e., (p1, p2) ∈ G.E \M,
M(p2j+2) = ∅, i.e., (p2j+1, p2j+2) ∈ G.E \M,
M(p2i) = p2i+1, i.e., (p2i, p2i+1) ∈M, ∀i ∈ [1, . . . , j]
M(p2i−1) ̸= p2i, i.e., (p2i−1, p2i) ∈ G.E \M. ∀i ∈ [1, . . . , j]
(7.23)
10I would like to thank Dr. Preetam Ghosh for suggesting this method to improve
the time complexity of the proposed algorithm.
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Algorithm 19: Stable To Maximum Convergence (W , T )
Input: W : The set of workers
T : The set of tasks
1 M← Find a stable matching via Gale-Shapley algorithm between W and T .
2 while true do
3 set all t ∈ T as unvisited
4 foreach unmatched w ∈ W do
5 p = {w}
6 p← FindBeneficialPath(p)
7 if p.isBeneficialPath then
8 break
9 if a beneficial path p = {p1, p2, .., p2j+2} is found then
10 for i← 1 to j + 1 do
11 M(p2i−1) ← p2i




By definition, note that there cannot be a beneficial path of even length, and for a
path p = {p1, p2} of length 1 to be beneficial, both p1 and p2 should be unmatched
inM.
The proposed algorithm is given in Algorithm 19. We first find a stable matching
M between the given workers and tasks using the deferred acceptance mechanism in
Gale-Shapley algorithm [42]. Then, in each iteration of the while loop in line 2, we
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Algorithm 20: FindBeneficialPath(p)
Input: p: Current path
1 w ← p.last() ; ▷ last node on current path
2 foreach t ∈ Pw in the preference order do
3 if M(t) = ∅ then
4 p← p ∪ {t}
5 p.isBeneficialPath ← true
6 return p
7 foreach t ∈ Pw in the preference order do
8 if t is unvisited then
9 set t as visited
10 p′ ← FindBeneficialPath(p ∪ {t,M(t)})
11 if p′.FindBeneficialPath then
12 return p′
try to find a beneficial path p inM. If we find one, we updateM as follows
M← (M\ E(p)) ∪ (E(p) \M), (7.24)
where E(p) is the set of edges in p. Note that in a beneficial path p of length 2j + 1
(with 2j + 2 nodes), there are j edges that are inM, and j + 1 edges that are not.
Thus, replacing the former j edges inM with the latter j + 1 edges will increase the
system utility by 1, which is performed between lines 9-12. However, if we cannot find
a beneficial path, it means M has reached the maximum possible assignment [103]
and will be returned as the final matching.


















































Fig. 57. Two example beneficial paths (shown with dotted lines) in the initial stable
matching (shown with solid lines) generated in the first line of Algorithm 19
when it is run on the example illustrated in Fig. 51. (a) Beneficial path
(4 → e → 5 → b) found by Algorithm 19; (b) An alternative beneficial path
(4 → c → 2 → e → 5 → a → 1 → d → 3 → b) that could be found if the
search was done without considering preference orders; (c) Matching obtained
by Algorithm 19 using the beneficial path shown in (a). The only remaining
unhappy pair is shown with a dashed line.
from each worker w not matched currently inM, we attempt to find a beneficial path
(lines 4-8 in Algorithm 19). If w can be matched directly with an unmatched task in
Pw, a beneficial path of length 1 is obtained immediately (lines 2-6 in Algorithm 20).
Otherwise, the tasks that are currently matched inM are processed in their preference
order. For each such task t, a new potential path is created by extending the current
path with task t and its partnerM(t), and the same process is repeated recursively
(lines 7-12 in Algorithm 20).
We run Algorithm 19 on the same toy example given in Fig. 51. We first obtain
the stable matching given in Fig. 57a. Then, we look for a beneficial path in this
matching. The process in Algorithm 20 finds the beneficial path 4 → e → 5 → b
(of length 3). Executing the lines 10-12 in Algorithm 19 will result in the opti-
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mal solution (with an unhappiness index of 1 caused by (5,e)) shown in Fig. 57c.
Since this matching is maximum, Algorithm 19 will return it as the final match-
ing. However, note that there can be multiple beneficial paths in the initial stable
matching, as illustrated in Fig. 57, and any of them might be returned first based on
the implementation. For example, assume this time that we find the beneficial path
4 → c → 2 → e → 5 → a → 1 → d → 3 → b. It gives us an assignment with an
unhappiness index of 4, and hence is not an optimal solution. In our implementation,
we visit the neighbors greedily in their preference order to find a beneficial path that
causes as little increase in the unhappiness index as possible.
Running time. Gale-Shapley algorithm that is executed in the first line of Algo-
rithm 19 runs in O(E) time, where E is the number of eligible pairs in the matching
instance. There can be at most O(N) cardinality difference between a stable matching
and a maximum matching in a bipartite graph, where N = max(m,n). Since find-
ing a beneficial path, as well as updating the matching accordingly, has O(N + E)
complexity (as we need to visit every edge at most once), the total running time of
Algorithm 19 becomes O(N2 +NE) or O(N3).
7.4 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithms using a
real world dataset.
7.4.1 Simulation Settings
In order to have a realistic set of user locations, we have used a taxi trip
dataset [81] in a city (i.e., New York City (NYC)) similar to previous work [29,
80, 104]. Previous work mostly consider taxi driver locations as workers and assign
task locations randomly. In order to have more realistic task locations as well, we
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have used the pick up locations of passengers as task locations. Specifically, we gen-
erate the user set for each of the 100 runs of an experiment by selecting the taxis that
dropped off their passengers between 1-2 pm on a randomly selected day in 2015 as
workers at the corresponding drop-off locations, and by creating a task at the pick
up location of each passenger who requested a taxi in the next hour of the same
day. Then, from this set we randomly sample a certain number of workers and tasks
according to the experiment specifications.
In the first part of the simulations, we use 50 workers and 50 tasks as smaller
and equal set sizes represent the hardest scenario. This is because, as it is shown
in Fig. 53, the largest difference in the matching cardinality between stable and
maximum system utility matching happens when |W|/|T |=1. That is, the trade-
off between user satisfaction and system utility becomes more important and harder
to handle when the size of the worker and task sets are equal. Nonetheless, in the
following simulations, we also examine the scenarios with different |W|/|T | ratios.
Moreover, we provide results regarding the scalability of proposed algorithms with up
to 1000 workers/tasks. The preference lists of workers and tasks are defined either
locally (i.e., based on the ascending order of distances) or randomly, as described in
Section 7.2.
7.4.2 Results
We first look at the effectiveness of the proposed approaches by comparing them
with ILP results in terms of unhappiness index. Throughout the section, we use the
notation Phx-Hopk to denote the Maximum to Stable reduction algorithm with x
phases in which the first (x−1) phases run only 1 hop and the xth phase runs up to k
hops. Fig. 58 shows the performance comparison of Ph1-Hop1, Ph2-Hop1, Stable to
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Fig. 58. Performance comparison of the heuristic algorithms with optimal results (ILP)
and maximum system utility matching in terms of unhappiness index (UI) in
the local (upper) and random (lower) settings, respectively.
Max and Max System Utility11 algorithms with ILP results in the local and random
settings, respectively. First of all, note that, as expected, the unhappiness index in the
initial maximum matching grows linearly with increasing average eligible worker/task
set size (simply denoted as |E|). Ph1-Hop1 algorithm gives a very close result to ILP,
and Ph2-Hop1 can further improve the result. The improvement is, however, more in
the random setting. Stable to Max algorithm also performs differently. It performs
better (i.e., fewer unhappy pairs) than other algorithms in the random setting, while
it results in a greater unhappiness index in the local setting. With larger |E|, it
11It refers to the solution found by the Ford-Fulkerson method [103].
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Fig. 59. The impact of number of hops and different phases on the performance of the
Maximum to Stable Reduction algorithm in the local (upper) and random
(lower) settings, respectively.
also performs better in the local setting and always reaches complete perfect user
satisfaction and stability (an unhappiness index of 0). The maximum gap between
the proposed algorithms and the ILP results occurs with |E| around 10-20 and gets
smaller as it increases or decreases.
Next, in Fig. 59, we look at the impact of the number of hops and different phases
on the performance of the Maximum to Stable reduction algorithm variants in both
local and random settings. Note that, in the local setting, the unhappiness index in
the optimal assignment increases until |E| is 15 and then starts to decline, while it
peaks at around 4-5 in the random setting. Besides, a sharper decrease is observed
after the peak in the random setting compared to the local setting. The results of
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Fig. 60. The change in the unhappiness index (in Ph1-Hop#) with different number
of hops in the local (upper) and random (lower) settings, respectively, for
different eligible worker/task sizes (|E|).
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Fig. 61. Running times of the proposed algorithms.
our algorithms are also in accordance with these trends in both settings.
As for the usefulness of Phase 2 or 3, we observe that more phases offer more
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Fig. 62. The difference in the unhappiness index between ILP and Ph2-Hop1 for dif-
ferent number of workers/tasks ratios.
benefit in the random setting compared to the local setting. However, there is not
much benefit in running Phase 2 (or Phase 3) before the peak in neither setting.
This is because the likelihood of finding a set of unhappy pairs that can be happified
simultaneously is quite low when |E| is small given that happifying multiple unhappy
pairs at the same time necessitates that the current partners of the nodes forming
those unhappy pairs have each other in their eligibility lists.
Note that we also run a special version called Only Ph2-Hop5 in which Phase 2
is directly run by skipping Phase 1. This was to show the benefit of phased approach
as it can provide results as good as Only Ph2-Hop5 with a much less running time
than it (as it is shown in Fig. 61). Another point is that the difference between the
performance of same phases with different number of hops is more profound in the
random setting than it is in the local setting. In fact, as it is shown in Fig. 60, running
the algorithm with higher number of hops reduces the unhappiness index by 1.12 per
hop in the random setting and by only 0.52 per hop in the local setting, on average.







































































































Fig. 63. The ratio of the unhappiness index (UI) to N = |W| = |T | in Ph1-Hop1 and
Stable to Max algorithms, respectively, for different number of workers and
tasks (in the local and random settings, respectively). The inner graphs show
the difference of UI/N in Max System Utility matching from the compared
algorithms when N = 1024.
a certain point (around 5-10 hops) in either setting.
In Fig. 61, we compare the running time of the proposed algorithms in the local
setting (since the results are almost identical in the random setting, the corresponding
figure is not shown here for brevity). Unsurprisingly, ILP has a very long running time
(e.g., approximately an hour when |E| = 50), which makes it infeasible to find the
optimal solutions for applications that demand timely response. The running time
of Only Ph2-Hop5 also increases substantially as the average eligible worker/task set
size, |E|, grows, which actually confirms the idea behind phased approach. Indeed,


















































































Fig. 64. The percentage of the unhappiness index in the Ph1-Hop1 and Stable to Max
algorithms, respectively, to the unhappiness index in the maximum system
utility based assignment for different number of workers and tasks (in the
local and random settings, respectively).
to Max algorithm take less than 4 seconds even when all workers are eligible for all
tasks. It should also be noted that the running time is not much affected by number
of phases and hops. For example, Ph1-Hop1 and Ph2-Hop1 take almost equal time
despite the fact that Ph2-Hop1 involves Ph1-Hop1 in it and additionally runs Phase
2 of the algorithm. This is due to the fact that the large part of the reduction in the
number of unhappy pairs occurs during Phase 1. For instance, in Fig. 58, when the
average number of eligible workers is 10 in the local setting, Phase 1 decreases the
number of unhappy pairs by around 155 (from 185 to 30), while Phase 2 decreases it
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by only about 2 and hence takes a lot less.
In Fig. 62, we analyze the performance of the proposed algorithms when there
are unequal number of workers and tasks in the system. Specifically, we calculate
the difference between the unhappiness index in the optimal (i.e., ILP) matching and
in the final matching produced by Ph2-Hop1 (others perform similar). We observe
that the difference in the unhappiness index gets smaller as the disparity between
the number of workers and tasks grows12. This is also consistent with the results
in Fig. 53, since the decrease in system utility is maximum when there are similar
number of workers and tasks, which indicates that a larger number of users’ happiness
will have to be sacrificed in order to reach the maximum system utility, in general.
Next, we look at the scalability results using both a Maximum to Stable algo-
rithm and Stable to Maximum algorithm. More specifically, we have used Ph1-Hop1
algorithm in local case (as it performs better than Stable to Maximum as shown
in Fig. 58) and Stable to Maximum algorithm in random case. Fig. 63 shows the
ratio of the unhappiness index to the total number of workers/tasks (N) for differ-
ent but equal number of workers and tasks with Ph1-Hop1 and Stable to Maximum
algorithms. The results show that the proposed algorithms scale very well and pro-
duce only a few additional unhappy pairs per user for larger networks, and that they
greatly outperform the Max System Utility matching by achieving up to more than
300 less unhappy pairs per user. Moreover, as shown in Fig. 64 when we calculate the
percentage of the unhappiness index compared to the unhappiness index in the Max
System Utility matching, we obtain a similar percentage regardless of the number of
workers and tasks with Stable to Maximum algorithm. With Ph1-Hop1 algorithm,
the percentage shifts a bit with increasing user count, however the peak stays similar.
12For unequal number of tasks and workers, there is a limit on the maximum average
eligible worker/task set size achievable. Thus, data is available up to this maximum.
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It is also worth noting that as the average eligible worker/task set size, |E|, increases,
we achieve a better performance in both scenarios.
7.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we studied the problem of finding a maximum size task assign-
ment that satisfies workers and task requesters as much as possible based on their
preferences. Since it is an NP-hard problem, we proposed two different heuristic algo-
rithms. In the first one, we initially find a maximum size (or system utility) matching,
and then reduce the unhappy pairs in it through a novel method called happify. In
the second algorithm, however, we first obtain a stable matching, and then transform
it into a maximum system utility matching by finding what we call beneficial paths
and reassigning the workers and tasks on these paths accordingly. The results have
shown that the proposed algorithms run very fast compared to the ILP-based fully
optimal solution, produce near-optimal task assignments, and complement each other
in different settings. Note that the findings of this study can be applied to any match-
ing problem, in which the goal is to maximize both system utility and happiness of




In this dissertation, we have studied the preference-aware task assignment problem in
various MCS settings, and explored how the conditions for preference-awareness (or
user happiness) are affected by the characteristics of the underlying system model.
Due to the nonexistence of optimal solutions and/or hardness of the problem, we have
proposed efficient approximation and heuristic algorithms, which we have shown to
produce near-optimal solutions through theoretical and empirical analysis.
Empirical results have shown that compared to the preference-aware solutions,
task assignments that are obtained by disregarding user preferences make a larger
number of users unhappy with their assignments even if they maximize a system-
level utility function, and that satisfying user preferences does not necessarily yield
a task assignment with a poor system-level utility score. In fact, as we have seen in
Chapter 4, our algorithms, which are designed to maximize user happiness, achieved
better coverage quality scores in most cases than the benchmark algorithms, which
were exclusively designed to maximize coverage quality. This was partly because
of the fact that our algorithms, by satisfying the coverage-based preferences of task
requesters, implicitly maximize the overall coverage quality as well.
We note that the results of this dissertation, especially those presented in Chap-
ter 3 & 4, are of vital importance for various theoretical preference-aware matching
problems in the economics literature as well. For instance, despite the nonexistence
results in general settings, this dissertation is the first to show that, in many-to-one
matching problems with additive utility functions, a pairwise stable matching always
209
exists and can be found in pseudo-polynomial time when there is a proportional rela-
tionship between the cost and utility functions. This dissertation also provides some
significant theoretical results on coalitional stability for both additive (Chapter 3)
and non-additive (Chapter 4) utility functions.
There are however still many open problems waiting to be solved in the field of
mobile crowdsensing, especially concerning preference-awareness in the task assign-
ment process. For instance, a key aspect that has been overlooked so far is the benefit
of cooperation between workers. In MCS systems with non-trivial tasks, it may be
the case that two workers who cannot carry out a certain task individually can do
so if they are both assigned to the task and work in a cooperative manner. There-
fore, their total utility for the task would be larger than the sum of their individual
utilities. Additional costs, however, may need to be incurred to make them work
cooperatively, which need to be considered in the assignment process, along with the
potential benefits to be reaped. This is similar to the assignment problem with non-
additive utility functions studied in Chapter 4, but a major difference is that the total
(coverage-based) utility of two (or more) workers for a task in the model considered
in Chapter 4 cannot be larger than the sum of their individual utilities.
In the online, preference-aware task assignment problem studied in Chapter 5,
we assume a system model with uniform task rewards and worker qualities. If an
MCS system contains different types of non-trivial tasks, this assumption may lose
its practicality. In future work, we would like to extend the results of this study by
considering a more general system model.
Another interesting problem is to find preference-aware task assignments in an
MCS system that contains both participatory and opportunistic workers. From the
perspective of task requesters, it may be desirable to first hire opportunistic work-
ers to minimize costs, and then to hire participatory workers to maximize coverage.
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However, this would have to be done considering their budget or capacity constraints
as well as the preferences of workers.
In Chapter 7, we have studied the problem of finding maximum size (coverage)
task assignments with minimum user unhappiness. This is a special case of the prob-
lem of finding maximum weight task assignments with minimum unhappiness. The
latter, general version of the problem has the potential to capture a wider range of
MCS applications, as it would enable the platform to assign different priorities to each
worker-task pair. Besides, in this chapter, we have made the simplifying assumption
that the system utility is independent of the happiness of the users. However, con-
tinuous participation of users, which is critical in long-term system utility, naturally
depends on the happiness of the users with the system. Thus, a new metric that
accounts for this interdependency between system utility and user happiness can help
formulate the problem more accurately.
In this dissertation, we have always assumed a system model with rational and
reliable participants. However, there may be, for example, workers who are trying
to spread misinformation by submitting fabricated data. When the possibility of
having such malicious users are taken into consideration, user preferences may become
uncertain. We have also assumed that the sets of workers and tasks were known to
the matching platform before the sensing campaign actually starts. Yet for many
real-world application, a more realistic model would allow users to join and leave the
system, and allow task requesters to publish new tasks and withdraw some of their
existing tasks in real time during the campaign. Lastly, we note that it is possible
to improve the long-term efficiency of the proposed algorithms by forming the task
assignments for an assignment period by modifying the assignments in the previous
task assignment period(s) instead of creating a new task assignment from scratch in
each assignment period. This has a potential to largely reduce the total running time
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of the proposed algorithms, especially in MCS applications, where user preferences
do not change significantly between consecutive assignment periods. We plan to
investigate these issues in our future work.
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